1 - Why is govt / CERC bent on market coupling though there isn’t evidence of significant gain?
Like you said there is no rational reason for doing this given the economic surplus even in handpicked data and conflicting shadow pilot reports and CERC stance. Optics of Monopoly seems bad, but again given IEX has no pricing power, so there is no case for abuse of dominance, which is typical ground to go after monopolies. One could speculate on possible reasons which have made the government go after other businesses in the past but they add no value to current discussion. Legally IEX has strong ground to litigate against these reforms and delay implementation. What stance Supreme Court takes and how soon this reform actually gets implemented is judgement call.
2 - What are your views on the impact of IEX volumes when market coupling is implemented?
Big traders like PTC who are also co-promoters of some exchanges will definitely move the volumes as soon as coupling is implemented and impact can be in the range of 30%.
3 - Would a power trader use IEX competitor for DAM while on IEX for RTM?
A lot depends upon how this gets implemented. Rival exchange would demand for interoperability of margins across different exchanges. But doing this would generate systemic settlement risks and fall under Payment and Settlement Acts 2007 which in turn would require RBI oversight and regulation. EU has a system of Central Counterparties/Shipping Agents which settle trade among themselves while traders keep their margin at one exchange. However in EU this is a necessity because of different countries/regulators being involved and doesn’t make sense in Indian context as such and again would require coordination with different set of regulators. As long as margin interoperability is restricted switch from IEX would be irrational for most users.
4 - After market coupling what in your view are the moats that would still last?
Coupling as envisaged by CERC if implement would impact moats/powers as follows:-
Cornered Resource - Severely Negative as proprietary algo shifts to Grid India
Network Economies – Severely Negative as price discovery moves to Grid India
Switching Costs – Negative as users get same price across exchanges, some conservative users might still stick with IEX given bigger Settlement Guarantee Fund
Scale Economies – Negative as reduced volumes available to amortize fixed costs, per unit profit comes down
Brand – No impact due to coupling, demonstrated history of reliability and trust.
Process Power – Minimal impact due to coupling, changes to bid format etc may limit IEX innovation but IEX has grown the market over 2 decades to institutional knowledge of customer needs and system limitation remains untouched.
Counter Positioning – NA
The judgement call that investors have to make is whether CERC can actually implement market coupling as envisaged. In EU even when economic surplus was meaningful, it took almost 2 decades of regulatory effort to couple the market, can CERC with no meaningful economic surplus implement the coupling?