Entertainment Network India Limited (ENIL)

ENIL AR21 notes

  • In FY21, Mirchi digital was one of the flagbearers of growth. Digital products either sold independently or as part of Solutions packages contributed to 12% of total revenues. We expect this to increase to nearly 25% of total revenues by FY25. Mirchi digital is currently reaching an estimated 50 million users through multiple platforms like Social Media, YouTube, music OTTs, etc.

  • During the year, Mirchi’s social media footprint grew impressively. Between its own handles and those belonging to its RJs, Mirchi had a reach of nearly 23 million on Facebook and 10 million on Instagram. On YouTube, its subscriber base grew to 13 million this year. Total views on our YouTube channels increased to nearly 800 million during the year.

  • In the US,

    • we have been present on FM in the second most important market for radio for South Asians – New Jersey (NJ) – since Jan 26th, 2019.

    • We have also been available across the US via our radiomirchiusa app.

    • In July 2021, we launched a powerful AM station in the number 1 radio market – the Bay Area in California.

    • We have also launched an online Telugu radio station on our app that specifically targets the Telugu people living in California. Even though its content is designed for California, it is available all over the US.

    • Over the last couple of years, the feedback on the product has been very encouraging, and it reflects in our revenue share, which is estimated to be close to 50% in NJ. We are confident of replicating this success in the Bay Area next year.

    • In the US, your Company has signed a lease agreement for a frequency– 1170 AM – in the Bay Area. This is a powerful frequency that covers the whole Bay area – from San Francisco to San Jose. The Bay Area is the biggest radio market for South Asians in the US. We hope to launch commercial operations soon.

    • During the year, we returned the New York frequency to its owner because the owner wanted to sell it, and it was anyway not proving to be viable.

  • Mirchi was present in Bahrain under a brand licensing arrangement with a local partner till September 2019, after which our partner decided to surrender the license. After making a bid on our own in November 2019, ENIL won the bid in June 2020. We have now relaunched Mirchi in Bahrain on May 9th, 2021, through a 100% owned subsidiary called Mirchi Bahrain WLL. Initial audience and client feedback have been good.

  • In our first stint in the UAE, in partnership with the Abu Dhabi Media Corporation, we had become the number 1 broadcaster across the country. In our second stint, this time in partnership with Dolphin Records, we have made a strong come-back in March 2021

  • A shareholder agreement was signed between ENIL, Global Entertainment Network Limited (GENL), Marhaba FM and Mr. Salem Fahad S E Al-Naemi to operate a radio station in Doha, Qatar. Marhaba FM holds a commercial radio broadcasting station license for the FM frequency 89.6 in the state of Qatar and it was operating under the brand name “One FM”. GENL is the wholly owned subsidiary of Marhaba FM. In March’2021 ENIL made an equity investment that gave us a 49% stake in the share capital of GENL. GENL shall provide services to Marhaba FM in connection with operating the station under the brand name “MirchiOne”. Despite multiple obstacles faced, including travel restrictions, MirchiOne was launched in Qatar on 21st March’2021.

  • Normally adverse economic conditions benefit radio, as advertisers spend more on “promotions” rather than core “brand building” . However, the pandemic is unique because it has disrupted the retail sector the most. With retail shut, there was no scope to run promotions . Radio depends heavily on retail advertising and so it has suffered a lot.

  • Solutions and Digital.

    • During the year, both saw a significant improvement in gross margins. Solutions’ gross margin improved to 52.7% from 38.4% last year and digital’s gross margin improved to 37.5% from 11.5% last year. Since both products are dependent on advertising, revenues fell during the year.

    • In FY21, we have taken the first steps towards building our own digital web and app platforms . The big gain in having our own platform is that we will finally “own” the customer. We will also own the ad inventory on the platform. This will future-proof the Company against any more economic disruptions and crises like the pandemic.

    • In line with this vision, your Company took the bold decision to drop the word “Radio” from its logo “Radio Mirchi”. The brand will now be known simply as “Mirchi”. This decision allows the brand to do so much more than just radio – original videos, original podcasts, live events, TV impact properties, solutions etc.

    • Because of the pandemic, the on-ground component of solutions was badly hit. It was down 92% over FY20. But our multi-media solutions component fared much better, dropping by only 16%. The solutions we designed for our clients using TV – what we call TV impact properties like Mirchi Music Awards – dropped by only 37%. Despite solutions products dropping, the margins of the solutions business rose strongly from 38% to 53%.

    • Mirchi now runs 18 web radio stations on Gaana including exclusive Punjabi and Marathi stations for metro markets like Delhi & Mumbai.

    • Mirchi’s selected content is also available on Amazon Alexa, making us part of the growth story of smart speakers and smart homes in India.

    • As a focused business line, Mirchi continues to create original visual content (Web series) and thereby ride on the growth of video OTT platforms in India. While the number of shows created during the year were less due to Covid restrictions, this will continue to be a major thrust area for Mirchi in the days to come especially since Mirchi’s talent and capabilities in multiple Indian languages places us in a unique position to grow this vertical.

    • In FY21, digital products, either sold independently, or as part of solutions, grew to approx. ` 32 crores, contributing about 12% to revenues. This 12% is part of the 1/3rd share of solutions. One of the positive impacts of this replacement of on-ground activities with digital was that gross margins increased to more than 50%. As is known, margins on on-ground activities are a little limited.

    • In order to add muscle to the solutions and digital businesses, your Company has invested in people, processes, training and software . Most of the programming team members are now making content not only for radio, but also for client solutions and digital platforms.

  • As a result of the Company’s right sizing exercise, the headcount of the Company came down from 1124 at the beginning of the year to 910 at the end . In addition, senior employees took pay cuts ranging from 10% to 50% from April 2020 to February 2021 . Many employees were put on Part-Work-Part-Pay (PWPP) in which they worked for half the week and received half pay

  • The annual incentive program was disbanded for all people in the first half of the year and though a special incentive plan was introduced for the 2nd half, no one was able to earn any incentive.

  • Vaccination doses have been provided free of cost to all employees, including the support staff. Employees were also offered the option of taking interest-free loans to pay for Covid related expenses. Employees were also encouraged to take an extra week off, a leave that we called “recharge” leave.

  • In another case, your Company won an order from the Delhi HC which stated that radio broadcasters did not need to take any license for the “underlying” works in a sound recording– viz the lyrics and compositions. As a result of this, your Company was able to write back past provisions made to the tune of Rs. 23.5 crores .

  • Financials

    • On a consolidated basis, total income of the Company declined from Rs. 56,153.32 lakhs during the previous year to Rs. 29,117.52 lakhs during the year under review. Profit after tax declined from Rs. 1,071.21 lakhs during the previous year to loss of Rs. (11,050.31) lakhs during the year under review.

    • In the 1st quarter, your Company’s revenues were down 72%. In the 2nd, 3rd and 4th quarters, revenue was down 59%, 42% and 34% respectively.

    • Radio ad volumes took a hit in the 1st half of the year falling by 74% in the 1st quarter and 27% in the 2nd quarter but recovered smartly in the 2nd half. Ad volumes grew by 1% and 6% respectively in the 3rd and 4th quarters. Pricing of radio however continued to remain lower by about 25% throughout the year .

    • Recovery typically follows this pattern – first the volumes recover, then the pricing.

    • The recovery continued into the 1st quarter of FY22. However, the 2nd wave of the pandemic has paused it. Recovery may now be delayed till the end of the 2nd wave, but the experience of the last year has shown that the demand for radio remains strong. With vaccinations growing rapidly, it is our hope and belief that future waves will be milder in strength and will require lesser restrictions on business. If this comes true, a recovery can be expected in FY22.

    • The pandemic caused disruption in the growth trajectory of 2nd brand, Mirchi Love and 3rd brand, Kool FM. Your management has taken a conservative, yet pragmatic view of the long-term impact of the pandemic on these channels and decided to impair their assets by Rs. 97.5 crores. The management team will continue to strive to return these stations to the earlier growth trajectory.

    • We gave up some office space, and also renegotiated rates in some places. This led to a saving of 16% during the year.

    • Due to the new royalty order, costs were down 38% during the year .

    • License Fees paid to the Govt were down just 8% despite a crash in revenues, because they are governed by a formula which sets the floor.

    • Marketing costs were pruned by 69% and travel virtually ground to a halt with costs down 90%

    • Cash and equivalents of Rs. 233 cr.

    • Substantial revenue from Holding company BCCL. Revenue of Rs. 65-70 cr out of total Rs. 272 cr in FY21.

    • Total investment of Rs. 19.64 cr in subsidiaries.

    • During the current year, the holding Company terminated eight lease arrangements pertaining to office premises and one lease arrangement pertaining to transmission facility resulting into de-recognition of related Right of use assets and lease liabilities amounting to 1,323.45 lakhs and 1,650.66 lakhs respectively. The resulting gain on termination amounting to ` 327.21 lakhs has been recorded as Gain on termination of lease.

  • Industry

    • Growth in radio penetration continues with 31 private FM broadcasters in 2020, across 111 cities who operates 385 FM radio stations in India .

    • In addition, the public broadcaster Prasar Bharti’s All India Radio service operates 479 stations in 23 languages reaching 92% of the country’s area. India also has 251 operational community radio stations as on September 2020.

    • As per the Pitch Madison report, the radio industry reported a 44% decline in advertising revenue in FY’21 to reach I 1,270 crore. With this drop, Radio has also lost one percent of the market share. This has brought down its share to 2% of the entire Media & Entertainment industry

    • costs related to payment to the Government of India and its companies proved to be sticky as the Government refused to give any relief. All the Government of India allowed was a 3-month deferment in 1st quarter license fees. Prasar Bharati gave no concessions for their tower rentals. BECIL gave a quarter’s waiver on monitoring charges, but that was all.

    • At one time, the FM radio industry was concerned about losing listenership to music apps. However, over time, it has become clear that music apps have created their followership, not taken away FM radio listeners , The 200+ million monthly listeners of radio continue to use the medium, but many of them are now also using music apps. In all, it is estimated that nearly 300 million users exist for music apps. FM radio and music apps have learnt to coexist with several partnerships now starting to form between them. For example, Mirchi has 18 radio stations playing on Gaana, and Gaana spends money on advertising and sponsorship on Mirchi.

    • Radio broadcasters pay royalties to music companies. The rate of royalty was last set by the Copyright Board (CRB) in August 2010 and the order was valid for 10 years till August 31st, 2020. There was some apprehension amongst radio broadcasters about what the new order would look like.

    • Broadcasters approached the Intellectual Properties Appellate Board (IPAB), the body that replaced the CRB for such matters, for a new order. The IPAB first restrained music companies from filing infringement suits against broadcasters till the matter was being heard and new orders passed. The new order would be effective from 1st September 2020.

    • While the earlier royalty was based on revenues (2% of revenues), the new order was based on actual hours of music used by radio stations . The new order prescribed rates by “needle hours” (actual hours) of music used. It divided the day into prime-time, non-prime time and night time with different rates for each time band .

    • The new order has been widely welcomed by the radio industry for several reasons.

      • Firstly, the rates were seen to be broadly fair , protecting the interests of both music companies and broadcasters. The IPAB rejected many of the excessive demands of the music companies. The needle-hour order actually helped the music industry in FY21, earning them more royalties than they would have earned if the revenue based order had continued (since revenues fell in FY21).

      • Secondly, it’s an order that applies to all music companies . The earlier order had been challenged by a few companies who managed to get orders in their favor and stay outside its purview, forcing broadcasters to negotiate voluntary licenses with them. Not only did this increase workload for broadcasters, it also subjected them again to the same old extreme demands of these companies.

      • Thirdly, even though the order is valid only for only one year, the IPAB has clearly said that the basic rate structure would not be disturbed in the future . It thus gives certainty about music royalties in the future.

    • The IPAB however also entertained a request from the music artists (composers and lyricists), represented by their society, the Intellectual Properties Rights Society (IPRS), to prescribe royalty for them also. Despite protests from broadcasters that various courts had opined that they didn’t need to pay IPRS at all, IPAB went ahead and prescribed rates for them. A few days later, the Delhi High Court ruled in one more long pending case that radio broadcasters did not need any license from IPRS, and thus did not have to pay them, thus rendering the IPAB order for IPRS infructuous. Broadcasters have now appealed in the Delhi HC to annul the IPRS part of the IPAB order, while accepting the rates set for music companies.

    • As per the applicable Frequency Module (FM) broadcasting policy, license fees is recognised in statement of profit and loss at the rate of 4% of gross revenue or minimum fixed fee for the concerned city, whichever is higher. Minimum fixed fee is 2.5% of the Non-Refundable One Time Entry Fee (NOTEF). However, for the first three years of operations in the states of North East (i.e. Assam and Meghalaya) and Jammu & Kashmir the rate of License fee is 2% of Gross Revenue or 1.25% of NOTEF, whichever is higher.

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Positive Commentary by Management after Q1

Looking at decent topline growth this quarter results, analysed the business with a certain interest considering:-

  • High promoter pedigree and skin in the game (Times group), decent management team
  • Scope for operating leverage to play out being mainly.a fixed costs business if top line continues to grow
  • Interesting new launches. Decent traction in digital channels, good UI/UX for new app and international markets seem promising

But there seems to be a structural problem here which still looks like a major overhang. Since 2014-2016, the business has seen severe deterioration of margins. This is even before COVID. For the core FCT business this seems structural. The only reasons I could think of this were:-

  • Radio is losing preference amongst top notch marketing teams as a channel of interest. Hence they drop prices to fill inventory - which is quite apparent in the quality of advertisers
  • Even though the ad slots fill up, there is hardly marquee brands spending media budgets here, just more hyper local business getting a mass medium for a low price

This quarter saw 76% recovery to pre Covid levels inspite of no effect of COVID - again seems like a sequential recovery and YOY increase but actually in the long term the business is structurally declining

The above 2 negatives were much stronger in the long term and decided not to invest.

Discl : Not invested

Please refer my post on ENIL as a Dead Companies walking in the thread.

Significant price erosion can often change the view, and post this, there was a severe correction and the share was available at much lower levels for long.

Eventually the company is now running into some tailwinds finally, including:-

  1. Ad spends are picking up - most FMCG concalls point to increasing APTID spends in the coming year and all mediums should benefit

  2. Management pointed out in the last call that pricing has bottomed out and should only improve from now on

  3. They already have good spare capacity to take on board any demand increase

  4. With central elections coming up, radio sees high spending by various political parties and hence upcoming year should see tailwinds from this and good operating leverage in a largely fixed costs business

  5. Technical strength looks good on weekly charts with decent build up in volumes over the last month, price comfortably above 10/30/40 WMAs and good RSI

  6. Scuttlebutt trying to listen to Radio Mirchi showed a decent amount of ads and also a decent corporate client base - showing some level of decent ad spends coming into the business

Disclosure : I am invested for the moderate term at sub 120 levels and biased. I am not a SEBI registered advisor

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Good points here. Seems like a classic case of industry priced to death, hence offering good margin of safety. However, one major issue is their investments in digital business are currently eroding their profits and there is no clarity on when/if they will start making money on these (at least 2-3 years).

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Fabulous results reported by ENIL, cyclicality seems to be playing out here in the media industry with last year being a major bottom. Ad spends have visibly already picked up and we have not reached Q4’24 and Q1’25 yet when the central election advertising starts kicking in.

In Q3 PAT has gone up to to 24 Cr for the quarter versus 3 Cr in Q2 and (8) Cr loss in Q3 last year. Revenues also saw a YOY increase of 21%.

The share price rise has been steep recently but valuation wise, at 12x trailing EV/EBITDA, this is still much below the 20x EV/EBITDA multiples this business has seen in good times earlier. Even Music Broadcast, a business in the same industry as ENIL but lower OPMs is currently trading at EV/EBITDA of 16+.

With Gaana now in their basket, plus all the digital initiatives with Mirchi, the streaming story is picking up pace. Hopefully with election spends, we are looking at a solid Q4 and Q1 ahead.

Disclosure : Same as above, invested since Aug’23 and biased. Added more last week. I am not a SEBI registered advisor and this is not investment advice.

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The current situation in ENIL is very interesting and I believe it offers a favourable risk/reward. The market is valuing it almost as a dead business, while there is significant transformation happening in the underlying business.

The company primarily has 3 key businesses:

  • Radio (India’s largest radio station brand - Mirchi)

  • Event (India’s largest events company - think concerts, Navratri celebration, marathons, spelling bees, etc)

  • Digital (Primarily Gaana)

Breaking each of these down (key points only)

A) Radio - (Stable cashflows with uncertain terminal value)

  • Company has 25+% market share in India. Only player who has consistently been profitable in the radio business

  • Historically, radio has been the main business of the company. But the rise of digital streaming, lower budgets from marketing towards brand building and FM being disabled in latest phones has made prospects of this industry gloomy (similar to print media).

  • Radio is a cyclical industry with very high margins. The year before election is very profitable due to high central government spending.

  • The company has radio licenses till 2030 (After which it will have to be renewed)

  • Competition is exiting this space

    • HT Media shutdown quite of few of their unprofitable stations inJune 2026 (Radio One (94.3 FM), Radio Nasha (91.9 FM), and Fever FM across major cities like Delhi, Mumbai, Bengaluru, and Chennai.)

    • Big FM went through bankruptcy and was acquired by another group

  • Post pandemic, the growth in radio has been primarily in volumes. Ad rates / Ad yields are 20%-25% lower than pandemic era

  • The radio business on its own generates ~INR 30-80 CR of EBITDA depending on the cycle.

B) Events Business (High ROCE business that should grow 10%-20% )

  • The company is India’s largest events company conducting ~300+ events (concerts/marathons/Navrathri/Spelling Bee/etc) in a year. It is primarily done using their Mirchi brand

  • This is a high ROCE business since the only capital required is manpower

  • India is becoming an experience first market similar to other developed countries. We are witnessing a boom in the number of events, concerts, bhajan clubbing, etc.

  • This vertical should grow ~10%-20% in the long run

  • Last year was flat in revenues. This was an aberration since many events were cancelled in feb/march due to straight of hormuz crisis. And events are heavy in Q3 & Q4.

  • This business generates ~40-50 Cr EBITDA

C) Digital Business (Primarily Gaana) - The optionality in ENIL

  • ENIL acquired Gaana from their parent Times group in Dec 2023 as a distressed sale (total consideration paid was INR 25L)

  • Gaana at its peak had about 180+ Mn users and had raised USD ~500-600 Mn (from Tencent, etc)

  • Competition intensity has reduced in music streaming industry in India.

  • Only players with strong balance sheet (Spotify, Apple Music, Amazon Music and the big daddy Youtube Music) / promoter support (JioSaavn) are surviving. The below players have shutdown in the last year

    • Airtel Wynk

    • Hungama

    • Resso

  • In such a space, the management of ENIL is planning to take a differentiated approach towards building Gaana.

  • Unlike competitors who offer both a free plan (supported by Ad revenue) and paid plan, Gaana has been relaunched and offers only a paid plan

  • For almost all music streaming platforms, the gross margin of a free user (supported by Ad revenue) is either wafer thin or negative. Most treat it as a marketing funnel.

    • Even Gaana at its 2022 peak, had a

      • Total revenue of INR 118 Cr out of which

        • Ad Revenue - INR 78 Cr,

        • Subscription Revenue - INR 28 Cr

        • Service Platform Revenue - INR 14.5 Cr.

      • To achieve this, Gaana burnt INR ~316 Cr. i.e, they spent 1 Rs to earn 0.37 Rs

  • Today the management of Gaana has said that they will not have any free or ad supported plan. They will only have paid subscriber plan.

  • They want every user on Gaana to be profitable. They are not going to look at growth at any costs. They will look to grow this vertical by 15%-20%. And the results have been promising

    Gaana (In INR Cr) FY24 FY25 FY26
    Subscription Revenue 15.3 46 80.5
    Burn 29.0 46.5 37.5
  • Between FY25 & FY26 the revenue of Gaana has increased by 70+% but the burn has reduced by 20%

  • Any user that they get for an annual plan of INR 599 per year is gross margin profitable for them. In the last two years, they have moved all their lower plan (INR 299) users to these higher plans (INR 599 and now INR 799).

    • I believe this doubling of revenue from INR 46 Cr to INR 81 Cr is primarily a result of increasing the prices of the plans. It is not volume led growth
  • In the long run, this will be a 30% gross margin business. The fixed cost is small & limited. The key cost is payment to label/artist which is 60%-70% of money earned. As subscription revenue increases, they profitability should increase.

  • However, there is an inconsistency that i have observed with respect to management’s guidance:

    • If we do back of the hand calculation, at 70% music production which is variable, the fixed cost for Gaana in FY25 & FY26 comes to around INR 60 Cr per annum (Revenue + Burn - Music production cost). For Gaana to be profitable the remaining 30% should cover this INR 60 Cr of fixed annual cost

    • To cover the INR 60 Cr of fixed annual cost, Gaana needs a revenue of INR 200 Cr. This is very far from the current run rate of INR 80 Cr per annum

    • Yet the management is confident of achieving breaking even in this financial year. What levers are they going use? I dont know. We know they have used pricing levers recently and there is only limited one can do with it.

    • In my view, as Investors, we should assume that this takes atleast 3-4 years to break-even (with fixed costs being further rationalised). But should management achieve their break-even target, it should lead to a major valuation re-rating.

What is the most surprising part about Gaana for me?

To think that in a value conscious country like India, where people are used to free music, there are still a number of people willingly paying for music. I find it very very surprising.

I thought that this would be more prevalent in tier-1 metros (I am personally a long time spotify subscriber). But over 60% of Gaana’s subscribers are from tier 2/3/4 metros. Gaana’s management says that there are 200 Mn people who listen to music across the country. They are targeting only the cohorts who they feel are willing to pay. The market to grow according to management is quite large.

We all know the business model of new age companies burning cash (to achieve network effects). This approach by Gaana seems very contrarian. But it seems to be working (till now).

What does all of this mean to us as an investor?

  • Gaana is today lowering the company’s profitability by 30-40 Cr. Any turnaround in Gaana should instantly improve the profitability of ENIL

  • Management had previously stated a goal of having atleast 50% revenue to be non-radio. They have achieved it (See below image from company presentation)

  • Yet, the market continues to value Gaana as a traditional business that has uncertain terminal value

What is the Margin of Safety for this investment?

  • Below is a snapshot of the investment
You Pay You Get
INR ~510 Cr (the current market cap) Radio Business (INR 30-80 Cr EBITDA) depending on the cycle
Event Business (INR 40-50 Cr EBITDA) growing 10%-20%
Gaana (Currently burning INR 30-40 Cr per annum
INR 424 Cr Cash on Balance Sheet
No debt (There are lease liabilites towards radio spectrum & office leasing). There is tax contingency of INR ~115 Cr (see risk section)
  • If we assume the market is valuing the entire 424 Cr of cash as it is, then the three businesses of Radio + Event + Gaana is being valued at INR ~85 Cr today

Quick & dirty sum of parts of the company

  • Exhicon Events (another listed events company) did INR 203 Cr as revenue and INR 55 Cr as EBITDA. This company trades at an EV/EBITDA multiple of 12.5x

    • At half the valuation multiple of Exhicon, the events business of ENIl which can do INR 40-50 Cr should be valued around INR 240 Cr (at 6x EV/EBITDA & 40 Cr EBITDA)
  • The radio business can do around INR 30-80 Cr depending on the cycle. Assuming mid point EBITDA of INR 50 Cr and a low EV/EBITDA (due to uncertanity of terminal value) multiple of 5x, the radio business would be worth around INR 250 Cr

  • Since Gaana is not profitable, we can assign it a value of INR 0 Cr (for the sake of conservatism/simplicity. Do not want to enter the domain of Revenue multiple for valuation).

  • There exists INR 425 cash on books. We will adjust it with the contingent liability of INR ~115 Cr (see risk section below). We will value cash at INR ~310 Cr

With the above, the total value of the business comes as : 240 + 250 + 0 + 310 = INR 800 Cr

The current market cap is INR ~510 Cr. This is a discount of ~40% to the business value.

Note: There are few other businesses in the company like International Radio, Digital Solutions (Affiliate revenue, etc). They are 10-20Cr in revenue. I am not assigning them any value in my computations.

What are the risks?

Risks In Gaana

  • Gaana is not able to turnround or it takes much longer than anticipated to control the burn

  • The growth in Gaana stagnates. The growth in the last year has been primarily pricing (plan price was doubled) driven and not subscriber driven. We need to monitor this.

    • For the last 3 quarters, the revenue from Gaana has stagnated at INR ~20 Cr per quarter. Managment has indicated that this is primarily due to churn of old users from the lower pricer plans.
  • Competition in music industry heats up. All of the existing players (except Gaana) have very strong balance sheet. Competition dropping prices (which happened recently with one of them) can impact growth & lead to churn

  • The market of Indian customers who are willing to pay for music is very small

  • Breakdown of relationship between Gaana & Music Labels / Artists. This is industry is known for cases & counter cases between all stakeholders. Gaana is involved in a few of these cases

Risks In Radio

  • The company’s radio license get expired and they are not able to renew (post 2030).

    • There could be a decent cash payout to government when the license is renewed (if it continues in the current Non-refundable One Time Entry Fee NOTEF regime). If the renewal happens under the newer phase III regime (4% of Annual Gross Revenue), then the one-time payouts will be much lesser
  • Ad yields / Ad rates continue to fall further

  • The number of listeners of radio starts falling drastically due to music streaming

  • High dependence on Government / Political spending in certain years

Risks In Events Business

  • Geo-political issues (war/pandemic), especially in H2 can impact the business

  • Vulnerability to erratic weather can lead to event cancellation / poor turnout

  • Competition is very fragmented is since it is a low entry-barrier business. At times, prices are severely undercut by new entrants

  • Quite a few events are IP driven (related to Mirchi). In case the radio license does not renew, it can impact the events too.

Other Risks in Business

  • There is a recent contingent liability of INR ~115 Cr from the income tax department. While the management is confident that it will be resolved with no/little cost to company. There is no guarantee on this.

  • There is a promoter reorganisation that is happening in the parent Times Group between the two brothers Samir & Vineet Jain. ENIL will be part of Vineet Jain’s business. Will need to keep an eye out on the impact of this on ENIL.

  • The INR 400+ Cr of cash may not materialise to us as minority investors in the form of buyback. The promoters may decide to keep the money in the company. The company however does pay a dividend to its shareholders. Current dividend yield is ~2%

How to play the ENIL investment?

Today, all three businesses of Gaana has materially lower profitability due to the reasons mentioned above.

In the next two years,

  • Radio should ideally see a margin up-cycle in 2028/29 due to election year spending

  • Events business should grow larger as number of events increase (also hopefully no geo-political issues like last quarter - very difficult to predict)

  • Gaana should hopefully become profitable or close to profitable by then

Should the above come to fruition, the business can see good re-rating.

In my view, this is a 2-3 year investment thesis for a sizeable investment return to realise. In the meantime you are paid ~2% dividend to hold it.

Any triggers (including faster Gaana turnaround) before it, will only be an upside.

Disclosure: Invested & Biased. Still studying to decide on position sizing within portfolio. Looking for inputs/thesis rebuttal from fellow investors.

Disclaimer: Not SEBI registered advisor. Please do not take any of this as investment advice. I have made a lot of mistakes in the past and I am sure this will continue in the future. Hopefully they are new mistakes.

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