Hi Aditya,
Nice Analysis! I have a couple of observations:
- For the distribution of mcap between promoters and public, I think the ownership of GSPL and GSPC should be further split between Governor and public as they also have a component of public shareholding. Only the effective Governor shareholding should be considered as the promoter shareholding. As per my calculations, the scheme is, in fact, effectively increasing the Governor’s holding in GGL by ~0.50% than the current effective cumulative holding in GGL.
- For the computation of combined mcap, the current total mcap of GSPL cannot be added directly as the market is also valuing GSPL’s holding of GGL shares in the mcap. We can potentially remove the GGL holding value (at some discount, say 60%) from the current market cap and then consider that value in computation of the combined mcap.
Unfortunately, after applying the above two considerations, I have noticed that there is no effective arbitrage in this scheme. There could be value addition through holdco discount removal, synergies, etc. but I guess that is a separate analysis altogether.
Regards,
Anish


