Fedbank Financial Services Ltd (Fed-fina)

Fedbank Financial Services (FEDFINA) is shaping up to be a solid, dependable player in the Gold and MSME lending space in India. The company focuses on keeping asset quality tight, growing through two clear business lines, and building a platform that can scale without losing control. After a heavy restructuring phase from Q3 FY25 to Q1 FY26, FEDFINA seems to have settled back into rhythm.

Key Investment Thesis:

  • De-risked balance sheet: Transitioned from 16% unsecured exposure (FY25) to sub-1% (Q2 FY26)
  • Twin-engine momentum: Gold loans (36% of AUM, 36% growth) and secured mortgages (54% of AUM, 22% growth)
  • Capital allocation discipline: Debt-equity ratio decreased from 4.03 (FY25) to 3.78 (Q2 FY26); ~150 gold branches expansion underway
  • Credit cost stabilization: Guidance of 100 ± 10 bps maintained; management overlay strategies yielding results
  • Operational leverage phase: Cost-to-income improved 136 bps sequentially to 56.9%; branch productivity acceleration post-expansion
  • Regulatory positioning: AA ratings from all three major agencies; well-positioned for evolving NBFC guidelines

SECTION 1: COMPANY GENESIS & EVOLUTION (1995-2010) - THE FOUNDATION YEARS
Origin & Early Phase (1995-2010)

Incorporation & Initial Setup (April 1995)

Fedbank Financial Services Limited was incorporated as a Kerala-based entity in April 1995. For its first 15 years, the company remained relatively dormant, with limited operational scale and focused presence in Kerala markets.

NBFC License & Commencement of Operations (August 2010)

  • RBI granted NBFC (Non-Banking Financial Company) license in August 2010
  • Company commenced operations post-license with a clear strategic mandate from Federal Bank (parent)
  • Initial focus: Mortgage sourcing for Federal Bank and gold lending operations
  • Regulatory classification: NBFC-ND-SI (Non-Deposit Taking, Systematically Important)

Strategic Partnership Foundation:

Parent Support & Positioning

Federal Bank’s 61.7% ownership stake provided:

  • Operational infrastructure and technology backbone
  • Cross-sell opportunities for home loan customers
  • Credit enhancement through parent bank’s relationships
  • Funding access at favorable rates through parent bank channels

SECTION 2: NBFC TRANSFORMATION & INFANCY PHASE (2010-2015)

Scale-up Period Characteristics

Business Model Genesis (2010-2015)

  • Sourcing Model: Originated loans for Federal Bank’s retail portfolio
  • Direct Operations: Built branch infrastructure for direct mortgage and gold loan sourcing
  • Product Focus: Two-product strategy - mortgages and gold loans
  • Geographic Strategy: Concentrated in Southern states (Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh)

Development Metrics - The Infancy Years

Operational Achievements (FY10-FY15)

  • Built foundational credit infrastructure for mortgage underwriting
  • Established gold loan valuation and security framework
  • Developed collection systems for secured lending
  • Achieved breakeven operations by FY12
  • Stabilized asset quality with GNPA < 1.5%

Constraints of the Period

  • Limited profitability due to dependence on parent bank for sourcing
  • Technology investments lagged peer institutions
  • Management bandwidth stretched across multiple initiatives

Valuation metrics remained conservative due to limited scale

SECTION 3: FOUNDATION PHASE & SCALE STRATEGY (2015-2019)

Pre-Strategic Investment Period (FY16-FY18)

Business Model Transition

  • Shift from pure sourcing partner to direct retail lender
  • Development of proprietary underwriting frameworks
  • Investment in distribution infrastructure independent of parent bank

Key Operational Developments (FY16-FY19)

FY16-FY18 Achievements

  • GNPA controlled at 1.0-1.5% despite scaling
  • Gold loan productivity improved through branch specialization
  • Mortgage book quality enhanced with selective underwriting
  • Operating expenses stabilized at 5.7% of AUM
  • ROA maintained at 1.7-2.0% range

Competitive Positioning (FY16-FY19)

  • Emerged as regional player in South India
  • Built reputation for asset quality in secured lending
  • Technology adoption lagged larger HFCs
  • Limited presence outside South/West regions

SECTION 4: STRATEGIC INFLECTION POINT - TRUE NORTH PARTNERSHIP (FY19), The True North Investment (November 2018)

Investment Structure & Valuation

  • Investor: True North (Leading Indian mid-market PE fund)
  • Stake: Significant minority investment (~25-30%)
  • Valuation: Implied post-money valuation of INR 1,200-1,400 crores
  • Investment thesis: Scaling secured MSME lending play with Pan-India distribution opportunity

Strategic Rationale for Partnership

Immediate Post-Investment Changes (FY19-FY20)

  • New management appointments with true MSME lending experience
  • Aggressive branch expansion programme initiated
  • Technology platform modernization accelerated
  • Geographic diversification strategy formalized
  • Capital raising strategy implemented

FY19 Financial Snapshot (Post-Investment)

SECTION 5: SCALE-UP PHASE & ACCELERATION (FY20-FY22)

Post-True North Strategy Execution
FY20: Foundation of Rapid Expansion

FY21: Momentum Continuation

SECTION 6: DELIVERY & MARKET RECOGNITION PHASE (FY23-Q3FY24)

FY23: Profitability Achievement

FY23 Operational Metrics

  • Branches: 575 (+60 from FY22)
  • Employees: 3,570 (+715 from FY22)
  • AUM per branch: INR 157 crores (from INR 120 in FY22)
  • Disbursements per branch: INR 187 crores (from INR 145 in FY22)

Credit Rating Milestones - FY23

  • January 2023: CARE Ratings upgraded to AA (from AA-)
  • Marked company entry into AA-rated NBFC cohort

SECTION 7: KEY QUARTERLY EXECUTION DELAYS POST IPO
H1 FY24 (Apr-Sep 2023) - Normalization Phase
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Journey: Company demonstrated pricing power and market acceptance of mortgage + gold dual model

Q1 FY25 (Apr-Jun 2024) - Post-IPO Momentum

Q1 FY25: Early Signs—Asset Quality Deterioration and Operational Strain

  • Unexpected Delinquencies: The company experienced a sharp rise in credit costs, hitting 1.2% (120bps) annualized, well above guidance of 80bps. This was driven mainly by early delinquencies in the mortgage portfolio, with gross non-performing loans (GNPL) in mortgages rising to 3% from 2.2% sequentially. The percentage of 1-day past due loans (1 DPD) climbed from 7.4% to 8%, indicating systemic stress.​
  • Collections and Infrastructure Deficit: The surge in delinquencies was not purely macro-driven. Management later acknowledged that its collections infrastructure, especially for ST LAP, had not kept pace with loan book growth. Processes and field force proved inadequate for the granularity and geographical depth of newer originations.​
  • Business Mix Misalignment: A strategic push on new originations and distribution expansion (e.g., gold branches and ST LAP) occurred before process, technology, and collections capacity were fully scaled. This “growth-through-capacity” strategy exposed operational bottlenecks when stress emerged in granular lending.
  • Market Environment: While the company cited general election and heatwave disruptions, these events only exacerbated deeply rooted process weaknesses rather than being the root cause.

Q2 FY25 (Jul-Sep 2024) - Stress Indicators Emerge

Q2 FY25: Escalation—Provisioning, Cautious Disbursal, and Conservatism

  • Management Response to Stress: In Q2, management took a more conservative stance, slowing disbursals within ST LAP and focusing on collections and portfolio management over loan book growth. This decision was made despite headline improvements in 1 DPD and 30 DPD, as underlying customer cashflows and environment had not improved.​
  • Elevated Provisions and Overlay: Additional discretionary ECL provisions were made (INR 22 crore overlay), reflecting the need to “get ahead of the curve” before annual risk model refreshes. This pushed the cost of credit higher, with management conceding that full-year credit costs would overshoot earlier guidance (now 90–100bps+ expected).
  • Branch and Opex Pressure: 46 new branches were added to support gold/ST LAP ambitions, increasing cost-to-income to 58.6%. These upfront investments further weighed on profitability just as income from newly opened branches had not yet stabilized.
  • Root Cause—Customer Profile and Economics: The principal drivers of stress were stagnant or declining real incomes for the underbanked, self-employed target segment—exacerbated by expense inflation and flat business recovery post-COVID. The segment’s cashflow volatility required far more intensive collections and risk screening than was in place.

Q3 FY25 (Oct-Dec 2024) - Crisis & Restructuring

Q3 FY25: Climax—Restructuring, Management Change, and One-Time Clean-Up

  • Leadership Transition: Parvez Mulla replaced Anil Kothuri as Managing Director mid-November 2024, reflecting the Board’s intent to pivot swiftly to risk containment and operational discipline.​
  • Aggressive Balance Sheet Clean-Up:
    • Elevated provisioning: INR 75.5 crore one-time provision for deep NPA pools and overlays for delayed resolutions.
    • Full annual ECL refresh to reset PD/LGD models for all buckets.
    • Assignment/derecognition of large unsecured business loan books (770+ crore), both to ringfence new originations from legacy risk and to release capital for secured business redeployment.
    • Sale of deep-delinquent small LAP NPAs (~INR 80 crore) to ARC, with upfront cash realization and improvement in reported asset quality and PCR.
  • Collections and Tech Overhaul: New CBO (Chief Business Officer) and verticalized collections structure were introduced; BRE-powered Salesforce LOS was rolled out to enforce stringent new loan origination and policy discipline for granular lending.
  • Clear Acknowledgement of Roots: Management admitted underinvestment in collections and branch-level controls; the stress was not seen as purely environmental but rooted in internal process/back-end underdevelopment.​

Corrective Actions (Q3 FY25 Onward)

  • Strategic Capital Allocation: Pivot to a “twin engine” model focusing on gold and secured LAP, with sub-1% unsecured exposure.
  • Aggressive Tech and Collections Build-Out: Field force doubled in six months; leader roles in collections verticalized and empowered.
  • Cost Rationalization, Branch Co-location: 49 ST LAP branches co-located within gold branches, freeing up costs; planned addition of >150 gold branches for FY26 in more strategically measured sequence.
  • Prudent Credit Cost Guidance: Management explicitly retained 1% credit cost guidance for FY26, unwilling to reduce guidance prematurely during clean-up.
  • ECL and Underwriting Revamp: Higher proportion of higher CIBIL scores and policy tightening for new customers.
  • Opex and Scale Reset: Commitment to keep cost-to-income at 56–58% levels through FY26 recovery, with expectations to unlock operating leverage only in FY27

FY26 Positioning—Outcome and Follow-Through

  • Secured Book: Over 99% of on-book portfolio now comprises secured gold and mortgage loans.
  • Collections Muscle: Significantly expanded, with resolution metrics stabilized.
  • Cost Structure and Branch Network: Growth investments (new branches, tech, field force) embedded in FY25 numbers, with future periods expected to benefit from these fixed cost bases as new branches ramp up.
  • Return Metrics: Credit costs returned to normative ranges; ROA/ROE on improvement path.
  • Business Philosophy: Candid admission that the FY25-26 period is a “rebuild and recovery” phase, with focus on consistency, predictability, and resilience above headline growth.​

SECTION 8: TRANSFORMATION PHASE - FY26 STRATEGIC RECALIBRATION
Q1 FY26 (Apr-Jun 2025) - First Full Quarter of Rebuild

Q1 FY26 Strategic Milestones

De-risking Initiatives:

  • 100% assignment of INR 770 crores unsecured BL portfolio (full credit risk transfer)
  • Residual unsecured BL book reduced from INR 1,064 crores to INR 270 crores
  • ARC sale: INR 25 crores of ST LAP delinquent NPAs via 85-15 SR structure
  • Maiden ECB issuance: INR 100 million (external commercial borrowing)

Product Mix Transformation:

  • Gold loans: 44% of on-book AUM (from 40% beginning of fiscal)
  • Mortgage (secured): 54% of on-book AUM
  • Unsecured MSME: 2.3% of on-book AUM

Operational Infrastructure:

  • Branch co-locations: 23 ST LAP branches merged into gold locations
  • New MSME hubs planned: 100+ new branches in pipeline
  • Collection team expansion: Onboarded senior leadership; field team strengthening target Q2
  • Technology deployment: System-driven BRE (Business Rule Engine) across ST LAP (200+ branches on Salesforce)

Capital & Leverage Management:

  • Capital adequacy increased 49 bps (21.9% → 22.4%)
  • Debt-equity ratio improved to 3.89 from 4.03
  • External commercial borrowing: 8.5% of borrowing mix (70-80 bps cheaper than local)
  • Incremental borrowing cost: Sub-8% (down from 8.5% in Q4 FY25)

Q2 FY26 (Jul-Sep 2025) - CURRENT QUARTER MOMENTUM

Latest Performance (September 30, 2025)

SECTION 9: BUSINESS MODEL ARCHITECTURE

The Twin-Engine Strategy

Engine 1: Gold Loans (32-46% of AUM)

Growth Trajectory:

  • FY19: INR 4.5 bn (22% of AUM)
  • FY22: INR 24.0 bn (39% of AUM)
  • FY25: INR 42.0 bn (37% of AUM)
  • Q2 FY26: INR 67.3 bn (42% of AUM) CURRENT

Strategic Positioning:

  • Upper-end of gold lending market (INR 100k average ticket size)
  • Less price-sensitive customer segment vs. mass-market competitors
  • LTV managed conservatively at 62-64% (vs. 70%+ market standard)
  • Zero credit loss track record over past 3+ years

Channel Model:

  • 494 specialized gold branches (437 in FY25 → 494 in Q2 FY26)
  • ~2,000 DSA network across India
  • Doorstep gold loan service (DSGL) - 71% YoY growth in Q1 FY26
  • 10.7 tons inventory as of Q2 FY26 (4% YoY growth)

Profitability Metrics:

  • Yield: 15.3% (Q2 FY26)
  • Credit cost: Near-zero
  • RoA equivalent: 3.0%+ (highest among product lines)
  • GNPA of 0.1% and NNPA of 0.0%

Engine 2: Mortgage Loans - LAP (54% of AUM)

Sub-segments within mortgage:

2a) Small-Ticket LAP (26% of overall AUM)

  • Ticket size: INR 1-3 million (vs. INR 500k-2.5mn market standard)
  • Niche positioning: Upper-informal segment
  • Yield: 16.1%
  • GNPA: 3.4% (elevated but improving from 4%+ stress levels) and NNPA of 1.9%
  • Strategy: Scale to 40% of AUM by FY26E

2b) Medium-Ticket LAP (26% of overall AUM)

  • Ticket size: INR 2.5-10 million
  • Prime/near-prime customer segment
  • Yield: 12.7%
  • GNPA: 4.9% (Elevated from stress levels) and NNPA of 2.8%
  • Strategy: Grow via direct assignment (minimize capital allocation)

2c) Affordable Housing/Home Loans (2-3% embedded in ST LAP)

  • Ticket size: INR 3-10 million
  • First-time home buyer focus
  • Yield: 14.8%
  • Strategy: Cross-sell from LAP customer base

Mortgage Engine Growth:

  • FY19: INR 8.8 bn
  • FY22: INR 39.2 bn (+346% over 3 years)
  • FY25: INR 74.3 bn
  • Q2 FY26: INR 88.0 bn CURRENT

Product Portfolio Evolution

SECTION 10: Management Commentary

Management Guidance - FY26 (Parvez Mulla Regime)

Core Commitments:

  1. AUM Growth: 20-25% normalized (vs. 28% organic ex-DL in H1)
  2. Credit Cost: 100 ± 10 basis points (bps) full year
  3. Cost-to-Income: Range-bound from Q4 FY25 levels (~56-57%)
  4. Return on Assets: Stabilizing toward 2.4-2.5% by FY27
  5. Return on Equity: 13-15% range (post equity dilution from IPO)

SECTION 11: CREDIT FRAMEWORK & RISK MANAGEMENT

Underwriting Standards - Current Framework

Gold Loans

  • LTV: 62% (Avg) vs. 70%+ market average
  • Minimum loan size: INR 3,000
  • Maximum tenure: 45 months (avg)
  • Renewal rate: 70% of customers
  • Collection strategy: Bullet repayment + EMI options

Small-Ticket LAP

  • Income assessment: 100+ data points per customer
  • CIBIL scores: 74% above 700, 26% in 650-700 range
  • LTV: 52.8% average
  • Ticket size: INR 1-3 million (avg INR 1.3 mn)
  • Tenure: 7-7.5 years (long-tenure benefit)

Medium-Ticket LAP

  • CIBIL requirement: Established professionals
  • LTV: 55.1% average
  • Ticket size: INR 4.9 million (avg)
  • Tenure: 4-5 years
  • Revenue model: Predominantly fixed rate

Collection Infrastructure - Q2 FY26 Status

Collection Performance Metrics (ST LAP)

  • 1+ DPD: 7.8% (Q2 FY26) vs. 8.0% (Q1)
  • 30+ DPD: 4.8% vs. 5.0%
  • Cure rates: 1+ to 30+: ~30% (target: 40%+ by year-end)

Regulatory Framework & Compliance

Credit Ratings (All Three Agencies = AA)

  • CARE Ratings: AA Stable (January 2024 upgrade)
  • CRISIL: AA Positive (January 2024 first-time)
  • India Ratings: AA Stable (February 2024 two-notch upgrade)

RBI Compliance:

  • NBFC-ND-SI Category: Meets all regulatory requirements
  • Bank-owned NBFC Guidelines (Oct 4 circular): Under consultation with RBI
  • Digital disbursement mandate (May 8, 2024): Fully compliant
  • External benchmarking framework: 45% of borrowings on external benchmarks

SECTION 12: VALUATION FRAMEWORK & INVESTMENT CASE

Valuation Framework

Bear Case

  • AUM growth normalizes to 18-20% (below guidance)
  • RoA remains compressed at 2.0% (vs. 2.6%+ target)
  • Cost-to-income stays elevated at 58%+
  • Credit costs spike to 120+ bps due to ST LAP stress
  • Price-to-Book multiple compression to 1.8-2.0x

Base Case)

  • AUM growth achieves 22-25% guidance
  • RoA improves to 2.3-2.4%
  • Cost-to-income improves to remains at or around 58%
  • Credit costs normalize to 80-90 bps by Q4
  • Price-to-Book multiple 2.0-2.5x (reflecting growth + quality)

Bull Case

  • AUM growth accelerates to 28-30% (gold price tailwind)
  • RoA expands to 2.6-2.8%
  • Cost-to-income improves to below 58% (operating leverage)
  • Credit costs decline to 60-70 bps (ST LAP recovery)
  • Price-to-Book multiple 2.5-3.0x (reflecting re-rating)

What I think Financials might turn out over a period of next 3 years:

SECTION 13: RISKS

Key Downside Risks

  1. ST LAP Portfolio Deterioration: Continued stress in small-ticket mortgage book could necessitate higher provisions
  2. Regulatory Headwinds: Bank-owned NBFC guidelines implementation could limit growth potential
  3. Technology Execution: Salesforce migration and BRE implementation risks
  4. Competition Intensification: Larger players expanding into secured lending could compress yields
  5. Gold Price Normalization: Sharp decline in gold prices would reduce gold loan growth momentum

Disclaimer: Invested and Baised, Buy Transaction in Last 10 days

Regards
Mann

22 Likes


Big Positive: 51.9% AUM growth in Gold Loan and AUM of ₹17,500 Cr AUM overall


Asset quality is slightly deteriorating; it is not dangerous as of now, but close monitoring is required.

Source: Investor Presentation

1 Like

Q4 FY26 Results:

Profitability
PAT: Up 10% QoQ, 368% YoY to 89.7 Cr.
Operating Profit: Up 11.7% YoY to ₹149.4 Cr in Q3 FY26
Net Interest Income: Up 16.8% YoY to ₹318.9 Cr

Business Growth
AUM Growth: 17% YoY growth. (32.5% YoY Ex. Business Loans). Achieved all time high net growth in AUM of 1174 Cr. in the quarter.
Gold Loan AUM: 51.9% YoY growth. Contributes 45.2% of total AUM.
Mortage AUM: 20% YoY growth to 9,084 Cr.

Disbursements growth:
8,606 Cr Vs 5205 QoQ
18,788 Cr Vs 13,579 Cr YoY
Gold Loans
Q2 FY26: 4,456 Cr
Q3 FY26: 7,853 Cr
Non-Gold Loans
Q2 FY26: 760 Cr
Q3 FY26: 753 Cr

AUM Growth:
YoY: 15,812 FY25 Vs 12,192 Cr FY24
QoQ: 17,500 Q3 Vs 16,136 Q2 FY26
Gold Loans
Q2 FY26: 6,731 Cr
Q3 FY26: 7,905 Cr
Non-Gold Loans
Q2 FY26: 9,405 Cr
Q3 FY26: 9,595 Cr

Gold Loan:
Gold Tonnage increased to 11.2 from 10.7 YoY. Indicates that the company is acquiring more gold and not just benefiting from price hikes.
AUM per branch hit an all time high of 13.3 indicating strong growth signs from new branches.
Loan to Value dropped to 59.3%. FEDFINA has a massive safety margin.

LAP STRESS:
The small ticket loan against assets was an issue. GNPA for Mortgages and business loans has been increasing since the past 3 quarters.
GNPA is at 2.1%

Yields, CoB and Spreads:

Yields YoY have been at an all time high at 17.4 % compared to 16.2 % FY24. While for Q3 FY26 the yield dropped but so did the cost of borrowing to a record low of 7.8%, achieving an all time high spread of 9%. The CoB dropped significantly from 9% in Q3 FY25 to 7.8% Q3 FY26.

81% of Medium Ticket LAP customers have a CIBIL score of >700. Indicating high quality borrower profile.
Small Ticket LAP has lower scores, only 9% have scores more than 700 which explains why this segment is seeing stress.

In Q3 FY26 they sold 313 Cr of loans. Their Off-Book ratio is 26%.

GNPA (Gross Stage 3): 2.1% (Q3 FY26) vs 1.8% (Q3 FY25).
Asset quality has deteriorated slightly YoY. This is due to Short term LAPs.

NNPA (Net Stage 3): 1.4% (Q3 FY26) vs 1.3% (Q3 FY25).

PCR: 32.3%
**30+ DPD: ** 4.4%. Improved slightly from last year which was 4.6%

The company had a very strong South India presence which they have now reduced from 67% in FY20 to 48% in Q3 FY26. West Region makes up 23% and North side has grown to 29%. Strong geographical presence reduces climate and political risks.

In every time bucket, FEDFINA’s assets are greater than its liabilities. They are highly liquid.
Funding Mix:
Term Loans: 54% (Banks are their main source)
NCDs: 18%
CPs: 6% - The low number is a good sign as they aren’t relying on short term loans.

Disbursements: ₹8,606 Cr (+95.8% YoY). This confirms the Gold demand.
ROA: 2.5% vs 0.6% Last year. >2.5 % is a good sign for NBFCs
ROE: 12.7% (vs 3.1%)

Cash Balance dropped to 336 Cr, company has deployed idle cash to loans which earn interest.
Borrowings rose to 11,207 Cr

Interest Income has increased to 528 Cr (from 501 Cr)
**Interest Expense: ** Decreased to 208 Cr
Interest Income has increased and expense has decreased. This drove NII up by 11% QoQ. Credit Costs remained stable.

Daily average cost of borrowing has decreased. Most small cap NBFCs borrow at higher rates giving FEDFINA the advantage and higher spreads.
Gold AUM grew 51.9% and gold tonnage hit a record 11.2 Tonnes and LTV is low at only 59.3%

Yes GNPA grew to 2.1% but credit costs stayed flat at 0.9% and unsecured business loans have reduced to only 1.6% of AUM.

I assumed flat profits due to credit costs and OPEX for new branches, but profit grew 10% QoQ, 368% YoY.

Apart from the Small ticket LAP problem, which is causing GNPA to increase, overall turnaround is successful. Strong earnings and growing AUM and Loan books. Technicals look great too, there is a weekly breakout as the stock soared 8% last trading session.

PS: This is my first post here (on VP), I have been following FEDFINA for a while and recently became an investor. This is not investment advice. This is solely my observation and my analysis. Thank you :)

5 Likes

47650-16-Jan-2026 (4).pdf (23.0 KB)
FEDFINA Q3 FY26 Concall Notes

This is a summary of the concall of FEDFINA, i got this through tijori.

2 Likes

Fed Bank Fin Services -

Q3 FY 26 results and Concall highlights -

Q3 outcomes -

Interest income - 526 vs 475 cr
Interest expenses - 208 vs 221 cr
NII - 318 vs 253 cr, up 25 pc
Gain on direct assignment - 0.1 vs 19 cr
Other income - 29 vs 38 cr
Total income - 347 vs 311 cr, up 12 pc
Operating expenses - 149 vs 133 cr, up 12 pc
Credit costs - 31 vs 108 cr ( sharp improvement on a YoY basis. Credit cost in Q2 was also @ 31 cr )
PAT - 88 vs 19 cr, up 368 pc ( up 10 pc vs Q2 )

Total branches @ 730 vs 693 ( have opened >100 new GL branches in last 9 months. At the same time, have merged 63 LAP branches with GL branches in preceding 9 months )

Asset Quality -

Stage 1 assets @ 95 vs 94.4 pc ( ie @ 12.29k vs 10.80k cr )
Stage 2 assets @ 3 vs 3.8 pc ( ie @ 382 vs 431 cr )
Stage 3 assets @ 2 vs 1.8 pc ( ie @ 266 vs 205 cr )
Total provisions held @ 2 vs 2.1 pc ( ie @ 255 vs 244 cr )

Yields, CoF, Spreads -

Avg yeilds in Q3 FY 26 @ 16.8 vs 17.1 pc

Avg cost of borrowing in Q3 FY 26 @ 7.8 vs 9 pc ( sharp fall on a YoY basis )

Spreads @ 9 vs 8.1 pc

AUM -

Gold loans @ 7.9k vs 5.2k cr
Non Gold loans @ 9.5k vs 9.7k cr

Gold loan AUM / branch @ 13.3 vs 10.7 cr ( across 594 branches )

Total Gold tonnage as collateral @ 11.2 vs 10.7 tons

Active customer base for Gold Loans @ 2.7 vs 2.5 lakh

LTV @ 59 vs 69 pc YoY

Fresh disbursements -

Gold loans @ 7.8k vs 3.4k cr
Non Gold loans @ 753 vs 954 cr
Total disbursements @ 8.6k vs 4.3k cr

Small ticket LAP and HL disbursements @ 208 vs 171 cr

Medium ticket LAP disbursements @ 545 vs 562 cr

Business loans disbursements @ NIL vs 220 cr ( discontinued disbursements here wef Q1 FY 26 )

Geographical mix of Mortgage loans -

South - 48 pc
West - 23 pc
North - 29 pc

Geographical mix of Gold loans -

South - 37 pc
West - 44 pc
North - 19 pc

Notes from Q3 concall -

Within LAP, company intends to keep focusing on high risk ST LAP and low risk MT LAP and shall strive to strike a balance between the two to manage overall risk at company level

Company was facing challenges in their ST LAP business. They intend to re-build and restructure this part of their business for better profitability and growth

In Q3, Gold loans AUM grew by 52 pc YoY

Company has merged 63 ST LAP branches with their gold loan branches in 9M FY 26

MT LAP business’s performance was satisfactory

Have institutionalised better checks and balances wrt their ST LAP business

Unsecured loan book continues to run down. It now constitutes only 0.6 pc of total loan book

AUM growth ( Ex - Business loans, now discontinued ) is at 32 pc YoY and 9 pc QoQ

Company is deliberately reducing their Direct assignment business

Since the Gold loans are a shorter term product, it enables the company to borrow for shorter terms and and lower rates + the rates in the economy are as such heading south

Q3 annualised RoA stands @ 2.5 pc
Q3 annualised RoE stands @ 12.7 pc

Operating leverage on account of rapid growth in GL business shall become visible wef Q4 ( as the growth curve steepened in Q3, it also leads to distribution of a lot of incentives at the time of loan origination )

Company has grown their gold loan tonnage @ aprox 10 pc / yr for last 5 yrs. Aim to achieve the same in by end of FY 26 as well

Company continues to maintain a very conservative LTV on Gold loans

Fresh ST LAP origination is happening in a much more conservative and healthier fashion. Stress in this part of portfolio should keep inching downwards from hereon

Company’s medium and long term aspiration is to hit 15 cr and 20 cr of Gold Loan / branch respectively

Company’s employees are specially incentivised for tonnage growth ( over and above the AUM growth )

Implementation of new labour code has hit the P&L by 4 cr ( a large part of this is a one time impact )

Cost / Income in FY 27 shall start to improve meaningfully vs FY 26 as the operating leverage keeps kicks in

Previously, the company had not invested adequately in their collection teams. ST LAP is a collections heavy business. Company has corrected this over last 12 months by rapidly expanding their internal collections team. Should see much better collections and asset quality going forward in their LAP vertical

MT LAP : LT LAP AUM stands @ 60 : 40

Disc: holding, inclined to add more, biased, not SEBI registered, not a buy / sell recommendation, posted only for educational purposes

6 Likes

How do we interpret this data on portfoio quality? What do these stages signify? Can someone explain in basic terms

1 Like

Gross Stage 3 is nothing, just gross NPA loans that are defaulted before subtracting any provisions.
Net Stage 3 is Net NPA, bad loans after subtracting provisions made by the bank.
PCR is the provision coverage ratio How much % of bad loans is already covered by provisions
1+DPD = 1+ Days Past Due (loans where payment is late by 1 day or more)
30+ DPD = Same as above, just 30 Days
ECL is Expected Credit Loss Provisions ( Money kept aside by the bank for future possible loan losses.)

it’s takes some time to cross 52w h level but it can be a good to watch it.their most of business are mortgage loan they can sell and recover some payment.so don’t worry it’s takes some time to maturity

Snap : Credit rating report

3 Likes

Fed Bank Fin Services -

Q4 FY 26 results and Concall highlights -

Q4 outcomes -

NII - 348 vs 283 cr

Other income - 29 vs 38 cr

Total income - 378 vs 321 cr, up 17 pc

Operating expenses - 215 vs 190 cr, up 13 pc

Operating profits - 162 vs 131 cr, up 24 pc

Credit costs - 28 vs 32 cr - sharp improvement

PAT - 100 vs 71 cr, up 40 pc

No of branches - 757 vs 694 - opened 63 new branches in FY 26

Employee count @ 5303 vs 4568

AUM @ 20153 vs 15812 cr, up 27 pc

Gold loans @ 10352 ( avg ticket size @ 2.7 lakh )

Medium Ticket LAPs @ 5570 cr ( avg ticket size @ 72 lakh )

Small Ticket LAPs @ 3782 cr ( avg ticket size @ 16 lakh )

Statewide breakup of branches -

TN - 90

Karnataka - 95

Maharashtra - 141

Gujarat - 136

AP - 57

Telangana - 42

Rajasthan - 34

MP - 20

UP - 22

Delhi - 46

Haryana - 32

Punjab - 14

Uttarakhand - 8

Spreads, Yields, COFs for FY 26 -

Avg yeilds @ 16.7 pc

COFs @ 8.6 pc

Spreads @ 8.1 pc

Percentage of off book assets in the Gold loan portfolio @ 23 pc

Percentage of off book assets in LAP portfolio @ 33 pc

Asset Quality trends -

GNPAs @ 1.9 vs 2 pc YoY

NNPAs @ 1.3 vs 1.2 pc YoY

PCR @ 32 vs 40 pc YoY

1 DPD + @ 6 vs 7.3 pc of AUM - substantial improvement

30 DPD + @ 3.7 vs 4.7 pc of AUM - substantial improvement

60 DPD + @ 2.3 vs 2.6 pc of AUM - substantial improvement

Notes from Q4 concall -

Within LAP, company intends to keep focusing on high risk ST LAP and low risk MT LAP and shall strive to strike a balance between the two to manage overall risk at company level

Cost / Income in FY 27 shall start to improve meaningfully vs FY 26 as the operating leverage keeps kicks in

Previously, the company had not invested adequately in their collection teams. ST LAP is a collections heavy business. Company has corrected this over last 12 months by rapidly expanding their internal collections team. Should see much better collections and asset quality going forward in their LAP vertical

Disbursements in Q4 -

MT LAP disbursals in Q4 @ 632 cr

ST LAP disbursals in Q4 @ 289 cr

Gold loan disbursals in Q4 @ 10,744 cr - since they r short tenured loans

Segment wise yeilds -

Gold loans - 17.7 pc, Avg LTV @ 70 pc

MT LAP - 12 pc, Avg LTV @ 53 pc

LT LAP - 15.1 pc Avg LTV @ 54 pc

FY 26 vs FY 25 credit costs @ 0.8 pc vs 1.5 pc - substantial improvement

Opex to AUM @ 5.5 vs 5.9 pc YoY - operating leverage playing out slowly but surely

Annual RoA @ 2.6 vs 2.2 pc

Annual RoE @ 14 pc vs 9 pc

Small ticket LAP should turn around wef next FY. Company is far more confident vs LY. Their expanded recovery teams are now in place and are relatively experienced by now. Growth should now come back in this segment

Fee income in FY 26 was relatively tepid as the disbursals on LAP segments were on the slower side. This should also reverse going forward - as the management now intends to grow both their ST and MT LAP businesses at accelerated pace

Aim to keep growing their AUM @ 20-25 pc over medium term

Company’s gold tonnage is up 12 pc YoY ( vs 75 pc AUM growth in gold loans )

Company’s avg gold loan / branch is @ 16 cr. Most of these branches have a peak gold loan disbursement capacity of 50-60 cr - depending on the no of lockers and their sizes that are available

FY 26 was a re-build year for the company. In FY 27, RoAs and RoEs should be better as operating leverage kicks in and credit costs remain under control

Disc: holding, biased, investment position, not SEBI registered, posted only for educational purposes

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