Bhagyanagar India Ltd - Copper Recycling Play

@rocketman But Bhagyanagar is planning to raise ₹150 crore, which is quite significant compared to its current equity base of around ₹250 crore. Management has indicated that the proceeds will be used for a mix of working capital and capex requirements.

Considering that historically the company has not been able to materially improve working-capital efficiency despite strong revenue growth, and also considering that the proposed capacity expansion itself is only around 28%, does this really appear to be an efficient capital-allocation decision from the perspective of a new investor — especially after the sharp run-up in the stock price?

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  1. Yes, they are planning to raise 150 crore, but nothing has been officially announced yet. So the extent of dilution is difficult to estimate at this stage, better to wait for the announcement.
  2. In copper and gold businesses, the working capital cycle is usually not a major concern.
    Inventory is liquid and debtor days are under a month. A better metric to track here is RoCE, which is steadily improving.
  3. On capex, quantity of capacity isn’t the only variable, the quality of capacity matters a lot too. That 28% increase, if it is largely value-added capacity, which seems likely, could translate into strong bottom-line growth.
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The supply side of the copper market in 2026 looks like a slow-motion train wreck. Existing mines in chile, indonesia, drc, panama are either being shutdown/scaled down or the quality of ore is steadily declining. New mines (even if found today) will take years to operationalize.@RocketMan has already provided a lot of information on this subject.
While the supply is teetering, demand is only growing through utilities, cable-makers, hyperscalers and all kinds of infra expansion. We have recently smashed past 15 years of copper price highs

Where will price go from here is anyone’s best guess. To my mind the only thing which can break this upward trajectory is another recession. But predicting a commodity price and recession are not my cup of tea. In fact, this is my first time playing a commodity upcycle. Let me make one thing clear, there is no shortage of copper at this time. But copper demand is rising by 2% annually while supply is being disrupted. Increased price has triggered copper replacement measures but that is a temporary solution.

Bhagyanagar sits at the heart of copper play. It is a backward integrated copper recycler situated near Hyderabad. Below are my concall notes:

current capacity at 35000 MTPA, 59% revenue coming from value added products which reflect in ~4% ebitda margins. They have around 500 clients resulting in low customer concentration. fy26 revenue is at ATH of 2378 crores, ebitda 106 cr and pat 50 cr. Despite west asia war they have delivered a strong q4 meaning their supply chain is quite diversified. Total equity has jumped from 193 to 257 cr through retained earnings. WC has increased from 157 to 230 cr inline with revenue uptick. Debt has reduced. fy25 volume was 18000 metric tonn which has increased to 24000 metric tonn. This along with increase in copper price has hit record high revenue. future growth to come from EV, power and renewable. BIL already supplies to key players in these sectors. They get a lot of plastic, aluminium along with copper scrap and they wish to recycle this as well. Estimated investment of 10 cr will be done for this. future outlook of 5% ebitda margins with 5000 cr revenue by 2030. 20% volume growth predicted for fy27 meaning 29000 metric tonn. 40 crores will be spent in next 2 years for capex. existing land can support upto 4 times of existing capacity.
scrap dependence is only 5% on gulf countries, 35% on america, 7-8% each on brazil, canada, europe, australia. shipping lines have been disrupted due to west asia war (I think utilization may dip with further disruption). No shares are pledged with banks currently. No plans to enter lead recycling.

BIL is looking into EPR and not yet started. expected small stream of revenue in current year. Entry of bigger players like adani, hindalco into recycling is a challenge going forward. ebitda per ton stands at 62000 rs which is among highest in the industry. The real estate within company has a book value of 29 cr which is under-reported by a factor of 10 at least. Real estate assets breakdown is:
4 acres in nacharam, 4.5 acres in upal and 5 acres in hardware park. too soon to comment on development of real estate entity which will be demerged.

business will take some hit in q1fy27 but still better YoY. Company looking at fundraise of 150 cr this year. Below are the valuations for fy26:
PE - 18x
PB - 3.5x
EPS - 15

My take is pretty simple here. Bhagyanagar is currently trading at a pe of 18 times. If one looks at the peers they are trading >30 times. Also, the book value of the company is severly depressed. They have land around Hyderabad which is being valued at the paltry sum of 29 crores. On a conservative note the value of this land should be 300 crores at least. They have one of the highest ebitda per ton in the industry and they are pure play for copper with 40 years of experience in the industry. Peers are distracted with recycling of other metals like lead, aluminium etc. Assuming if copper price are flat for fy27 BIL will still report 20% volume growth which makes this an undervalue play by all metrics.
So why market is nervous to re-rate this company? I think the real value unlocking may happen post demerger but keep in mind stock price already quadrupled in fy26.

Major risks to BIL as I see are only two. Either we are hit with global recession in which case BIL may be least of my concern or scrap supply disruption from America. You could consider some other risks like management execution, increased competition.

Also, kudos to @RocketMan for asking some very prudent questions in concall and great due diligence overall. I would like to know your strategy post demerger if possible. Would you keep both entities or sell BIL (real estate + windmills business) to invest back in Tieramet Limited (copper entity)?

Disc: invested at recent levels. Will accumulate if price falls further.

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Nicely summarized. Would like to add a few thoughts on how I’m approaching it.

First things first, forecasting commodity prices is not my cup of tea, so having a sense of the underlying trend is good enough for me. After studying copper for some time, it’s quite clear that copper is in a structural uptrend driven by both demand and supply dynamics. That said, it’s never going to be a one-way ride, commodities are inherently volatile, and I expect the same here as well.

Earlier, I was playing this theme through Sunlite Recycling, but after reading more, I realized that value addition is extremely important. You cannot rely purely on commodity sales. When you are supplying OEMs with value-added products, those sales tend to be recurring in nature, and demand is relatively inelastic to smaller fluctuations in copper prices. In contrast, commodity sales such as rods or cathodes can be highly opportunistic, with intense competition.

That’s why I shifted my position to Bhagyanagar. I realized that value addition takes time and requires meaningful capex. If you look at the balance sheet, Bhagyanagar already has ~200 crore of gross block, largely plant & machinery, which supports the argument that for a commodity player to transition into value-added products, the process will likely be slow and capital intensive.

On the other side, even companies already selling value-added products won’t find backward integration into scrap easy. For example, Precision Wires is undertaking ~240 crore capex for scrap backward integration, that’s a serious amount of money, money Bhagyanagar doesn’t need to spend. So it’s not a flip-the-switch process for value-added players either. It requires serious capital, and even after that, you still need to build a global sourcing network which takes it own time. Look what happened with Jain Resource in Q4, its copper EBITDA/tonne crashed to ~13,000 because it was doing commodity sales and was overly dependent on the Gulf region for scrap sourcing.

So we have a fairly unique setup here, and a lot of it is not fully captured on the balance sheet, which makes it even more attractive from a value-investor’s perspective.

Now, coming to what was asked regarding the 200 crore asset value, that is only the circle rate of the real estate. The actual market value is likely several multiples higher. Of course, none of this matters if those assets remain idle, but management has clearly indicated that one of the land parcels alone could generate ~400 crore of free cash flow. So I do see meaningful value here. I may continue holding that piece as well, depending on the market cap at which it eventually gets listed.

As pointed out earlier, the biggest risk remains a global recession, which I completely agree with, no demand means no growth. One also has to remember that China accounts for ~50% of global copper consumption, and its domestic real estate market is still in a bear phase, which can keep copper prices softer for longer.

That said, Bhagyanagar’s FY26 realization was only ~956/kg, while current copper prices are around 1,330/kg, so from a near-term pricing perspective, there doesn’t seem to be much to worry about over the next year.

And finally, every thesis remains just a thesis until management actually executes. None of us can forecast that with certainty. But considering all the variables at hand, the risk-reward appears quite attractive.

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very well written and the only anti-thesis point here is i think global recession and also in a meaningful way because slowdown won’t be much of a problem i guess as the priority capex will go on and AI capex won’t stop and this AI capex have ripple effects through which demand here would not be affected in a slowdown. only recession will be bad for the company but that too won’t last long.

I have more examples on limitation of screeners adding to what I shared in sg mart thread

In december 2025, promoter had pledged roughly 5% of shares with mcx for hedging purpose. Exchanges wrongly reported this as stake sale. Out of the blue all screener tools started reporting 96% of shares as pledged. Even today screener shows 6% shares as plegded and stake sale of 5%. Both of these claims are denied by the promoter. While some small portion was sold in March for personal use, it is nowhere near the 5% being reported. I have already shared my views on book value being severly depressed. Imagine owning ~14 acres of land near Hyderabad and accounting it at 29 cr only. I am pointing these things out because I used to blindly apply pledged percentage = 0 query condition while filtering stocks in screener. And unless some analyst clarifies this in concall, AI would miss it as well.

While BIL themselves are at fault for above misunderstandings, bottomline remains that screeners are not reliable way to filter stocks.

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Yup, I too realized this a long time back, so the only screens I use are market cap based.

I have removed all other conditions.

On pledge, 4-6% is pledged to mcx as a collateral for hedging purposes.

GST Notice - https://www.bseindia.com/xml-data/corpfiling/AttachLive/b6e2212c-54ec-4f0c-8a7c-1248d764bcf0.pdf

Sharing some original insights on this. When I was invested in Sunlite Recycling, I noticed multiple GST-related cases in the annual report, so I had a telephonic conversation with the management to understand the dynamics.

The promoter explained why this happens. Basically, copper scrap passes through multiple dealers before reaching the company, and since it’s scrap, it sometimes moves through unregistered dealers as well. This creates mismatches in the GST ITC chain, which eventually gets flagged by the department, after which notices are sent to everyone involved in the chain.

Listen to the MD of International Copper Association India, he explained how the industry faces GST issues due to the multiple handling of scrap → https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O89RhJnmY64

This is very common in the industry, one can look at the filings of other copper recyclers to verify.

For ex → https://nsearchives.nseindia.com/corporate/SUNLITE_27072025155113_Gst_Order_update.pdf

Most of the times, such order are set aside and charges are dropped → https://nsearchives.nseindia.com/corporate/SUNLITE_23022026102351_GST_Order_Outcome.pdf

What happens in this case should not be much different, but that said, one must always keep an eye on it.

Nothing here is a recommendation or advice. This is just an insight based on my experience, which I think adds value to the discussion.

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Recently, I found that the promoters also have another company, Bhagyanagar Magnesium, which manufactures magnesium components for automotive, aerospace & defence.

This business is not part of the listed entity. Whether it gets merged into the listed company at some point or remains separate, I have no idea, but it looks interesting, so sharing.

Bhagyanagar Magnesium.pdf (5.0 MB)

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https://youtu.be/ZaA4cMntGUU?si=GgqcB5O46W3bDDs1 Very recent management interview

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If anyone can clear the doubt or has their own thesis on the following take.

How come Bhagyanagar operating margin hovers around just 4.5% with 62% value additions contributing to its revenue in FY26 & higher Ebitda/ton as compared to Jain recycling whose value additions are going to get commissioned later in this year & yet enjoys a higher operating margin with 6% ?
Its baffling to know what kind of streamline process or technology does Jain possess which helps them achieve superior margin on just basic copper commodity sales.

Reply from management to this exact question at 14:12, highly recommend you watch the interview linked above by @sreejithc1989

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Because you are looking at wrong metric.

Jain has 3 verticals, copper, lead and aluminium

Margins are different across the verticals.

Ebitda/tonne per verticcal, is the correct metric.

Jain sits a value chain lower than Bhagyanagar.

It’s copper ebitda/tonne guidance (from recent con-call) is 30,000.

You can cross-check this via it’s balance sheet, total plant and machinery across all the vertical is only 66 crore, it’s pure recycling commodity business with no forward integration (as of now).

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Interesting observation.

I was watching this video and got curious about ultrasonic welding. It doesn’t seem like an easy process, so I did a bit of digging:

“Bhagyanagar India Limited produces highly efficient solar absorber fins using technology transferred in 2006 from CSIR–National Aerospace Laboratories (NAL). The company employs ultrasonic welding to create a flawless, high-conductivity bond between oxygen-free copper tubes and solar fins.”

Also, learned, company uses this tech to manufacture solar fins, and is 100% source to V-Guard. (info. from network, not verified personally).

Anyways, not that important in the broader context, just something interesting I stumbled upon.

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Found this interesting article on Bhagyanagar. Bhagyanagar India: Riding The Copper Supercycle

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that video didnt clear the margin anamoly.
but I digged deeper to what @RocketMan said and found the data.

Jain is mainly into 3 types of recycling:

  • Copper & copper ingots
  • Lead & lead alloy ingots
  • Aluminium & aluminium alloys
  • Others (Very minimal)

If we take Fy24,25 & 26 - revenue contribution & OPM for each segment is as follows:

  • Copper & copper ingots
    FY24 = 1928.2 Cr(43.5% rev.) @ 3.7% OPM
    FY25= 3193.9 Cr (49.7%) @ 3.3% OPM
    FY26= 5261.5 Cr (55.1%) @ 3.7% OPM

  • Lead & lead alloy ingots
    FY24 = 2076.2 Cr(46.5% rev.) @ 7.9% OPM
    FY25= 2811.9 Cr (43.7%) @ 8.3% OPM
    FY26= 3818.3 Cr (40%) @ 8.9% OPM

  • Aluminium & aluminium alloys
    FY24 = 271.8 Cr(6.1% rev.) @ 5.4% OPM
    FY25= 273.2 Cr (4.3%) @ 9.3% OPM
    FY26= 371 Cr (3.9%) @ 7.1% OPM

So blended margin of JAIN is somewhere around 6%.
But considering only copper business of JAIN which currently has very minimal value addition v/s BHAGYANAGAR’s 62% value addition as contribution to its topline = a mere difference of just 100-130 Bps approx (considering bhagyanagar would be earning a tad higher ebitda but blended margin comes down to 4.5% or 80 bps more to JAIN’s) is worth to ponder upon.

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You are focusing on wrong metric.

Focus on Ebitda per tonne not margins.

In lastest con-call Jain has given guidance of 30,000 for copper.

Bhagayanar is at 62,000.

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This is where you are missing the point.

Copper is a high value commodity unlike lead and aluminium.

So a “mere” 150bps is where the magic happens.

Always look at ebitda/ tonne (ex inventory gains)

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I think in copper recyling business we should look at Ebitda/Ton instead of just looking at margins as pointed out by @RocketMan because according to my understanding copper price as compared to lead and aluminium is expensive as much as 5x-6x, so a mere 1% margin difference translates to a massive bottom line figures. If you look at FY26 figures of Jain, their copper ebitda/ton was ~ 36K while Q4 was ~ 14K. Also in recent interview BIL’s management mentioned that a large chunk of their profit roughly 25/kg is a fixed fabrication charge for the engineering work. This means they are much better protected from sudden LME price crashes compared to a pure smelter relying entirely on refining spreads. Meaning 25000 EBITDA/ton is kinda fixed.

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