

The Chinese Communist Party's coercive diplomacy

Fergus Hanson, Emilia Currey and Tracy Beattie

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Policy Brief
Report No. 36/2020



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What's the problem?

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is increasingly deploying coercive diplomacy against foreign governments and companies. Coercive diplomacy isn't well understood, and countries and companies have struggled to develop an effective toolkit to push back against and resist it.

This report tracks the CCP's use of coercive diplomacy over the past 10 years, recording 152 cases of coercive diplomacy affecting 27 countries as well as the European Union. The data shows that there's been a sharp escalation in these tactics since 2018. The regions and countries that recorded the most instances of coercive diplomacy over the last decade include Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand and East Asia.

The CCP's coercive tactics can include economic measures (such as trade sanctions, investment restrictions, tourism bans and popular boycotts) and non-economic measures (such as arbitrary detention, restrictions on official travel and state-issued threats). These efforts seek to punish undesired behaviour and focus on issues including securing territorial claims, deploying Huawei's 5G technology, suppressing minorities in Xinjiang, blocking the reception of the Dalai Lama and obscuring the handling of the Covid-19 pandemic.¹

China is the largest trading partner for nearly two-thirds of the world's countries, and its global economic importance gives it significant leverage.² The impacts of coercive diplomacy are exacerbated by the growing dependency of foreign governments and companies on the Chinese market. The economic, business and security risks of that dependency are likely to increase if the CCP can continue to successfully use this form of coercion.

What's the solution?

A coordinated and sustained international effort by foreign governments and companies is needed to counter this coercive diplomacy and uphold global stability. This can be achieved by the following means:

- Increase global situational awareness about the widespread use of coercive diplomacy and the most effective strategies to counter it.
- Respond via coordinated and joint pushback through multilateral forums and by building minilateral coalitions of states affected by the same coercive methods.
- Five Eyes countries should consider adopting a collective economic security measure, analogous to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty establishing NATO. Using their collective intelligence arrangements and by pulling in other partners, authoritative joint attributions could be made of any coercive measures levied against any of the members with collective economic and diplomatic measures taken in response.
- Factor in the heightened risk of doing business and building economic relations with China, particularly with regard to trade flows, supply chains and market share.
- Develop economic, foreign and trade protocols in collaboration with the business community on how best to respond to coercive methods applied to business. In cases of coordinated action against companies, the dispute should be elevated to a state-level discussion to prevent individual companies being picked off and capitulating.

Introduction

First, as a responsible major country, China stands upright with honour. We never strong-arm others, never seek supremacy, never withdraw from commitments, never bully others, and never complain. The word ‘coercion’ has nothing to do with China.

— Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying, October 2019.³

The past three years have seen an escalation in the CCP’s political and strategic use of coercive measures to defend what it defines as China’s ‘core’ national interests.⁴ Those interests include preserving domestic stability, stimulating economic development, upholding territorial integrity and securing great power status.⁵ The CCP has made it clear that these interests are ‘non-negotiable bottom lines of Chinese foreign policy’.⁶ Elizabeth Economy, the Director for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, explains that President Xi Jinping desires to ‘use China’s power to influence others and to establish the global rules of the game’ to protect and promote China’s national interests.⁷

Coercive diplomacy can be defined as ‘non-militarised coercion’ or ‘the use of threats of negative actions to force the target state to change behaviour’.⁸ This is in contrast with chequebook diplomacy, in which positive inducements and confidence-building measures in the forms of foreign assistance and promised investment are used by states, including the CCP, to reward countries.⁹ This carrot-and-stick approach reflects ‘a new level of assertiveness, confidence and ambition’ in the CCP’s foreign policy and economic diplomacy.¹⁰

Every country is concerned about protecting its interests and playing to its strengths. Larger states, such as the US and Russia, have applied pressure to smaller states to get what they want with varying levels of success.¹¹ Nevertheless, the CCP’s approach is unique in that it rarely employs traditional methods of coercive diplomacy, which are regulated through the state’s official capacity.¹² The CCP is instead arbitrarily imposing measures without officially acknowledging the link between the measures taken and the CCP’s interests, which allows for greater flexibility in escalating or de-escalating situations with less accountability and international oversight.¹³ This non-traditional type of coercive diplomacy therefore requires a very different set of policy tools and responses.

This research has documented 152 instances of CCP coercive diplomacy between 2010 and 2020 (Figure 1). Of those cases, 100 targeted foreign governments, while the remaining 52 cases targeted specific companies.

Figure 1: Cases of coercive diplomacy used by the CCP, by year, 2010 to 2019




Figure 1 shows a sharp increase in the number of recorded cases from 2018 onwards. Although it isn't possible to show the full dataset for 2020, within the first eight months there were 34 recorded cases, which equates to more than half of the number recorded in 2019.

Coercive diplomacy from the CCP's perspective

The CCP has been persistent in maintaining the narrative that its actions are proportionate to its pursuit of protecting core national interests. Most Chinese-language sources examined for this report indicate that, from the CCP's perspective, coercive diplomacy is an instrument that's either exclusively used by the West and to which the CCP objects,¹⁴ or is carried out by the general Chinese public and has nothing to do with the government.¹⁵

However, Chinese state-run think tanks and media organisations have explicitly encouraged the use of coercive diplomatic tactics against offending actors.¹⁶ Jian Jisong, an international law expert at the Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, writes that 'China should liberate its thinking, and fully utilise the important tool of unilateral sanctions'.¹⁷ That sentiment is also reflected by the China Institute for Contemporary International Relations, a think tank closely associated with the Ministry of State Security, which states that 'given the fact that our nation has increasing economic power, we should prudently use economic sanctions against those countries that ... threaten our country's national interests'.¹⁸

The CCP, particularly under the leadership of Xi Jinping, has made it increasingly clear that the party 'leads everything' and is in strict control of the country through its 'ideology' and 'structural system'.¹⁹ This differs from liberal democracies in that China's core national interests are closely centred on the CCP's own self-defined political security. Any conduct by foreign states or companies perceived to breach these core national interests is therefore treated as a direct threat to the legitimacy and survival of the CCP (Figure 2).

Figure 2: *Global Times* tweet depicting Australia as a puppet of the US and issuing a warning against key Australian industries



Source: *Global Times* (@globaltimesnews), 'Opinion: If #Australia provokes China more, China will fight it to the end to defend its core interests', Twitter, 2:20 am, 9 July 2020, [online](https://twitter.com/globaltimesnews/status/1274444444444444444).

Methodology

This report draws on English and Chinese open-source information from news articles, policy papers, academic research, company websites, social media posts, official government documents and statements made by politicians and business officials. This report attempted to gather as many examples of coercive diplomacy as could be identified through open-source materials over a 10-year period and the cases underwent external peer review by 27 experts from 16 different countries. However, various limitations in the methodology used and finite human and language resources mean that it's certainly not exhaustive or comprehensive. The resulting database is a starting point and an indicator of practice rather than a complete record.

Coercive diplomacy, by design, is difficult to measure because it takes various forms, is defined differently across the literature and can represent different levels of state authoritativeness, particularly in cases involving nationalist responses. The underlying data for most of this report relies on direct or implied statements by senior CCP officials and authoritative Chinese state media, non-authoritative Chinese media, and perceptions of coercive diplomacy in foreign media reports (although in some circumstances non-Chinese sources may be restricted or controlled in part by governments to prevent any further deterioration in relations with the Chinese state). Where possible, this report supplements this data with analysis from academic sources and in-country experts during the peer review process. Those sources are used to connect the action that the CCP objects to and the

resulting coercive measure, as the CCP doesn't make the link explicit and tends to deny responsibility. However, some examples are likely to have been missed in this dataset or incorrectly specified, as cases might be only partially reported, be reported in error or go entirely unreported.

This report excluded some acts of coercion, such as coercion against civil society actors and individuals, unless there was a clear link to a state dispute. This report also excluded cases in which the measures were considered a normal or proportionate diplomatic response to state conduct and cases that amounted to 'tit-for-tat' measures. For example, coercive acts related to the US–China trade war and the diplomatic fallout from the India–China border clash aren't counted in the dataset. A single incident or dispute can generate multiple instances of coercive diplomacy, which affects the total number of cases recorded in this report. A single dispute might start with a verbal threat and be followed up by a tourist ban and then by some form of trade sanction. Because this report focuses on instances of coercion rather than individual disputes, the methodology used would count that as three different instances of coercion.

Categorising CCP coercion


Coercive diplomacy encompasses a broad range of tactics that can be applied either individually or collectively by the CCP against individual companies and governments. This report divides the methods of CCP coercive diplomacy into eight categories: arbitrary detention or execution, restrictions on official travel, investment restrictions, trade restrictions, tourism restrictions, popular boycotts, pressure on specific companies and state-issued threats.

Arbitrary detention or execution

The CCP has sought to use arbitrary indictments, detainments and executions of foreign nationals for coercive effect against governments 'that are not willing to fall in line with [the CCP's] narrative or to cooperate, according to its own terms'.²⁰ Arbitrary detentions and executions often involve the imposition of enforced disappearances, unusual trial delays, harsh punishments, prolonged interrogations and lack of transparency to maximise the effects of coercion.²¹ The CCP is also known to reinstate Chinese citizenship to detainees to prevent them from being repatriated, placing even further pressure on the governments of their home countries.²²

Restrictions on official travel

Restrictions on official travel involve exerting coercive leverage by downgrading bilateral relations, imposing sanctions on travel to China by foreign leaders and state delegations, or refusing to meet with foreign counterparts.²³ Examples of restrictions on official travel that have previously been imposed by the CCP include refusals of entry into China and cancellations of high-level visits.²⁴ This often subjects the targeted government to greater political pressure in its own country to repair or reset relations to the CCP's advantage.



Investment restrictions

China's emergence as a major global investor has enabled the CCP to impose restrictions on Chinese outbound and inbound investment activities, such as major trade deals, foreign direct investment, infrastructure projects and joint ventures.²⁵ Those investment restrictions can lead to economic consequences unless the target state changes its stance to that demanded by the CCP.²⁶ This method of coercive diplomacy is commonly used against developing countries in conjunction with cheque-book diplomacy.

Trade restrictions

The CCP relies heavily on trade restrictions as a means of coercing states. This tactic involves concerted efforts to disrupt trade flows and restrict foreign access to the Chinese market through import and export restrictions.²⁷ The restrictions can be facilitated through the selective use of international regulations, targeted customs inspections, licence denials, tariff increases or unofficial embargoes.²⁸ Chinese authorities often give unrelated administrative or regulatory explanations for such moves, simply denying the punishment motive.

Tourism restrictions

With direct influence over the movements of its own citizens, the CCP has increasingly turned to tourism restrictions to coerce foreign governments. Given the size of China's tourism market, the effects of Chinese tourism restrictions are often immediate and long-lasting. The CCP has blocked outbound tourism by issuing official travel warnings, suspending package tours organised through state-run travel agencies and banning permits for independent travellers.²⁹ In other instances, the CCP has blocked inbound tourism by suspending visa waivers or limiting access to consular services.³⁰

Popular boycotts

The CCP can retaliate against foreign governments without imposing direct legal or regulatory interventions by encouraging its citizens to engage in nationalistic popular boycott campaigns through state and social media (Figure 3).³¹ Popular boycotts can be distinguished from pressure on specific companies in that they focus on companies and industries from the target state more broadly as a means of punishing the state and influencing its public opinion. Popular boycotts aren't always directly orchestrated by Chinese authorities but can still be encouraged through uncontrolled nationalist protests or negative coverage in state media.³² In the words of the Chinese Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, 'Chinese people's anger is not just verbal but will translate into action.'³³ The centralisation and comprehensive government control of media in China make it easier for the CCP to mobilise its extensive consumer base and amplify existing boycott campaigns to coerce other countries.³⁴ Pál Nyíri from the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam explains that 'in a country that so tightly controls its online spheres, we can assume some degree of at least tacit support simply by the fact that such actions are allowed to continue on the Chinese web.'³⁵

Figure 3: Chinese demonstrators staging a protest to boycott South Korean conglomerate Lotte Group in March 2017 after the heightening of diplomatic tensions between China, South Korea and the US over the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system



Source: AFP, 'Chinese protest against South Korea's Lotte', *The Straits Times*, 5 March 2017, [online](#).

Pressure on specific companies

Multiple foreign companies have been coerced by Chinese authorities and consumers into issuing public apologies and modifying business operations for supposedly 'hurting the feelings of Chinese people'.³⁶ Such objectionable actions include 'mislabelling' Chinese territories on marketing platforms, supporting pro-democracy movements and making references to politically sensitive issues, even if they weren't originally targeted at the Chinese market.³⁷ While this method of coercive diplomacy is similar to popular boycotts, the two methods can be distinguished in that individual companies are the target on these occasions, rather than foreign governments, although the effect can be to demonstrate strength to the country where the company is based. This method of coercive diplomacy leads to adverse economic impacts due to losses in sales, popular endorsement, brand reputation or market access to the mainland.³⁸ For this research, cases were limited to those that had a geopolitical angle and were either explicitly encouraged by state media or were likely to have been tacitly supported (although discerning the latter category necessarily involved a degree of subjectivity).

State-issued threats

Chinese diplomats, embassies, and government ministries seek to use coercive diplomacy by releasing official statements threatening foreign governments.³⁹ Most, if not all, such state-issued threats contain vague terminology such as 'countermeasures',⁴⁰ 'retaliation',⁴¹ 'inflict pain',⁴² and 'the right to further react'.⁴³ Another source of state-issued threats is state-run media organisations. The *Global Times*, *China Daily*, *Xinhua News* and other outlets are often used as mouthpieces by

the CCP to publish warnings through sensationalised English-language commentary aimed at the target state and the international community.⁴⁴ *Global Times* editor-in-chief Hu Xijin has implied on numerous occasions that the *Global Times* reflects the views of Chinese authorities, stating that ‘they can’t speak willfully, but I can’ (Figure 4).⁴⁵ State-issued threats are often used as a prelude to tougher coercive measures.

Figure 4: Tweets by *Global Times* editor-in-chief Hu Xijin sharing information about potential countermeasures by the CCP against the US

The image shows a screenshot of four tweets from the account @HuXijin_GT, posted between May and August 2019. Each tweet features a circular profile picture of Hu Xijin and a blue verification checkmark. The tweets are arranged vertically and separated by thin horizontal lines. Each tweet includes a text body, a date, and engagement metrics (replies, retweets, and likes). The text of the tweets discusses potential countermeasures against US tariffs, such as imposing retaliatory tariffs, restricting rare earth exports, and placing Chinese companies on the Entity List.

Hu Xijin 胡锡进 @HuXijin_GT · Aug 23, 2019
Based on what I know, China will take further **countermeasures** in response to US tariffs on \$300 billion Chinese goods. Beijing will soon unveil a plan of imposing retaliatory tariffs on certain US products. China has ammunition to fight back. The US side will feel the pain.
221 replies 518 retweets 675 likes

Hu Xijin 胡锡进 @HuXijin_GT · May 28, 2019
Based on what I know, China is seriously considering restricting rare earth exports to the US. China may also take other **countermeasures** in the future.
213 replies 486 retweets 611 likes


Hu Xijin 胡锡进 @HuXijin_GT · Jun 6, 2019
Based on what I know, more than one Chinese key departments are collecting experts' opinion on further **countermeasures** against US suppression. Plus, new measure is likely on its way.
127 replies 190 retweets 303 likes

Hu Xijin 胡锡进 @HuXijin_GT · May 31, 2019
Based on what I know, China will take major retaliative measures against the US placing Huawei and other Chinese companies on Entity List. This move indicates Beijing will not wait passively and more **countermeasures** will follow.
104 replies 251 retweets 377 likes

Key findings

This research documents 152 instances of CCP coercive diplomacy between 2010 and 2020. Of those cases, 100 targeted foreign governments (Figure 5), while the other 52 cases targeted foreign companies. Those two categories are analysed separately in this report.

Figure 5: Cases of coercive diplomacy used by the CCP against foreign governments, by category



The most common methods of coercive diplomacy against foreign governments


From the data gathered for this report, the most prominent and common methods of coercive diplomacy used by the CCP to target foreign governments are; **state-issued threats** (with 34 cases recorded between 2010 and 2020, over half of which were recorded in 2020 alone), **trade restrictions** (19 cases recorded) and **tourism restrictions** (17 cases recorded).

Of the 27 countries affected, **Australia** was subjected to the highest number of recorded cases (17 cases), followed by **Canada** (10 cases) and the **United States** (9 cases).

Geopolitical trends

The regions that recorded the most instances of coercive diplomacy were Europe; North America; Australia and New Zealand; and East Asia (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan), while countries in Africa, South America, the Pacific islands and the remaining parts of Asia recorded the smallest number of cases (Figure 6). There were no recorded cases of coercive diplomacy in Central America, Central Asia, and Russia during the relevant period. This divide bears many similarities to the divide between high-income and middle/low-income countries, as defined by the World Bank.⁴⁶

Figure 6: Cases of coercive diplomacy, by region



The most likely reason for this is that the political backers of the CCP are predominantly in the developing world. The CCP has had no reason to subject those countries to coercive diplomatic measures in the past 10 years. The CCP maintains a non-alliance policy, and its supporters aren't a formal block.⁴⁷ However, the recent opposing joint statements to the UN on the CCP's treatment of Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjiang provide a good demonstration of current affiliations. As demonstrated in Figures 7 and 8, there's no overlap between countries subjected to coercive diplomacy by the CCP and those supportive of the CCP's persecution of minorities, with the exception of the Philippines. The CCP's use of coercive diplomacy against the Philippines arose mainly from disputes over the South China Sea. However, since President Rodrigo Duterte publicly announced a foreign policy shift to China in 2016, no further coercive diplomacy cases against the Philippines have been recorded.⁴⁸

Figure 7: Countries that have recorded cases of coercive diplomacy by the CCP between 2010 and 2020





Figure 8: Countries by their stance on the CCP's treatment of Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjiang




- Signatories of joint statement condemning China's Xinjiang policies
- Signatories of joint statement defending China's Xinjiang policies



Another geopolitical trend is the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the CCP’s coercive diplomacy. The pandemic caused a world-wide lockdown that inhibited key forms of diplomatic and economic leverage for the CCP, particularly tourism restrictions (which included foreign students). This likely contributed to the rise in state-issued threats, of which over half of the 34 recorded cases from the last decade occurred after the CCP implemented the 23 January 2020 lockdown in Wuhan (see figure 9).

Figure 9: Cases of state-issued threats recorded before and after the Wuhan lockdown commenced



Threats were also a timely way for the CCP to combat the rise in criticism against its handling of the outbreak. Criticisms came mainly from Western European and Anglosphere countries, but countries such as Brazil also expressed criticism and were accordingly subjected to threats of countermeasures. The increase in state-issued threats in 2020 can also be linked to the CCP’s crackdown in Hong Kong, which prompted states around the world to take positions and actions the CCP disliked at a time when they had limited options to use other forms of coercive diplomacy.

After China started easing its lockdown restrictions, another key form of diplomatic leverage became China’s exports of medical supplies. In line with the above geopolitical analysis, the CCP ‘rapidly escalated’ medical and financial relief efforts to many countries in the developing world, particularly in Africa.⁴⁹ With the much-needed medical supplies as ‘carrots’, the CCP was able to offer them with the expectation that the recipient countries wouldn’t criticise the CCP’s mishandling of the outbreak. The trade in medical supplies could also be used coercively in an attempt to influence state behaviour. For example, in April 2020, the Netherlands angered the CCP by renaming the country’s diplomatic mission in Taiwan as ‘Netherlands Office Taipei’. In response, the state-run *Global Times* published an article that cited ‘Chinese netizens’ who called for the export of medical supplies to the Netherlands to cease and quoted an analyst who raised this move as a means for the CCP to send a warning to the Netherlands. This also worked as a warning to other states about the CCP’s willingness to use coercive measures, even in critical areas such as health care and during a global pandemic.⁵⁰

Divide-and-conquer tactics

Each of the 100 recorded cases of coercive diplomacy involved the CCP acting unilaterally against an individual country. Although the response of countries to the coercive measures wasn't always clear, where it was possible to discern the reaction, most countries made re-establishing good relations the priority. For example, the CCP enacted multiple coercive measures against Norway in 2010 in retaliation to the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo. After those measures were enacted, UN voting patterns showed closer alignment between China and Norway, and the Norwegian Government supported the admission of China as an observer in the Arctic Council in 2013 and refused to meet with the Dalai Lama for the first time in 2014 (although Norway, like many other countries, may have ceased those meetings in response to China's general growing global clout, without the fallout from the awarding of the prize).⁵¹ The CCP's actions succeeded in influencing Norway's foreign policy, as the concessions required to appease the party were relatively minor (the same level of success mightn't have been achieved had the required concession been bigger).⁵² This type of result seems likely only to license further coercion by the CCP against others.

The CCP intentionally isolates countries in this way to retain comparative strength and ensure the effectiveness of its coercive methods. The CCP's comparative strength would be significantly diminished if countries that have been subjected to similar coercive diplomatic tactics joined forces to counter them. Remarkably, countries have so far failed to band together to counter CCP coercion, even when that's been manifestly in their interests. This may be due to a lack of awareness of the widespread use by the CCP of coercive diplomacy, a lack of strategic analysis by foreign ministries of the best way to counter such coercion, or both.

A notable example of this failure involved Canada and Australia. Just days following the arrest of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou in Canada pursuant to the US–Canada extradition treaty, the CCP arbitrarily arrested Canadian citizens Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor. It took three weeks before Australia released a statement expressing its 'concerns' over the Canadians' detention.⁵³ The statement fell short of condemning the CCP's actions and didn't call for the immediate release of the Canadians, despite two Australian citizens having been subjected to arbitrary detention the previous year and both of them still being detained.⁵⁴ Australia's delay in issuing the statement meant that Australia and Canada (as well as the EU and US) weren't unified in their response to the CCP's actions and therefore had little impact.

Further analysis on the most common methods of coercive diplomacy against foreign governments

State-issued threats

In addition to the Covid-19 pandemic significantly limiting other forms of coercive diplomacy available to the CCP in 2020 (discussed above) a likely reason for the high rate of state-issued threats is because they are the quickest and most cost-effective form of coercive diplomacy and carry the lowest risk to the CCP's interests. Our research has found these can be enough, on their own, to coerce the target state into changing course if the state places limited political value on the source of the dispute⁵⁵ (although threats were not enough to change behaviour if the stakes were high enough, as the in-depth case studies on pages 18–21 illustrate).

Trade restrictions

This report recorded 19 cases of trade restrictions between 2010 and 2020, over half of which occurred since 2018. In all recorded cases, the CCP never officially implemented official sanctions against the target state; instead, an unrelated official reason was provided (such as non-compliance with sanitation or labelling requirements) or no reason was given at all. There are strong indicators for each recorded case that the CCP's measures were designed to thinly disguise the use of trade to punish and change the behaviour of target states.

For some issues, to be effective, the target state needs to be aware that the trade measures are being levied as punishment for a given action, so, while direct causal relationships aren't made explicit by the CCP, the trade restrictions are made in such a way as to make the connection clear to the target state. For other issues, it can be useful to maintain greater ambiguity to put the target state off balance, not knowing exactly why the restrictions are happening but only that the CCP is displeased and that concessions in some form are needed. Both approaches help the CCP maintain its official stance that coercive diplomacy is exclusively employed by the West.⁵⁶ By providing an unrelated official reason to disguise coercive diplomatic measures, the CCP is able to maintain plausible deniability, which offers some protection against countries raising the issue through international channels, such as the World Trade Organization.⁵⁷

The recorded cases of trade restrictions also demonstrate that the CCP is highly selective in the commodities it targets in order to send a powerful message to target states whilst minimising any harm to its own interests.⁵⁸ For example, the CCP imposed restrictions on Canadian meat imports in June 2019 in retaliation against the arrest of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou.⁵⁹ However, the CCP retracted these restrictions just 5 months later despite the tensions over this issue persisting, after the effects of a swine fever outbreak continued to drive domestic pork prices unsustainably high.⁶⁰ With China's domestic supply not being expected to recover for two or three years (especially with the risk of further outbreaks) and inflation rates nearing an 8 year high as a result,⁶¹ it was ultimately in the CCP's interests to make this concession.⁶² This case illustrates some of the constraints on the CCP's use of economic coercion.

The CCP's recent trade restrictions against Australian barley (which are widely interpreted to be retaliation for Australia pushing for an inquiry into the origins and handling of the Covid-19 outbreak) further illustrate how these measures are often 'aligned with—or constrained by—market trends and conditions'.⁶³ Of all the trade restriction cases recorded, the CCP's measures imposed on barley stand out as seemingly having the biggest effect on China's own trade practices, as Australian barley accounted for up to 80% of China's barley imports in recent years.⁶⁴ However, this in fact aligns with the CCP's goal of self-sufficiency and import diversification.⁶⁵ Furthermore, the restrictions coincided with a significant decline in China's domestic demand for barley.⁶⁶ Though the sanctions were 'triggered' by Australia's call for the Covid-19 inquiry, the CCP wanted to employ them anyway due to the benefit that would provide to the Chinese domestic market.⁶⁷ As argued by Scott Waldron from the University of Queensland, it is significant that the CCP has not imposed restrictions in relation to wool, given China buys approximately 75% of Australia's wool exports.⁶⁸

The selective use of trade restrictions simultaneously minimises impacts on Chinese consumers and businesses, while maintaining leverage against the target state. Severe disruption to all trade with a target state would not only negatively affect Chinese consumers and businesses but would also exhaust all leverage against the target state in one go and completely undermine the CCP's narrative of plausible deniability. To date, the CCP has aimed to find a balance between punishing a country enough to make it change its behaviour and running the risk of damaging relations to the point at which the state no longer sees value in appeasing the CCP or at which the Chinese economy would be damaged. As demonstrated by the case studies, the CCP selects only individual commodities or services to target with restrictions. While targeted restrictions were in place, it was common for other sectors within the same state to experience an increase in Chinese trade. This was the case in Canada in 2019; after Canadian canola imports were blocked in China, Canadian wheat exporters experienced a rise in wheat imports into China.⁶⁹ Similarly, in August 2020, trade between China and Australia was 4% higher than in the previous year, despite the constraints of the Covid-19 pandemic and a deterioration in bilateral relations.⁷⁰


Tourism restrictions

Tourism restrictions are the third most common form of coercive diplomacy used to target foreign governments identified through this research. This report recorded 17 cases between 2010 and 2020, half of which occurred after 2018. China is the world's largest outbound tourism market. It accounts for more than 20% of global tourism, and 150 million Chinese tourists travelled abroad and spent a combined total of US\$277 billion in 2018.⁷¹ Subject to the long-term impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic on large-scale tourism, those figures are likely to continue to increase and further grow the importance of the Chinese tourist market, as only an estimated 10% of Chinese citizens hold passports.⁷²

The CCP holds considerable influence over its outbound tourism market,⁷³ which it has manipulated to promote foreign policy objectives. As demonstrated in the recorded cases, the CCP controls outbound tourism through issuing travel warnings and using its regulatory powers over travel agents to direct them to avoid selling package tours to a blacklisted country. The travel restrictions necessitated by the Covid-19 pandemic have not prevented the CCP from threatening tourism restrictions or issuing travel warnings. The lack of international travel at the time these warnings were issued highlights the fact that the measures are usually not in response to the reasons claimed by the CCP and are primarily used to coerce.

In-depth case studies

Norway, South Korea, Canada and Australia have each individually experienced the full spectrum of the CCP's coercive diplomatic tactics. Despite obvious temporal and geographical differences among the following four case studies, the CCP's actions followed a remarkably similar pattern.



In-Depth Case Study: South Korea



TRIGGER

8 July 2016

South Korea announced the installation of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system to focus on threats from North Korea.

July 2016

STATE-ISSUED THREAT



The Chinese Foreign Ministry released a statement expressing its 'strong dissatisfaction and firm opposition' to the deployment of the THAAD system.¹ The following day, the Global Times released an article recommending China impose countermeasures against South Korea, from cutting off economic ties to restricting official travel, in retaliation to South Korea's decision.

It has been estimated that in July 2016 alone, 'the Chinese government issued 27 statements and the People's Daily ran 265 articles criticising Seoul's decision.'²



TRADE RESTRICTIONS

August 2016

A key feature of the retaliatory restrictions against South Korea was that China intentionally selected the entertainment industry (followed by tourism) in order to maximise the 'symbolic and psychological impact of the sanctions'.⁴

From August 2016, Korean celebrities no longer appeared in Chinese television shows and commercials, despite being enormously popular in China at the time.³ Tours and concerts were also cancelled, and although the reason was not made clear to the Chinese population, it was widely rumoured that Chinese state agencies had banned the Korean entertainment industry.

October 2016

TOURISM RESTRICTIONS



In October 2016 China's National Tourism Administration 'issued informal instructions to travel agencies to decrease the number of outbound travellers to South Korea by 20 percent'.⁵ This caused the stock prices of South Korean hotels and duty free shops to fall by 7-8 percent.⁶

Chinese tourist numbers dropped by 60 percent in the first few months after these restrictions were introduced.⁸ The financial impact of these restrictions were significant for South Korea, especially considering that in the preceding year Chinese tourists made up 47 percent of all tourist arrivals. An estimated revenue loss of \$15.62 billion USD has been linked to the tourism restrictions.⁹

After this move failed to deter South Korea from installing the THAAD system, broader travel restrictions were introduced after the installation process began in March 2017. This is alleged to have included instructions to travel companies stating that if they failed to comply with the ban they would be fined and/or have their licence revoked, although this was not directly acknowledged by Beijing.⁷

Although restrictions eased in 2018, tourism numbers have yet to return to pre-2016 levels.¹⁰



POPULAR BOYCOTT

November 2016

When the installation process of the THAAD system continued into 2017, Chinese authorities reportedly subjected a number of South Korean consumer goods companies to various 'informal punitive measures'.¹⁴

Chinese authorities facilitated a boycott against Lotte Group, a South Korean multinational conglomerate, after it stepped forward to provide a golf course for the site of the THAAD system in November 2016.¹¹

Jeongseok Lee argues that 'China minimized the negative impact on its own economy by carefully targeting the South Korean companies outside of its manufacturing value chain'.¹⁵ China would have inflicted greater economic harm on South Korea if it had targeted 'intermediary goods in the IT sector' which account for 50 percent of South Korea's exports to China.¹⁶ However, this would have had too significant an impact on China's own companies, as there were no viable alternative providers.

State-owned media also spearheaded a campaign against South Korean car manufacturers Hyundai and Kia, sales of which dropped 52 percent, pushing them to their lowest levels since 2014. Images of a Hyundai vehicle vandalised by an angry mob went viral in March 2017.¹²

A recent study found that while Chinese authorities had taken visible measures to assist in boycotting South Korean products, the reduced consumption of these products is also attributable to voluntary boycotts by Chinese consumers.¹³

1. Jeongseok Lee, "Back to Normal? the End of the THAAD Dispute between China and South Korea," *China Brief* 17, no. 15 (2017).

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Darren J. Lim, Victor A. Ferguson and Rosa Bishop, "Chinese Outbound Tourism as an Instrument of Economic Statecraft," *Journal of Contemporary China* (2020): 12.

6. Jeongseok Lee, "Back to Normal? the End of the THAAD Dispute between China and South Korea," *China Brief* 17, no. 15 (2017).

7. Darren J. Lim, Victor A. Ferguson and Rosa Bishop, "Chinese Outbound Tourism as an Instrument of Economic Statecraft," *Journal of Contemporary China* (2020): 12.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid, 13.

10. Ibid.

11. Jeongseok Lee, "Back to Normal? the End of the THAAD Dispute between China and South Korea," *China Brief* 17, no. 15 (2017).

12. Celine Ce, "South Korea's Hyundai, Kia sales halve in China amid diplomatic spat over THAAD" *The South China Morning Post*, April 5, 2017, <https://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/2085118/south-koreas-hyundai-kia-sales-halve-china-amid-diplomatic-spat>


13. Sun-Ae Shin, Jinkwon Lee and Uk Hwang, "Voluntary and Government Induced Consumer Boycotts: The Case of a Conflict between China and Korea Regarding THAAD," *Journal of Economic Studies* 37, no.1 (2019): 179.

14. Jeongseok Lee, "Back to Normal? the End of the THAAD Dispute between China and South Korea," *China Brief* 17, no. 15 (2017).

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

In-Depth Case Study: Canada



In-Depth Case Study: Australia



TRIGGER

April 2020

Australia called for an investigation into the origins and handling of the Covid-19 outbreak.

April 2020

STATE-ISSUED THREAT



The Chinese Ambassador to Australia, Cheng Jingye, warned of a mass boycott by China of Australian services and products in response to Australia's calls for a coronavirus inquiry in May 2020.¹

In threatening the boycott, Cheng specifically mentioned tourism restrictions, saying that Australia's push for the inquiry could cause Chinese tourists and students to have 'second thoughts' about coming to Australia. Cheng further stated that Chinese citizens will say 'Why should we drink Australian wine? Eat Australian beef?'²



TRADE RESTRICTIONS

12 May 2020

A major Chinese commodities trader warned of the risk that China's ban posed to Australia's long-term imports to China if it weren't lifted within six months. The state-owned commodity trading company, Xiamen Xiangyu, temporarily shifted to other Australian abattoirs. However, it was reported that the associated costs and logistics meant that the company would be likely to have to import US beef in the near future if the ban were not lifted.⁴

China banned imports of beef from four Australian abattoirs. Chinese authorities stated that the ban was due to 'labelling and health certificate requirements'. However, the ban came after the ambassador threatened an economic backlash if Australia pursued the Covid-19 inquiry.³

18 May 2020

TRADE RESTRICTIONS



China imposed an anti-dumping duty of 73.6% and an anti-subsidy duty of 6.9% on Australian barley. It was widely reported that these measures were imposed as a form of economic coercion against Australia's call for the inquiry.⁵

While the investigation was launched well before the Covid-19 pandemic began, it nevertheless coincided with deteriorating bilateral relations at that time.⁹ According to Weihuan Zhou, the CCP strategically launched the investigation into barley, one of Australia's major exports, in retaliation for Australia's use of anti-dumping measures against China.¹⁰

Similarly to the restrictions on Australian beef, these measures were implemented after the Chinese Ambassador made his threats. However, Chinese Commerce Minister Zhong Shan stated that the measures were based on evidence and the result of an investigation that had commenced 18 months before.⁶

Of all the trade restriction cases recorded, this case stands out as having the biggest perceived effect on China's own trade practices, as barley from Australia accounted for up to 80% of China's barley imports in recent years. However, the decision encourages the diversification of China's import markets and protects its domestic industry.¹¹

Industry leaders in Australia called the investigation a sham, and the outcomes announced by China haven't been substantiated.⁷ Scott Waldron drew attention to a number of untested and spurious claims on which the conclusions of the investigation were based.⁸

Despite the complex range of reasons behind the CCP's implementation of these measures, it's likely that Australia's call for the Covid-19 investigation was the 'trigger'.¹²

The Australian grain industry warned that the tariffs would effectively halt shipments of barley to China, with a potential cost to rural and regional Australian economies of at least A\$500 million per year.¹³



TOURISM RESTRICTIONS

6 June 2020

Dr Delia Lin, a senior lecturer from the Asia Institute at the University of Melbourne, stated that the warning wasn't about genuine concern over the safety of Chinese citizens, especially as Covid-19 travel restrictions rendered it 'meaningless'. Instead, the warning was 'intended to damage the image of Australia' and demonstrate the strength of China.¹⁵

The Chinese Ministry of Culture and Tourism issued a travel warning against Australia. The warning came after the Chinese state-owned Global Times published an article urging Chinese students to reconsider further studies in Australia, citing, among other things, Australia's support for an investigation into the Covid-19 pandemic.¹⁴

10 June 2020

ARBITRARY EXECUTION



In June 2020, Australian citizen Karm Gillespie was sentenced to death by a Chinese court for drug trafficking. Originally arrested in 2013, Gillespie was made to wait five years between his two-day trial in 2014 and 2015 and his sentencing.¹⁶

Some media and commentators in the public discourse have linked Gillespie's sentence with the deteriorating bilateral relations between China and Australia. A spokesperson from the Chinese Foreign Ministry refuted this claim.¹⁷



STATE-ISSUED THREAT

18 August 2020

The Australian Minister for Trade Simon Birmingham disputed the CCP's claims of dumping, stating that 'Australian wine is not sold at below-market prices and exports are not subsidised'.¹⁹ Victorian wine consultant James Hall reiterated that Australian wine has the 'second-highest prices per litre of any wine being imported into China' further stating that 'it's a decision that seems to be political'.²⁰

The Chinese Ministry of Commerce announced it would launch an anti-dumping investigation into Australian wine amid growing tensions between China and Australia. Cheng Jinye, the Chinese Ambassador to Australia, first alluded to a boycott of Australian wine in April 2020 after the Australian government called for an independent inquiry into the Covid-19 pandemic. He stated in a newspaper interview that 'maybe [Chinese citizens] will say 'why should we drink Australian wine?''¹⁸

1. Anthony Galloway, Eryk Bagshaw, 'Australia could lose billions from Chinese Government boycott threat', Sydney Morning Herald, 27 April 2020, online.

2. Galloway & Bagshaw, 'Australia could lose billions from Chinese Government boycott threat'.

3. Kath Sullivan, Jodie Gunders, 'Red-meat processors have beef sales to China suspended as trade barriers escalate', ABC News, 12 May 2020, online.

4. Michael Smith, 'Australian beef exports threatened as Chinese buyers look to US', Financial Review, 21 June 2020, online.

5. Scott Waldron, 'China's tariffs on Australian barley: coercion, protectionism, or both?', The Diplomat, 19 June 2020, online.

6. 'China defends tariffs on Australia's barley as relations sour', Bloomberg, 25 May 2020, online.

7. Michael Smith, Brad Thompson, 'China pulls the trigger on 80pc Australian barley tariffs', Australian Financial Review, 18 May 2020, online.

8. Scott Waldron, 'The exposure of Australian agriculture to risks from China: the cases of barley and beef', School of Agriculture and Food Sciences, University of Queensland, 2020, 13.

9. Waldron, 'China's tariffs on Australian barley: coercion, protectionism, or both?'.

10. Weihuan Zhou, 'Barley is not a random choice—here's the real reason China is taking on Australia over dumping', The Conversation, 23 November 2018, online.

11. Waldron, 'China's tariffs on Australian barley: coercion, protectionism, or both?'.

12. Waldron, 'China's tariffs on Australian barley: coercion, protectionism, or both?'.

13. Daniel Hurst, 'Why has China slapped tariffs on Australian barley and what can Australia do about it?', The Guardian, 20 May 2020, online.

14. Max Walden, 'Australia says China travel warning "unhelpful" amid escalating diplomatic row', ABC News, 8 June 2020, online.

15. Walden, 'Australia says China travel warning "unhelpful" amid escalating diplomatic row'.

16. Bill Birtles, 'Karm Gillespie's lawyer reveals Australian made to wait five years for death sentence after trial', ABC News, 16 June 2020, online.

17. Birtles, 'Karm Gillespie's lawyer reveals Australian made to wait five years for death sentence after trial'.

18. 'Australia warns China against using 'economic coercion' to discourage coronavirus probe', South China Morning Post, 27 April 2020, online.

19. Stephen Dziedzic, 'China launches anti-dumping investigation into Australian wine exports', ABC News, 18 August 2020, online.

20. Dziedzic, 'China launches anti-dumping investigation into Australian wine exports'.

Coercive diplomacy against foreign companies

This report documents 52 cases of pressure applied by or at least encouraged by the CCP against foreign companies. In many of the recorded cases, the CCP applied pressure by inciting backlash from Chinese consumers, blocking websites or adding legal penalties. Even in cases in which the CCP can't be directly linked to the backlash, it has arguably encouraged this consumer response by not censoring it. This is despite the backlash being overtly political and something that would ordinarily attract censorship in China if it were directed against anything contrary to the CCP's interests.

The effectiveness of the CCP's coercion against companies can be measured by the rate at which apologies were issued in response to the coercion. Of the cases recorded in this report, 82.7% of the companies issued apologies. Almost no companies had their own governments step up to help them respond (Figures 10, 11 and 12).

Figure 10: Percentages of companies that have issued apologies, complied with directions from Chinese state authorities, or both




Figure 11: An image portraying foreign brands being targeted by the Chinese social media platform Weibo



Source: Manya Koetse, 'Hong Kong protests: Brand "witch hunt" takes over Chinese internet', *BBC News*, 15 August 2019, [online](#).

Figure 12: An official apology by Italian luxury brand Versace was shared online after it received backlash for designing T-shirts that implied that Hong Kong and Macau are independent territories

VERSACE

我对我们公司近期造成的一个失误而深感抱歉，目前该事件正在社交媒体上被讨论。我一直尊重中国国家主权，这就是我为什么想亲自为这种错误以及由此而产生的不良影响而道歉。

Source: VERSACE (@Versace), 'The Company apologizes for the design of its product and a recall of the t-shirt has been implemented in July', *Twitter*, 7:36 pm, 11 August 2019, [online](#).

VERSACE

I AM DEEPLY SORRY FOR THE UNFORTUNATE RECENT ERROR THAT WAS MADE BY OUR COMPANY AND THAT IS BEING CURRENTLY DISCUSSED ON VARIOUS SOCIAL MEDIA CHANNELS. NEVER HAVE I WANTED TO DISRESPECT CHINA'S NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THIS IS WHY I WANTED TO PERSONALLY APOLOGIZE FOR SUCH INACCURACY AND FOR ANY DISTRESS THAT IT MIGHT HAVE CAUSED.

The success of coercive measures against businesses largely stems from companies being profit-driven and having limited power relative to the world's second largest economy. China's consumer spending overtook the US's for the first time in 2019,⁷⁴ so companies are unlikely to risk losing access to that market. Targeting companies allows the CCP to achieve political ends while keeping the dispute at arm's length from governments that would be better placed to push back. For example, in April 2018, the Chinese Civil Aviation Administration ordered 36 international airlines to remove all references from their websites that suggested Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau were separate regions or risk having the company's 'serious dishonesty' recorded and facing 'disciplinary actions'.⁷⁵ By July 2018, all 36 airlines, including British Airways, Japan Airlines, Lufthansa and Qantas, had modified their websites and other promotional material to reflect the CCP's views. Delta Airlines went further and apologised for its listing, stating 'We are fully committed to China and to our Chinese customers.'⁷⁶ If the governments of the countries where the airlines were headquartered had instead banded together to counter the threat, the outcome would likely have been very different.

The emergence of a counter-coercion strategy

A number of foreign governments, including those of Australia, Canada, Japan, India, the UK and the US, are starting to call out the CCP's coercive diplomacy as it happens and are working on ways to develop an effective counter-coercion strategy.⁷⁷ For example, Australia set the foundations for a counter-coercion strategy back in June 2017 during the 16th Shangri-La Dialogue when then Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull stated that 'a coercive China would find its neighbours resenting demands they cede their autonomy and strategic space, and look to counterweight Beijing's power by bolstering alliances and partnerships.'⁷⁸ The Australian Government then enacted new national security and foreign interference legislation, citing 'disturbing reports about Chinese influence'.⁷⁹ Three years later, in June 2020, Prime Minister Scott Morrison formally declared that Australia won't be intimidated by threats from the CCP and won't trade its values in response to 'coercion'.⁸⁰ In August 2020, Morrison affirmed that Australia wants to 'see international engagement framed by agreed rules and norms, not crude economic or political coercion' in reference to the CCP and 'will call it as we see it'.⁸¹ Another example was in August 2020 when the Five Eyes intelligence alliance issued a joint statement demonstrating grave concern over the disqualification of pro-democracy candidates in the Hong Kong Legislative Council elections and condemning the suppression of Hong Kong citizens' rights and freedoms following the imposition of a new national security law by the CCP.⁸² The joint statement came after the CCP threatened countermeasures against all five member states for suspending extradition treaties and providing assistance to Hong Kong citizens.⁸³ While counter-coercion strategies remain unclear for the rest of the world, they're likely to increase in the future as the CCP continues with its coercive tactics.

Future challenges and recommendations

Coercive diplomacy is an important tool of Chinese foreign policy that the CCP will continue to use against foreign governments and companies, particularly in democratic countries. The CCP's practice of coercive diplomacy is very broad in its targets, intentions, methods and levels of retaliation. Therefore, this report seeks to offer flexible policy options that can be implemented across different levels of society.

Recommendation 1: Increase global situational awareness about coercive diplomacy

The current failure of countries and companies to effectively deter coercive diplomacy suggests that there's limited appreciation of its prevalence and limited discussion of effective countermeasures. Governments could remedy this by tasking their foreign ministries to track coercive diplomacy and use that data to identify potential coalitions, particularly in the areas of economic cooperation, trade liberalisation and technological development. Research institutions could also be encouraged to systematically track instances of coercive diplomacy.

Recommendation 2: Respond via coordinated and joint pushback

Responding to coercive threats in an individual capacity, whether as a state or as a company, will only work for the US, given China's current size and heft. To be effective, governments need to counter the CCP's divide-and-conquer tactics by pursuing coordinated and joint pushback through multilateral forums such as the G7, G10 and European Union and by building minilateral coalitions of countries affected by the same coercive methods. Those coalitions could be used to publicly call out examples of coercion in the same way that's currently used to attribute cyberattacks, and follow that up with countermeasures. In many cases, it would be unethical and against core values to reciprocate with like-for-like countermeasures (for example, arbitrary arrests and executions), so countermeasures will need to target alternative areas, such as through joint statements, economic sanctions or official travel restrictions.

Recommendation 3: Establish a 5 Eyes collective economic security pact

The Five Eyes countries should consider adopting a collective economic security measure, analogous to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty establishing NATO ("an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all"). Using their collective intelligence arrangements, the Five Eyes countries could make authoritative joint attributions of any coercive measures levied against any of the five members and take collective economic and diplomatic measures in retaliation. Such an arrangement could also involve an agreement to abstain from taking advantage of any coercive trade measures imposed by the CCP (for example, refusing to fill the shortfall created by banning Canadian pork). While this approach may be less attractive to the current US Administration it may be of interest to future administrations and would be highly effective in deterring the use of coercive diplomatic measures.

Recommendation 4: Develop protocols in collaboration with the business community to counter coercive measures targeting companies

Affected governments should work more closely with business groups to develop protocols on how to best respond to economic coercive methods applied by the CCP. The increasing risk of economic coercion by the party should be assessed as a structural matter in economic and trade policies, not just as isolated or unexpected acts in response to particular decisions and events. In cases of coordinated action against companies, the dispute should be elevated to a state-level discussion to prevent individual companies from being picked off and being forced to capitulate. In the case involving 36 global airlines, a more effective approach would have involved governments assuming the lead in responding to the ultimatum, working to form a global coalition of countries and their airlines that refused to be pressured, and countering the coercion by threatening reciprocal bans on access to their markets.

Recommendation 5: Factor in the heightened risk of doing business and building economic relations with China

As the CCP uses economic coercion more often, and more overtly, foreign companies with business operations in China need to factor in the increasing risk to trade flows, supply chains and market share. That risk is significant enough to warrant board-level attention and will no doubt be a standing topic in audit committees because of its bottom-line impact. This requires board-level involvement to protect shareholder value and is also likely to require companies to work more closely with their home government policymakers.

Appendix

Table 1: Cases of CCP coercive diplomacy targeting foreign governments

Country	Date	Category	Information
Australia	August 2020	State-issued threat	According to ABC News , the Chinese Ministry of Commerce announced it would launch an anti-dumping investigation into Australian wine in August 2020 amid growing tensions between China and Australia. Chinese officials further warned that a second investigation may be launched to determine whether Australian wine exports were benefiting from government subsidies. Cheng Jinye, the Chinese Ambassador to Australia, first alluded to a boycott of Australian wine in April 2020 after the Australian government called for an independent inquiry into the Covid-19 pandemic. He stated in a newspaper interview that ‘maybe [Chinese citizens] will say ‘why should we drink Australian wine?’. The Australian Minister for Trade Simon Birmingham disputed the CCP’s claims of dumping, stating that ‘Australian wine is not sold at below-market prices and exports are not subsidised’. Victorian wine consultant James Hall reiterated that Australian wine has the ‘second-highest prices per litre of any wine being imported into China’ further stating that ‘it’s a decision that seems to be political’. Jeffrey Wilson from the Perth USAsia Centre identified this move as fitting in with the CCPs wider pattern of coercion.
Australia	July 2020	State-issued threat	The Chinese state-run Global Times published an article stating that Australia ‘will face unbearable consequences by undermining its ties with China’ after Canberra released a joint statement with the US during the 30th Australia–US Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) that denied China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea. Other issues that were raised during the consultations included human rights violations in Xinjiang and Hong Kong’s national security law. Chen Hong, the Director of the Australian Studies Centre at East China Normal University, further warned that ‘Although China would prefer not to use trade exchanges as leverage, strained China–Australia ties and rising anti-China sentiment in Australia would discourage economic exchanges.’
Australia	July 2020	State-issued threat	According to ABC News , Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian condemned Australia’s decision to suspend its extradition treaty with Hong Kong and provide a pathway to permanent residency for Hong Kong citizens after the implementation of Hong Kong’s national security law. Zhao stated that China reserved the right to ‘take actions’ against Australia. The Australian Financial Review reported that a number of major state-backed newspapers in China, including the Shanghai Morning Post, Xinhua News and Nanjing Daily, ran articles about racist attacks in Australia and denied comments made by Australian politicians regarding the Covid-19 pandemic, cyberattacks and human rights violations.

Country	Date	Category	Information
Australia	June 2020	Arbitrary detention / execution	According to ABC News , Australian citizen Karm Gillespie was sentenced to death in China on drug trafficking charges. Gillespie was arrested for carrying 7.5 kilograms of methamphetamine out of Guangzhou Baiyun Airport in 2014. It was reported that Gillespie's lawyers refrained from releasing any public statements about his imprisonment for fear of jeopardising negotiations with China. Former fraud investigator and detainee Peter Humphrey said that Gillespie's death sentence 'had nothing to do with the original case against him'. The timing of Gillespie's sentence and a lengthy trial delay that resulted in five years of imprisonment can be interpreted as a likely sign of Chinese diplomatic leverage following Australia's call for an independent inquiry into the Covid-19 outbreak. However, Chinese Foreign Ministry's spokesperson Zhao Lijian insisted that Gillespie's case 'had nothing to do with the bilateral relationship', while Chinese state media accused Australia of being 'increasingly irrational'.
Australia	June 2020	Tourism restrictions	According to ABC News , the Chinese Ministry of Culture and Tourism issued a travel warning against Australia, citing a 'significant increase' in racial violence against Chinese citizens. The travel warning came after the Global Times published an article urging Chinese students to reconsider further studies in Australia, which generated thousands of concerned comments on Chinese social media. Delia Lin, a senior lecturer from the University of Melbourne's Asia Institute, stated that the travel warning was 'not about genuine concern over the safety of Chinese citizens', as the Covid-19 pandemic had already restricted international travel. Rather, the warning was 'intended to damage the image of Australia' following Australia's call for an independent inquiry into the Covid-19 pandemic.
Australia	May 2020	Trade restrictions	According to Bloomberg News , China imposed an anti-dumping duty of 73.6% and an anti-subsidy duty of 6.9% on Australian barley. It was widely reported that those measures were imposed as a form of economic coercion against Australia's call for an inquiry into the handling of the Covid-19 pandemic, especially since they were implemented after Cheng Jingye, China's ambassador to Australia, threatened trade retaliation in response to the call for the inquiry. However, Chinese Commerce Minister Zhong Shan asserted that the measures were based on evidence and the result of an investigation that commenced 18 months before. The Australian Government has refuted the claim that the measures were based on evidence. Scott Waldron has also drawn attention to a number of untested and spurious claims on which the conclusions of the investigation were based. ⁸⁴ While the investigation was launched well before the Covid-19 pandemic had even started, it nevertheless coincided with deteriorating bilateral relations at that time. According to Weihuan Zhou , the CCP strategically launched the investigation into barley, which is one of Australia's major exports to China, in retaliation for Australia's use of anti-dumping measures against China. ⁸⁵ Despite the complex range of reasons for the CCP to implement these measures, it's likely that Australia's call for the Covid-19 investigation was the 'trigger'. The Australian grain industry warned that the tariffs would effectively halt shipments of barley to China, at a potential cost to rural and regional Australian economies of A\$500 million per year.

Country	Date	Category	Information
Australia	May 2020	Trade restrictions	According to <i>The Economist</i> , China directly banned beef imports from Australia's four largest meat processing plants on 12 May in response to Australia pressing for an independent inquiry into the origins of the Covid-19 outbreak. Chinese authorities officially cited labelling issues as the reason for the ban, which directly affected 35% of Australia's total beef exports to China. However, federal Agriculture Minister David Littleproud confirmed that all four abattoirs had met the 30-day requirement to address labelling concerns. The <i>South China Morning Post</i> reported that two New Zealand processors were unaffected by this ban, despite similar breaches.
Australia	April 2020	State-issued threat	According to the <i>Australian Financial Review</i> , the Chinese ambassador to Australia, Cheng Jingye, warned of a mass boycott of Australian goods and services after the government's call for an independent Covid-19 inquiry. Cheng stated in an interview that 'the Chinese public is frustrated, dismayed and disappointed with what Australia is doing.' Australia faced similar criticisms and warnings from the Chinese Embassy in Canberra and Chinese state-owned media, and the Global Times compared Australia to 'chewing gum stuck on the sole of China's shoe'.
Australia	November 2019	Restrictions on official travel	According to <i>ABC News</i> , Australian parliamentarians Andrew Hastie and James Paterson were denied visas for travel to China as part of a study tour organised by the China Matters think tank. The Chinese Embassy in Canberra stated that the decisions on the visa refusals were due to the parliamentarians' 'unwarranted attacks' against China. Hastie and Paterson have previously criticised the Chinese Government for its human rights violations against the Uyghur population in the Xinjiang region and interference in Australian political institutions. A spokesperson from the Chinese Embassy stated that the door for dialogue, such as the study tour, would remain open if 'the people concerned genuinely repent and redress their mistakes'. Both Hastie and Paterson rejected the request to 'repent'.
Australia	February 2019	Trade restrictions	According to <i>The Guardian</i> , Australian coal imports were experiencing significant delays at Chinese ports. This resulted in a 'sharp drop' in the share price of a number of Australian coal export companies as Chinese buyers made the switch to imports from Indonesia and Russia, which reportedly didn't experience any delays at the border. Chinese official explanations for the delays related to the need for environmental checks, and both Chinese and Australian government officials denied the restrictions were politically motivated. However, <i>SBS News</i> reported that analysts and former Australian Government officials were among those who supported the belief that the restrictions imposed on Australian coal were related to increased bilateral tensions over Australia's ban on the use of Huawei's equipment for building 5G infrastructure, among other issues.
Australia	August 2018	Restrictions on official travel	According to the <i>Australian Financial Review</i> , the Australian Government failed to obtain approval from the Chinese Government for formal ministerial invitations to attend the 2018 Australia Week in China event, which is a major showcase for Australian trade and business in China. The event was ultimately abandoned, likely as a direct response to Australia's introduction of new foreign interference laws that were perceived to be anti-China. Then Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull eventually delivered a relationship 'reset' speech in August 2018, which was officially welcomed by the Chinese Government.

Country	Date	Category	Information
Australia	August 2018	State-issued threat	The Chinese Ministry of Commerce reportedly stated that Australia made the ‘wrong decision’ on banning Huawei from its national 5G infrastructure and warned that ‘if Sino-Australian economic ties are hurt, Australia is the one that will bear more losses, not China.’ This threat precipitated a series of retaliatory articles run by the <i>Global Times</i> and the <i>China Daily</i> . One article published by the <i>Global Times</i> stated that ‘discrimination against Huawei is a discrimination against China’s political system’ and will ‘come with a price tag bereft of benefit to Australia’.
Australia	June 2018	Restrictions on official travel	According to <i>The Guardian</i> , China denied visas to several Australian journalists intending to travel to China on an annual trip with the Australia–China Relations Institute amid diplomatic tensions relating to Beijing’s interference in Australian politics. The visa refusals immediately followed the enforcement of trade restrictions on Australian wine and beef exports to China. Bob Carr, then the Director of Australia–China Relations Institute, stated in an interview that a phone call with China’s Ambassador to Australia revealed that the visas were denied due to ‘frosty’ diplomatic relations.
Australia	May 2018	Trade restrictions	According to the <i>Sydney Morning Herald</i> , Australian beef exporters were subject to non-tariff barriers and regulatory hurdles in China, leading to a halt in a \$500 million deal for chilled meat shipments. This was likely in response to Australia taking a firmer approach to Chinese relations, including introducing foreign interference laws and issuing warnings regarding China’s military bases in the South China Sea and influence in the Pacific. The CEO of the Australian Meat Industry Council, Patrick Hutchinson, stated that Australian beef exporters were in a ‘quagmire’ as a result of Chinese officials not upholding the deal. In an interview with the <i>Australian Financial Review</i> , federal Trade Minister Simon Birmingham stated that these regulatory hurdles had been raised with Chinese authorities.
Australia	April 2018	Trade restrictions	According to <i>Reuters</i> , Australia’s Treasury Wine Estates said that Australian wine was being held up at Chinese customs by ‘new and additional verification requirements’. The go-slow , also known as a ‘red tape blockade’, followed diplomatic tensions over Australia’s announcement of new foreign interference laws. According to <i>The Australian</i> , the CEO of McWilliam’s Wines confirmed reports of the go-slow, stating that customs officials in China were exercising much greater scrutiny over export documents. The <i>Sydney Morning Herald</i> reported that one industry source confirmed Australian wine was taking up to two months to clear customs, while wine imported from other countries took only two weeks.
Australia	March 2017	Arbitrary detention / execution	According to <i>ABC News</i> , the Chinese Government prevented 2-year-old Australian citizen and passport holder Lutfy Wumaier and his mother Nadila Wumaier, who had a valid Australian visa, from leaving Xinjiang Province in China. Several experts, including James Leibold from La Trobe University and Elaine Pearson from Human Rights Watch, believe they were being used for ‘hostage diplomacy’ in response to diplomatic tensions over a range of issues, including Australia’s Huawei ban and criticism of China’s exploitation of the Uyghur minority in Xinjiang. <i>Sadam Abudusalamu</i> , the father and husband of Lutfy and Ms. Wumaier, publicly spoke out about their situation on the ABC’s <i>Four Corners</i> in July 2019 against the Deputy Head of Mission at the Chinese Embassy in Canberra, Wang Xining. Since then, Ms Wumaier has been repeatedly taken in for questioning, and was instructed by authorities to urge her husband to remain silent. The Australian Embassy in Beijing formally requested that Ms Wumaier and her son be allowed to return to Australia.

Country	Date	Category	Information
Australia	September 2016	Trade restrictions	According to the <i>Australian Financial Review</i> , Chinese authorities blocked at least nine shipments of pasteurised milk from Australia and announced that they would strengthen supervision over Australian dairy imports. A notice posted on the Chinese Government's website alleged that traces of 'disease-causing' bacteria were found in Australian milk samples, thus triggering the measures, and articles claiming that foreign milk is of a lower quality than locally produced milk were published by Chinese state-run media. Chris Melville, the General Manager of Camperdown Dairy, said the Australian Government had confirmed that there were no food safety issues and that the industry had 'test results to prove it is not true'. This blockade was likely in response to Australia's criticism of China's land reclamation activities in the South China Sea and its rejection of two major Chinese investment proposals. The notice also coincided with then Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull's attendance at a G20 meeting in Hangzhou, China.
Botswana	July 2017	State-issued threat	According to <i>Reuters</i> , the Chinese Government warned Botswana to 'earnestly respect' China's core interests after the country invited the Dalai Lama to visit it in a private capacity. The <i>Botswana Guardian</i> reported that the PRC threatened to recall its ambassador and pressure other African states to isolate Botswana if the visit proceeded. While the Dalai Lama did cancel the trip due to medical reasons, Botswana President Ian Khama remained firm on the invitation and responded to China by stating 'We are not your colony.'
Brazil	March 2020	State-issued threat	According to <i>Bloomberg</i> , the Chinese Ambassador to Brazil, Yang Wanming, published a critical op-ed in a major Brazilian newspaper and demanded an official apology by Eduardo Bolsonaro, the son of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, for commenting that the 'Chinese dictatorship' was responsible for the mismanagement of the Covid-19 outbreak. Yang <i>warned</i> that 'Should any country insist on being China's enemy, we will be its most sophisticated enemy.' Numerous Brazilian officials have since contacted Yang to apologise.
Canada	July 2020	State-issued threat	According to <i>Bloomberg</i> , Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian threatened 'the right to take further actions' against Canada and 'all consequences shall be borne by the Canadian government' for suspending the country's extradition treaty with Hong Kong after China's imposition of a new national security law. The Chinese Embassy in Ottawa <i>stated</i> that Canada 'grossly interfered in China's internal affairs', while the state-backed Global Times published an article stating that 'Canada will definitely face a harsh consequence from Beijing.'
Canada	May 2020	State-issued threat	According to the <i>Globe and Mail</i> , the Chinese Government issued warnings to Canada demanding the immediate release of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou or risk further damage to relations between the two countries. Cheng Xiaohe, the Deputy Director of China's Center for International Strategic Studies, suggested that China would release Canadian citizens Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor, as well as lift sanctions on Canadian goods, if Meng were promptly released. This corresponded with numerous articles published by state-backed media outlets threatening further action. The <i>Global Times</i> , for example, published an article that stated: 'Canada will pay a huge price for the illegal arrest of Meng' and 'what it will suffer ultimately would be not only disrepute but also larger losses.'

Country	Date	Category	Information
Canada	June 2019	Trade restrictions	According to the <i>South China Morning Post</i> , China suspended the importation of all meat products from Canada. Chinese authorities justified this decision by stating that the Canadian meat exporters forged 'inauthentic export certificates'. However, this was recognised as retaliation by China against Canada in response to the arrest of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou. <i>The Globe and Mail</i> reported that the ban was ultimately lifted in November 2019 due to an outbreak of swine flu in China that destroyed most of its domestic meat supply. <i>The Canadian Meat Council</i> estimated that the ban resulted in a loss of nearly C\$100 million to the meat industry.
Canada	April 2019	Arbitrary detention / execution	According to <i>CNN</i> , Canadian citizen Fan Wei was sentenced to death for drug offences on 30 April by a Chinese court amid heightened tensions between Canada and China over the arrest of the Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou. Canadian authorities accused China of applying the death penalty arbitrarily and requested clemency for Fan. Several characteristics indicated that the sentence was arbitrary. First, the reports of his sentence in China drew attention to his Canadian citizenship despite him being part of a much larger group, including people from the US and Mexico. Second, despite Fan being put on trial in 2013, his sentence wasn't handed down until after Meng was arrested and in the same week that China began putting increased pressure on Canadian authorities by blocking pork imports from Canada. Finally, Fan's appeal hearing was suddenly granted in January 2019, corresponding with the week-long hearing of Meng in Canada.
Canada	April 2019	Trade restrictions	According to the <i>South China Morning Post</i> , Canadian soybean, pea and pork exporters faced a series of obstacles and delays in shipments to China. Routine port inspections that usually take a few days increased to at least three weeks, leading to a reduction in Chinese buyers purchasing Canadian produce. Former Counsellor at the Canadian Embassy in Beijing Charles Burton noted that Chinese authorities were compiling a list of Canadian businesses with the aim of imposing 'continued retaliatory actions'. The <i>Financial Times</i> reported that the restriction was part of China's retaliation for the arrest of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou.
Canada	March 2019	Trade restrictions	According to <i>CBC News</i> , Chinese authorities revoked the sales licence for a major Canadian canola distributor. The ban was extended to all Canadian canola imports by the end of the month. Chinese customs officials cited fungal disease in crops as the basis for the decision. However, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency conducted further investigations and didn't identify any disease of concern. This decision was made a week before the hearing date set for Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou, who was arrested in Canada in December 2018 at the request of the US. Beijing warned of serious consequences if Meng were not released, and tensions between China and Canada have escalated since her arrest.

Country	Date	Category	Information
Canada	January 2019	Arbitrary detention / execution	According to the <i>South China Morning Post</i> , Canadian citizen Robert Schellenberg was sentenced to death for allegedly planning to smuggle narcotics from China to Australia. He was originally sentenced to 15 years imprisonment in November 2018; however, that sentence was appealed in the Liaoning Provincial High Court the day after Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou appeared in court in Canada. The court highlighted the appropriateness of a harsher sentence, to which Prime Minister Justin Trudeau responded that China had arbitrarily sentenced Schellenberg to death. A specialist in Chinese law at George Washington University drew attention to several unusual features of Schellenberg's increased sentence, including the speed at which the retrial was called, the scheduling of the sentencing to occur after Meng Wanzhou was charged and invitations for international media outlets to observe the case.
Canada	January 2019	Tourism restrictions	According to <i>CBC News</i> , China issued a travel warning for Canada in response to mounting diplomatic tensions over the arrest of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou in 2018 on financial fraud and other related charges. The Chinese Embassy in Canada cited Meng's 'arbitrary detention' as the basis for urging Chinese citizens to 'fully evaluate' the risks of arbitrary enforcement of laws in Canada and to exercise great caution while travelling.
Canada	December 2018	Arbitrary detention / execution	According to <i>The Diplomat</i> , Canadian citizens Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor were detained by the Chinese Ministry of State Security on 10 December and charged with espionage. Kovrig was working as a North East Asia Security Advisor for the International Crisis Group when he was taken, and Spavor was a business consultant travelling to South Korea. It was widely recognised that these arrests were directly linked to a Canadian court's decision to detain Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou in response to an extradition request by the US. Canadian Foreign Minister François-Philippe Champagne issued a statement condemning the arrested men's lack of access to legal assistance and family support. In response, the Chinese Embassy in Canada published a statement denying that the arrests were arbitrary while insisting that Meng Wanzhou's arrest was.
Canada	August 2014	Arbitrary detention / execution	According to <i>Global News</i> , Canadian citizens Kevin and Julia Garratt were arrested by Chinese authorities just weeks after Chinese businessman Su Bin was detained in Canada pending extradition to the US for conspiring to hack sensitive military information from defence contractors. While the couple were eventually released and deported, they were allegedly subjected to psychological torture, instructed to sign a statement promising not to appeal and forced to pay for investigation expenses. The <i>South China Morning Post</i> reported that Canadian Ambassador to China Guy Saint-Jacques stated that, despite there not being a direct offer to swap people, there was an 'implicit link' between the cases of Su and the Garratts.
Czech Republic	January 2020	State-issued threat	According to <i>Reuters</i> , the Chinese Embassy in Prague sent a threatening letter to Czech authorities after Jaroslav Kubera, the Chairman of the Czech Senate, planned an official visit to Taiwan. The letter stated that the Chinese Government 'resolutely opposes' any official contact between the Czech Republic and Taiwan, explaining that such a visit would 'seriously hurt the feelings of the Chinese people' and damage the interests of the Czech Republic. The Chinese Embassy further stated that 'Czech enterprises with economic interests in China will have to pay for Chairman Kubera's visit to Taiwan'. While the Czech Government didn't endorse the visit, Prime Minister Andrej Babiš condemned the letter as being unacceptable and urged the replacement of the Chinese Ambassador to the Czech Republic.

Country	Date	Category	Information
Czech Republic	October 2019	Tourism restrictions	According to Reuters , the Chinese Government cancelled several incoming musical group tours from the Czech Republic after the Prague City Council terminated its sister city agreement with Beijing. The Mayor of Prague, Zdenek Hrib, explained that the council ended the agreement, which was signed in 2016, due to a clause that required the city to 'respect the one-China policy and acknowledge Taiwan as an inseparable part of Chinese territory'. Hrib had previously flown the Tibetan flag from the city hall, met with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen and resisted demands from China to expel a Taiwanese representative from a diplomatic meeting. Xinhua reported that the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang criticised the Prague City Council for having 'behaved very badly on issues involving China's national sovereignty and core interests'. The Chinese Embassy in Prague also reflected that sentiment, stating that the council had 'very negative' impacts on bilateral relations between the two countries.
Denmark	December 2019	Trade restrictions	According to Berlingske , Chinese Ambassador to Denmark Feng Tie made threats during a meeting with Faroe Islands autonomous territory Prime Minister Bárður Nielsen and Foreign Minister Jenis av Rana that China wouldn't enter into a proposed free trade agreement if Huawei were not given a contract with Faroese service provider Føroya Tele to develop the region's 5G infrastructure. An audio recording of the threat was initially the subject of a court injunction to prevent Faroese media publishing the content, as it could compromise relations between Denmark and China. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying stated that the reporting of this threat was 'false and ill-defined'.
Denmark	November 2013	State-issued threat	According to the Hong Kong Free Press , the Chinese Embassy in Copenhagen repeatedly pressured organisers of the Copenhagen International Film Festival to remove several documentaries that were critical of the CCP from public screening and urged the director of the festival to ensure that a documentary produced by Chinese activist Ai Weiwei wouldn't be awarded. The embassy claimed that the organisers of the film festival failed to obtain appropriate export licences and threatened 'consequences' for Danish-Chinese relations for noncompliance. However, the festival received backing from the Danish Ministry of Culture, and the screening of the documentaries went ahead.
Eswatini	February 2020	Tourism restrictions	The Chinese Ambassador to South Africa , Lin Songtian, released a statement on 1 February confirming that Eswatini citizens no longer had access to Chinese embassies around the world (except for the consulate in Johannesburg). The Daily Maverick reported that this came after Eswatini reaffirmed its diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Chinese Ambassador to Pretoria Lin Songtian further stated that the embassy was now keeping a close watch on Eswatini citizens who plan to travel to China in the future.
Eswatini	February 2020	State-issued threat	The Chinese Ambassador to South Africa , Lin Songtian, released a statement on 1 February titled 'No diplomatic relations, no business benefits'. In the statement, the ambassador attacked Eswatini for its continued 'immoral and abnormal relations with Taiwan'. He also called Eswatini 'a transgressor of international rules and norms' and stated that Eswatini would be 'isolated from the international community' if it continued to maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan. The CCP has made it clear that, unless Eswatini cuts ties with Taiwan, it won't benefit from the development that China is offering other African countries.

Country	Date	Category	Information
European Union	September 2016	State-issued threat	According to <i>Reuters</i> , Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lu Kang threatened countermeasures against the EU in retaliation for the Dalai Lama speaking at the European Parliament and meeting with President Martin Schulz in September 2016. Lu further stated that 'China absolutely cannot remain indifferent, and we will make the correct choice in accordance with our judgment of the situation.'
France	February 2020	Popular boycotts	According to <i>Forbes</i> , the Chinese Embassy in Paris released an official statement threatening economic retaliation against Huawei's major European competitors, Ericsson and Nokia, after the French Government excluded Huawei from developing its 5G infrastructure. The statement claimed that 'China has always given Nokia and Ericsson fair treatment in the deployment of 5G networks in China' and 'we do not wish to see the development of European companies in the Chinese market affected by the discrimination and protectionism of France and other European countries with regard to Huawei.'
Germany	July 2020	State-issued threat	According to <i>Reuters</i> , the Chinese Embassy in Berlin claimed 'the right to respond further' in response to German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas announcing that the country would suspend its extradition agreement with Hong Kong after Chief Executive Carrie Lam postponed the Hong Kong Legislative Council election. The embassy stated that the suspension 'grossly interferes with China's internal affairs', while Maas affirmed that 'We have repeatedly made our expectation clear that China lives up to its legal responsibilities under international law.'
Germany	December 2019	State-issued threat	According to the <i>South China Morning Post</i> , Chinese Ambassador to Germany Wu Ken threatened economic 'consequences' against Germany following draft legislation that would exclude 'untrustworthy' vendors, such as Huawei, from developing the country's 5G infrastructure. Wu also reiterated the importance of the Chinese market to the German car manufacturing industry, noting that German manufacturers produced nearly a quarter of the 28 million cars sold in China in 2018. Chen Weihua, a correspondent for the state-owned newspaper <i>China Daily</i> , supported the ambassador's condemnation, saying that 'anyone who believes China should remain silent and not respond are living in 1900.' Chinese state-backed media outlets ran a series of articles in January 2020 criticising Germany's preliminary ban of Huawei from its 5G rollout in anticipation of a decision being handed down by the government; a <i>Global Times</i> article quoted a Chinese state official suggesting that 'some economic means, including countermeasures, are necessary.'
Germany	September 2019	Restrictions on official travel	According to <i>Deutsche Welle</i> , a German human rights parliamentary committee was refused entry into China ahead of a planned trip. The committee intended to travel to Beijing, Tibet and Xinjiang to focus on the treatment of minority groups in China. The committee's human rights spokesperson, Michael Brand, stated that the incident was 'about making an example of people who dare to clearly address the topic of human rights and touch on sensitive issues'.

Country	Date	Category	Information
Germany	August 2019	Restrictions on official travel	According to <i>Suddeutsche Zeitung</i> , the Chinese Government enforced a travel ban on German MP Margarete Bause and threatened to deny entry to a delegation on digitisation, artificial intelligence and technology start-ups from the Bundestag's Digitisation Committee that was scheduled from 23 August to 1 September. This came after Bause, who was a member of the delegation, repeatedly criticised China for its violations of the human rights of the Uyghur population. The Chinese Government stated that the delegation would be granted entry if Bause were removed from the group. However, the committee maintained that it wouldn't accept China's demands to change the list of participants and called off the trip to China as a result. In response to the travel ban, Bause stated that 'China is increasingly using a divide and conquer strategy to apply pressure. We as parliamentarians must not let them divide us.'
India	August 2019	Investment restrictions	According to <i>Reuters</i> , Chinese officials stated that they would implement 'reverse sanctions' on Indian firms within China if India proceeded to block Huawei from developing 5G networks in the country. India ultimately allowed Huawei to participate in a 5G trial on 31 December 2019—a decision that was uniformly welcomed by Chinese officials.
Japan	September 2012	Popular boycotts	According to <i>The Diplomat</i> , a number of Japanese brands were forced to temporarily close their commercial properties and stores in several locations in China. This was in response to escalating violence, vandalism and arson against Japanese companies and increasing calls for consumer boycotts arising from the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. <i>Kyodo News</i> reported anti-Japanese protests across 85 cities in China. The boycott, which was encouraged by Chinese state media and online activists, targeted a number of Japanese companies, including Canon, Honda, Panasonic, Shiseido, Toyota and Uniqlo. The <i>Washington Post</i> reported that Chinese journalists were instructed by government officials to report on the nationalistic aspects of the protests and refrain from reporting any violent incidents. <i>The Guardian</i> stated that authorities stepped in to tone down the protests after demonstrators started directing their frustrations towards the Chinese Government.
Japan	May 2012	Restrictions on official travel	According to the <i>Wall Street Journal</i> , the Chinese Government cancelled a high-level meeting between Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi and Japan Business Federation Chairman Hiromasa Yonekura after Japan allowed the World Uyghur Congress to hold a major conference in Tokyo. The <i>Japan Times</i> further reported that a failed meeting between Chinese President Hu Jintao and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiko Noda after the Japan – China – South Korea summit in Beijing was likely related to the conference.
Japan	September 2010	Restrictions on official travel	According to <i>The Guardian</i> , the Chinese Government cancelled several diplomatic events and high-level state visits with Japan ahead of the 40th anniversary of the normalisation of China–Japan relations in September amid territorial disputes regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu island chain. China reportedly 'severed senior-level government contacts with Japan', including halting meetings on aviation, coal and other joint development projects. For example, <i>BBC News</i> reported that a high-level Chinese delegation to Japan, led by the Vice Chair of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Li Jianguo, was cancelled for 'various reasons' the day after the release of a Chinese trawler's crew members. The <i>New York Times</i> reported that the Chinese Government also cancelled a high-level military visit to Japan by Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Guo Boxiong.

Country	Date	Category	Information
Japan	September 2010	Trade restrictions	According to the <i>New York Times</i> , the Chinese Government blocked exports of rare-earth minerals to Japan in response to the Japanese Government's detention of the captain of a Chinese fishing trawler that collided with two Japanese coast guard vessels near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. While this wasn't an official embargo, it was an 'administrative halt to exports', which made it harder to challenge in the World Trade Organization. China mines around 93% of the world's rare-earth minerals, which are vital in several types of manufacturing that Japan's economy relies upon. Although the Chinese Ministry of Commerce previously announced intentions to reduce export quotas for rare earths, the fact that the halt took place months after the announcement during the height of the territorial dispute suggests that this was likely an act of coercion.
Japan	September 2012	Tourism restrictions	According to <i>Cheng et al.</i> , the Japan National Tourism Organisation reported a 40% drop in the number of Chinese tourists after the Japanese Government announced its intention to purchase a section of the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands from a private Japanese owner. <i>The Chinese Government</i> was highly critical of the move and subsequently issued a travel warning about 'safety risks' for Chinese tourists travelling to Japan. This was backed up by state media and Chinese travel companies discouraging travel to Japan. <i>The result</i> was the cancellation of 'tens of thousands' of flight and tour bookings, which had a 'significant impact on Japanese retail outlets'. After tensions eased, travel reportedly returned to normal with no residual effects.
Japan	September 2010	State-issued threat	<i>The Chinese Foreign Ministry</i> made stern representations to the Japanese Foreign Ministry and threatened that 'the Japanese side alone will have to bear all consequences' if the Japanese Government failed to revoke its decision to purchase a section of the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. A week after the threats, the Chinese state-run <i>China Daily</i> published an article urging that 'China should take strong countermeasures, especially economic sanctions, to respond to Japan's provocations.'
Kenya	September 2018	Investment restrictions	According to the <i>Daily Nation</i> , Chinese authorities threatened to withhold funding for the next phase of a Kenyan railway project. President Xi Jinping reportedly refused to sign the funding agreement during President Kenyatta's visit to the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation in order to express displeasure at what China viewed as an 'increasingly hostile operating environment' in Kenya, citing negative media reports and criticisms from politicians.
Mongolia	November 2016	Investment restrictions	According to the <i>Straits Times</i> , loan and investment talks between China and Mongolia were postponed indefinitely. The bilateral meetings were suspended as a result of Mongolia hosting the Dalai Lama for a four-day visit. The meetings were to discuss soft loans and Chinese investment in various infrastructure projects. Mongolia declared in August 2016 that its economy was suffering a financial crisis and was relying on Chinese investment to rectify the situation. <i>The South China Morning Post</i> reported that in December 2016, the Mongolian Government apologised and stated that it would not host the Dalai Lama in the future.

Country	Date	Category	Information
Mongolia	November 2016	Trade restrictions	According to <i>Reuters</i> , the Chinese Government imposed higher fees on commodity shipments at the border between Mongolia and China. This occurred a week after the Dalai Lama, whom China views as a dangerous separatist, visited Mongolia. China imposed a ¥10 'transit fee' and an additional ¥8 per tonne fee on mining commodities (mainly copper and coal) that were brought into China via key border crossings. This was driven by the intention to restrict imports in order to adversely affect the Mongolian economy. <i>Reuters</i> reported that three months later the Chinese Foreign Minister made a statement expressing hope that Mongolia had learned its lesson about inviting the Dalai Lama into the country.
Netherlands	April 2020	State-issued threat	According to the <i>Dutch Review</i> , Chinese state-backed media threatened the Dutch Government with repercussions and boycotts in retaliation to a name change of the country's diplomatic mission in Taiwan from 'Netherlands Trade and Investment' to 'Netherlands Office Taipei'. The state-backed <i>Global Times</i> reported that the Chinese Government was considering suspending trade deals and people-to-people exchanges. The Chinese Embassy in The Hague also submitted an official complaint to the Dutch Foreign Ministry regarding the name change, stating that the Netherlands was in violation of the one-China principle.
Netherlands	April 2020	Trade restrictions	According to the <i>Taiwan News</i> , the Chinese Government issued threats through state-backed media that it would suspend exports of crucial medical supplies to the Netherlands during the Covid-19 pandemic in retaliation against the name change for the country's diplomatic mission in Taiwan. The <i>Global Times</i> labelled the name change a 'provocative move' that was in violation of the one-China principle. Li Haidong, a professor at the Institute of International Relations of the China Foreign Affairs University, was quoted in a <i>Global Times</i> article saying that the suspension of exports of medical supplies amid the pandemic would send a warning to the Netherlands and other countries in the region.
New Zealand	July 2020	State-issued threat	<i>Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson</i> Wang Wenbin stated that China 'reserves the right to make further reactions' in relation to New Zealand's decision to suspend its extradition treaty with Hong Kong alongside Australia, Canada and the US following the implementation of Hong Kong's new national security law. The <i>Global Times</i> also published an article stating that China would 'definitely and resolutely respond' to New Zealand.
New Zealand	February 2019	Restrictions on official travel	According to the <i>New Zealand Herald</i> , Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern's official state visit to China was delayed following the New Zealand Government's decision to ban mobile service provider Spark from using Huawei equipment in its 5G network development. <i>Reuters</i> reported that Ardern responded to the Huawei claims by stating that 'the decision around 5G ... is governed by a regulation, a process that checks that whatever decision we make is in the best interest of New Zealanders' data and security.'


Country	Date	Category	Information
New Zealand	February 2019	Tourism restrictions	According to the <i>South China Morning Post</i> , the Chinese Government postponed the joint 2019 China – New Zealand Year of Tourism campaign amid diplomatic tensions over China's growing influence in the Pacific and New Zealand's decision to ban mobile service provider Spark from using Huawei equipment in its 5G network development. An article published by the Global Times claimed that Chinese tourists were punishing New Zealand by abandoning their travel plans over the Huawei ban. The New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment explained that China postponed the joint tourism campaign, which aimed to strengthen bilateral economic ties, 'due to changes of schedule on the Chinese side'. The campaign was reinstated a month later in March 2019. New Zealand's second largest tourism market is China, and more than 570,000 Chinese tourists contributed nearly US\$16 billion to the country's economy in 2018. Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern publicly acknowledged that New Zealand's relationship with China 'is a complex relationship and sometimes it will have its challenges'.
Norway	December 2012	Tourism restrictions	According to the <i>Financial Times</i> , the Chinese Government explicitly excluded Norwegians from receiving visa-free transits as part of a series of punishments for the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo. All other European countries apart from Norway were given this benefit, which allows travellers to transit and stay in Beijing for up to 72 hours without visas.
Norway	June 2012	Restrictions on official travel	According to <i>Public Radio International</i> , former Norwegian Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik was denied a visa to China in retaliation for the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo. Bondevik was to attend a World Council of Churches meeting being held in China. Senior-level diplomatic exchanges between Norway and China stalled completely until 19 December 2016, when the Norwegian Government issued a statement affirming its commitment to the one-China policy and agreeing not to 'support actions that undermine' Chinese interests.
Norway	December 2010	Trade restrictions	According to <i>The Independent</i> , China blocked salmon imports from Norway, citing 'food safety issues', in retaliation for the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo in Oslo. The additional import controls on salmon, which effectively blocked the product entering the country, applied only to shipments from Norway. The Norwegian Government reported China to the World Trade Organization, as sales of salmon to China collapsed by 61.8% between 2010 and 2013. Former Norwegian diplomats indicated that several state-owned and partially state-owned enterprises from Norway faced great difficulty operating in China. Relations improved in 2016 after Oslo agreed to not 'support actions that undermine' Chinese interests.
Norway	October 2010	Trade restrictions	According to the <i>New York Times</i> , bilateral free-trade negotiations between Norway and China were called off after the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo in October 2010. Trade negotiations resumed in 2019 after the 'unfreezing' of diplomatic relations following Norway's public statement that it supports the one-China policy.
Norway	October 2010	State-issued threat	According to Bjørnar Sverdrup-Thygeson, the Chinese Government declared that the decision by the Norwegian Nobel Committee to award the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo was a 'grave mistake that would have damaging consequences for Sino-Norwegian relations'. It was reported that Chinese authorities contacted Norwegian representatives in Beijing and Oslo to express their dissatisfaction with the decision and pressured diplomatic representatives of other countries into boycotting the award ceremony.

Country	Date	Category	Information
Palau	November 2017	Tourism restrictions	According to <i>ABC News</i> , China banned package tours to Palau, likely in response to the state's continuing diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Chinese state authorities reportedly notified travel agencies that group tours to countries not listed as having 'approved destination status' were prohibited and that agencies that booked tours to Palau 'would be punished'. Palau Pacific Airways stated that the word 'Palau' was banned in all offline and online sales marketing. Palau experienced a 22.7% drop in arrivals from China in the last quarter of 2017 following the removal of Palau's approved destination status. The <i>Pacific Note</i> highlighted that this tourism restriction affected Palau's economy well into 2019, as tourism is a 'major driving force' for the country. In July 2018, Palau Pacific Airways announced an indefinite suspension of flights from China due to low sales, citing the Chinese ban on tourists in its letter to the Palau Congress.
Philippines	September 2014	Tourism restrictions	According to <i>BBC News</i> , the Chinese Government issued a travel warning against the Philippines on 12 September, citing a 'worsened security situation' that included an alleged bomb plot, kidnappings and criminal gangs within the country. However, those events were deemed by regional experts to be isolated incidents. Instead, it's likely that the travel warning was issued after the Philippines took China to the Permanent Court of Arbitration over its territorial claim in the South China Sea (which the court subsequently upheld). As a result of the travel warning, the number of Chinese tourists fell from 18,479 in August to fewer than 7,000 in September. Aileen Baviera, a professor at the Asia Centre of the University of the Philippines Diliman, argued that 'hying up the danger to their own nationals in the Philippines is one way that they [China] put subtle pressure on the government.'
Philippines	September 2013	Restrictions on official travel	According to the <i>South China Morning Post</i> , China withdrew an invitation for Philippines' then President, Benigno Aquino, to attend the China-ASEAN Expo hosted by China after the Philippines took China to the Permanent Court of Arbitration over its territorial claim in the South China Sea. China's Foreign Ministry stated that it had never invited Aquino in the first place, although a spokesperson from the Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs stated that China had invited a high-level delegation to the fair a few months before. The Philippines Trade Secretary was sent to represent the President instead.
Philippines	May 2012	Tourism restrictions	According to the <i>Philstar</i> , Chinese travel agencies suspended tours to the Philippines in response to heightened tensions between the two countries over the Scarborough Shoal stand-off in the South China Sea. The Chinese Government issued a travel warning, calling on all travel agencies to cancel tours to the Philippines and citing a planned protest outside the Chinese Embassy in Manila. This also deterred a number of independent and semi-independent travellers from visiting the Philippines. Some Chinese airlines also cancelled flights to Manila, citing a high number of cancellations. <i>The Inquirer</i> reported that tourism-related stocks in the Philippines fell as a result of the Chinese travel restrictions.

Country	Date	Category	Information
Philippines	May 2012	Trade restrictions	According to Lim et al. , Chinese authorities placed tighter controls on banana imports from the Philippines. Chinese officials claimed that they had discovered insects in a shipment of bananas from the Philippines, even though the insects were also commonly found in Chinese-grown bananas. However, a number of experts in the field drew attention to the fact that the restrictions immediately followed a Philippines warship confronting Chinese fishermen in the South China Sea in April 2012. Tensions peaked in 2013 after the Philippines filed for arbitration over the maritime incident and showed signs of improvement only after Rodrigo Duterte became President in 2016. Just months before Duterte's election, China destroyed 35 tonnes of bananas from the Philippines, worth US\$33,000.
Slovakia	October 2016	State-issued threat	According to Reuters , Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying announced that China would be making 'a corresponding response' against Slovakia after Slovakian President Andrej Kiska met with the Dalai Lama. Hua stated that the meeting had 'broken the political basis of China-Slovak relations' and demanded that Slovakia 'clearly recognise the anti-Chinese separatist nature of the Dalai Lama clique'. The South China Morning Post reported that Chinese Premier Li Keqiang cancelled a meeting a month later that was originally scheduled between him and Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico. The meeting resumed only after Fico promised to maintain a 'principled stance' on the one-China policy.
South Africa	February 2018	State-issued threat	According to the Business Standard , the Chinese Embassy in Pretoria issued a 'strongly worded' statement against the visit of Central Tibetan Administration President Lobsang Sangay. The statement accused South Africa of disregarding its longstanding commitment to the one-China policy and included threats that Chinese investment would be discouraged should the visit go ahead. Sangay was scheduled to attend President Zuma's address at the inaugural session of the South African Parliament; however, it was postponed, reportedly due to political tensions within South Africa.
South Korea	March 2017	Popular boycotts	According to the Financial Times , the Chinese Government organised boycotts against South Korean businesses after the country agreed to host the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system. Reuters reported that the South Korean car company Hyundai recorded a 42% drop in sales, and Kia recorded a 54% drop. Chinese cruise passengers docking in South Korea refused to disembark in order to send a message against the THAAD deployment. Supermarkets and cosmetics companies also saw a sharp decline in sales from the boycott. In particular, South Korean supermarket Lotte had nearly all of its stores in China forcibly closed due to 'unspecified fire code violations'. Lotte was particularly hard hit (most of its stores remained shut after five months), as the company had sold land to the South Korean Government for the THAAD deployment.

Country	Date	Category	Information
South Korea	March 2017	Tourism restrictions	According to Lim et al. , the China National Tourism Administration issued instructions to Chinese travel agencies to reduce the number of tourists travelling to South Korea by 20% in retaliation against South Korea announcing its intention to deploy the US THAAD anti-missile system. <i>Voice of America</i> reported that the CCP described the installation as an ‘unnecessary and provocative regional military escalation’. Although this was never formally acknowledged by the CCP, evidence suggests that travel agencies were told that companies that continued to organise travel to South Korea would face fines, have their licences revoked, or both. This resulted in a 48.3% decrease in the numbers of Chinese tourists visiting South Korea from 2016 to 2017, costing the South Korean tourism sector an estimated total revenue loss of US\$15.62 billion. Tourism flows gradually recovered, although 2019 rates had still not reached pre-incident levels.
South Korea	August 2016	Trade restrictions	According to Jeongseok Lee , South Korean celebrities were removed from Chinese television shows and commercials by Chinese authorities following the dispute over South Korea’s decision to install the THAAD anti-missile system. ⁸⁶ <i>Reuters</i> reported that Korean pop music and drama shows were blocked from Chinese online platforms, and a number of live concerts in China were cancelled. China denied that it was implementing these bans.
South Korea	July 2016	State-issued threat	According to Jeongseok Lee , the Chinese Foreign Ministry released a statement on 8 July expressing its ‘strong dissatisfaction and firm opposition’ to South Korea’s decision to install the THAAD anti-missile system. The following day, the <i>Global Times</i> published an article recommending that China impose countermeasures against South Korea, ranging from cutting off economic ties to restricting official travel, in retaliation against South Korea’s decision. It’s been estimated that in July 2016 the Chinese Government issued 27 statements and the People’s Daily ran 265 articles criticising Seoul’s decision.
Sweden	January 2020	State-issued threat	According to the <i>Washington Post</i> , Chinese Ambassador to Sweden Gui Congyou threatened local journalists during an interview in January 2020 and warned the Swedish Government of ‘consequences’ amid diplomatic tensions over the detention of Hong Kong bookseller Gui Minhai. The <i>South China Morning Post</i> reported the ambassador likened the relationship between Swedish reporters and the Chinese Government to a boxing challenge and posed the question: ‘What choice do you expect the heavyweight boxer to have?’ Swedish Foreign Minister Ann Linde condemned the threats as ‘unacceptable’, and the spokesperson for the Left Party, Hakan Svenneling, tweeted that the ambassador should ‘be declared persona non grata ... after he has threatened the Swedish Government to silence.’
Sweden	December 2019	Trade restrictions	According to the <i>South China Morning Post</i> , the Chinese Government cancelled a number of Chinese business delegations to Sweden and postponed trade talks by the China–Sweden Joint Committee on Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation in retaliation against Swedish Minister for Culture Amanda Lind awarding the Tucholsky Writer’s Prize to Gui Minhai, a Chinese-born Swedish writer and publisher. Chinese Ambassador to Sweden Gui Congyou also warned of additional restrictions on ‘cultural exchanges and cooperation on the economy and trade’, stating that ‘the Swedish side has to take full responsibility and bear the consequences.’

Country	Date	Category	Information
Sweden	November 2019	State-issued threat	According to the <i>South China Morning Post</i> , Chinese Ambassador to Sweden Gui Congyou threatened 'bad consequences' against the Swedish Government in retaliation for awarding the Tucholsky Writer's Prize to Gui Minhai. The Chinese Embassy stated that the decision to award the prize was evidence of an 'ulterior political agenda and consistent biases and hostility against China'. Despite the threats, the ceremony went ahead and the prize was presented to an empty chair to mark Gui's absence. Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Lofven affirmed that Sweden would not 'give in to this type of threat'.
Sweden	September 2018	Popular boycotts	According to the <i>Washington Post</i> , Chinese state media and online users called for a mass boycott of Swedish companies in retaliation against a Swedish television program satirising a tourist incident in which a Chinese family was expelled from the Generator Hostel in Stockholm. This online backlash came after the Global Times published an article claiming that the Chinese family was attacked by police and abandoned at a remote graveyard at night. The Swedish network issued an official apology for causing offence.
Sweden	September 2018	Restrictions on official travel	According to <i>The Guardian</i> , several journalists from Sweden's leading newspapers and broadcasters were denied visas to enter China in retaliation against Chinese tourists being expelled from the Generator Hostel in Stockholm. It was reported that Swedish editors also 'received a near-constant stream of threatening and critical emails and phone calls' from Chinese state authorities. Utgivarna (the media publishers association in Sweden) issued a statement condemning attempts made by Chinese authorities to 'undermine the freedom of the press and the freedom of expression under the Swedish constitution with false statements and threats'.
Sweden	September 2018	State-issued threat	According to <i>Jerden and Boman</i> , the Chinese Embassy in Stockholm and the Chinese Foreign Ministry warned the Swedish Government that it 'reserve [sic] the rights to take further actions' in retaliation for the Generator Hostel incident. While Swedish authorities confirmed that standard procedures were followed, the Chinese Embassy and state media outlets alleged that the tourists were subjected to 'brutal abuse' and that their lives were endangered. The threats intensified after a Swedish television program ran a satirical skit on the incident.
Sweden	September 2018	Tourism restrictions	According to <i>Jerden and Boman</i> , the Chinese Embassy in Stockholm attempted to 'leverage' the flow of Chinese tourists in order to pressure the Swedish Government to apologise for the Generator Hostel incident. Immediately following the incident, the embassy issued a travel alert stating that Chinese tourists had recently suffered 'brutal treatment' at the hands of Swedish authorities. The travel warning was extended a number of times, referencing a rise in the number of robberies and thefts reported against Chinese tourists. The Chinese Ambassador warned that the Swedish Government needed to apologise to 'restore the Chinese tourists' confidence in Sweden' following what he claimed had been a 'sharp drop in visitor numbers from China'.
Taiwan	August 2019	Popular boycotts	According to the <i>Straits Times</i> , China's National Film Board ordered Chinese directors and actors to boycott the Taiwanese Golden Horse Awards. In the previous year, the event was condemned by several Chinese officials after a Taiwanese director made a pro-independence acceptance speech. Maserati, the Italian luxury car maker and a major sponsor for the awards, cut its sponsorship ties with the film awards as a result.



Country	Date	Category	Information
Taiwan	August 2019	Tourism restrictions	According to the <i>Nikkei Asian Review</i> , Chinese officials placed restrictions on Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan. China's State Council later confirmed that 'Taiwan independence' activities led by Tsai Ing-wen's ruling Democratic Progressive Party were the reason behind the travel ban. Limiting travel in the lead-up to the 2020 election mirrored the approach taken in 2016, although this was the first time that Chinese officials had publicly stated that it was in relation to the election. As a result of the restrictions, mainland tourists visiting Taiwan in September 2019 were 57% fewer than in the previous year. Group tourism also fell by 60%, despite not being part of the ban. This had a significant impact on the tourism sector in Taiwan, as Chinese tourists account for approximately a quarter of overseas visitors.
Taiwan	July 2018	Restrictions on official travel	According to the <i>Taipei Times</i> , the East Asia Youth Games in Taichung, Taiwan, were cancelled after the Chinese Government urged the East Asian Olympic Committee to revoke Taiwan's right to host the event, citing 'political factors' after Taiwan renamed its national sports team from 'Chinese Taipei' to 'Taiwan' for the postponed 2020 Olympics in Tokyo. The Taichung City Government and the Presidential Office both expressed strong regret over the cancellation.
Taiwan	May 2016	Tourism restrictions	According to the <i>Jing Daily</i> , the Chinese Government limited group tours to Taiwan after the election of the pro-independence government led by President Tsai Ing-wen. China officially stated that this was in response to Taiwan experiencing a time of political uncertainty. However, the move was viewed by analysts as an attempt to pressure Tsai Ing-wen into accepting the '1992 consensus'. The Chinese Government advised a number of Chinese travel agencies to limit their tours to Taiwan. The state-owned China International Travel Service launched a Taiwan tour package that excluded all destinations that voted predominantly for the pro-independence government.
Turkey	February 2019	State-issued threat	According to the <i>Hurriyet Daily News</i> , China threatened to restrict investment and commercial interests in Turkey in retaliation for Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu raising concerns over the treatment of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang at the UN. Deng Li, a Chinese diplomat in Turkey, stated that, if Turkey continued down the path of 'criticising your friend publicly' (in reference to China), then 'it will negatively affect mutual trust and understanding and will be reflected in commercial and economic relations.' The following month, Deng Li stated that China was looking to double its investments in Turkey by 2021.
Turkey	February 2019	Tourism restrictions	According to the <i>South China Morning Post</i> , the Chinese Embassy in Ankara advised Chinese residents and tourists travelling to Turkey 'to be wary and pay attention to their personal safety'. The warning came just days after Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu raised the issue of human rights violations in Xinjiang at the UN. Cavusoglu described China's treatment of Muslims in Xinjiang as 'a great embarrassment for humanity', which prompted a 'strong rebuke' from China. Analysts have described this move as an 'expression of [China's] displeasure' and a 'countermeasure on the Turkish government'. They have said that, 'while there was a potential risk for Chinese citizens in Turkey, the situation was not grave'.

Country	Date	Category	Information
Turkey	February 2016	Tourism restrictions	According to <i>Dunya News</i> , the Chinese Embassy in Istanbul announced changes to visa applications for Turkish citizens on 4 February. The embassy stated that tourist visas would no longer be granted to individuals unless they participated in organised group tours. <i>BBC News</i> reported that those changes were considered a response to a number of protests that occurred in Turkey against China's treatment of its Uyghur population between mid-2015 and early 2016, although Chinese authorities didn't explicitly link the two events.
UK	July 2020	State-issued threat	According to <i>The Guardian</i> , Chinese state-backed media outlets warned the UK of retaliation following its decision to eliminate Huawei from its national 5G infrastructure. The <i>Global Times</i> published a series of articles suggesting economic countermeasures, such as investment and trade restrictions, as 'available options for China to fight back'. One particular article stated that 'it is necessary for China to retaliate against the UK, otherwise we would not [sic] be seen as easy to bully. Such retaliation should be public and painful for the UK.'
UK	June 2020	State-issued threat	According to <i>The Guardian</i> , the Chinese Foreign Ministry accused the UK of 'gross interference' and threatened 'consequences' after Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced an intention to provide Hong Kong residents with a pathway to British citizenship in response to China's new national security legislation. The <i>Global Times</i> published an article suggesting that the UK could face 'substantial damage' to its economy if China were to rescind a trade deal between the two countries. The Chinese Foreign Ministry further threatened retaliation against the UK for its decision to grant 3 million Hong Kong citizens British residency. Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian stated that 'China strongly condemns this and reserves the right to take further measures.'
UK	June 2020	State-issued threat	According to the <i>Straits Times</i> , the Chinese Government placed significant pressure on the UK to reconsider its review of Huawei's involvement in the UK's 5G network rollout. Chinese Ambassador to the UK Liu Xiaoming suggested that the move to ban Huawei would undermine upcoming Chinese infrastructure projects in the country, including a number of nuclear power plants and the HS2 high-speed rail network.
UK	May 2012	State-issued threat	According to <i>BBC News</i> , former Chinese chief legislator Wu Bangguo cancelled a proposed trip to the UK and threatened 'serious consequences' after the then British Prime Minister, David Cameron, expressed an intention to meet with the Dalai Lama. The British Embassy in Beijing expressed 'regret' over the cancellation of what would have been a 'brief but symbolic' visit of a senior Chinese official. Cameron subsequently distanced the UK from the Dalai Lama on a visit to China in 2013.
US	July 2020	State-issued threat	According to <i>Bloomberg</i> , Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian threatened retaliation against the US for unanimously passing the Hong Kong Autonomy Act, which penalises banks and financial institutions that do business with Chinese officials who implement China's national security law in Hong Kong. Zhao stated that China 'deplores and firmly opposes' the Hong Kong Autonomy Act and said that the US will 'face strong countermeasures and they have to bear all the consequences'.

Country	Date	Category	Information
US	May 2020	State-issued threat	According to the <i>South China Morning Post</i> , Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian condemned a decision made by the US Department of Homeland Security to implement visa restrictions targeting Chinese journalists. That decision came after China expelled a number of American journalists in March 2020. Zhao cautioned the US to 'immediately correct its mistake, or China will have no choice but to take countermeasures'.
US	April 2020	State-issued threat	According to <i>The Telegraph</i> , Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunyin threatened the US with 'further reactions' from China after the passing of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act, which was first introduced on 6 February 2019. The Act requires government bodies to report on the treatment of Muslim minorities in Xinjiang Province and seeks to introduce 'visa and property-blocking' sanctions on Chinese officials and entities associated with human rights abuses in the region. The CCP's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Regional Advisory Committee termed the bill a 'blatant act of hegemony' that sends 'a completely wrong signal to violent and terrorist forces'. The <i>Global Times</i> reported that China was preparing to sanction American politicians and organisations on a forthcoming 'unreliable entities list'.
US	December 2019	Restrictions on official travel	According to <i>BBC News</i> , the Chinese Government suspended visits by American military ships and aircraft to Hong Kong and placed travel sanctions on several non-government organisations and human rights groups. Those actions were in retaliation for the signing of the Human Rights and Democracy Act. The targeted organisations included Human Rights Watch, Freedom House, the National Endowment for Democracy and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Hua Chunying warned of further actions and urged the US to 'to correct the mistakes and stop interfering in our internal affairs.'
US	November 2019	State-issued threat	According to <i>The Guardian</i> , the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the US is 'doomed to fail' and threatened to retaliate against the US with countermeasures after the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act received unanimous approval from the US Senate. The Act allows for the sanctioning of Chinese officials deemed responsible for human rights abuses in Hong Kong. The ministry has described the Act as 'pure interference in China's internal affairs', 'full of prejudice and arrogance', and with 'sinister intentions and hegemonic nature'. US Ambassador Terry Branstad was summoned to China twice in one week and urged to prevent the government from interfering in China's internal affairs.
US	October 2019	Restrictions on official travel	According to <i>Bloomberg</i> , a US congressional delegation was denied entry visas into China. Chinese authorities stated that the visas would be granted if the delegation cancelled its scheduled trip to Taiwan. The delegation didn't cancel the trip, and a representative of the delegation stated that they were exploring ways for Congress to reinforce support for Taiwan in the coming months. Representative Sean Patrick Maloney wrote that this decision amounted to 'visa blackmail, designed to stanch the longstanding tradition of robust US congressional engagement with Taiwan'.

Country	Date	Category	Information
US	September 2019	Arbitrary detention / execution	According to <i>CNN</i> , FedEx pilot Todd Honn was arrested at Guangzhou Airport on 12 September for allegedly smuggling illegal weapons and ammunition. The charges relate to the possession of 'non-metallic pellets used in lower power replica guns'. However, Honn's arrest came after months of tension between the Chinese Government and FedEx. China began investigating the company in June 2019, when Huawei alleged that the company diverted to the US two packages that were intended for Huawei's headquarters in China. A more recent investigation was also opened before Honn's arrest into FedEx allegedly shipping knives to Hong Kong during the protests. Honn was released on bail but was prohibited from leaving mainland China.
US	June 2019	Arbitrary detention / execution	According to <i>CNBC</i> , an unnamed Chinese-American Koch Industries executive was detained and interrogated in his hotel room in China for several days. It's believed that the executive was selectively detained because of the close relationship between David and Charles Koch and the US Republican Party. Several sources claimed that the detention was an attempt to send a message to President Donald Trump during bilateral trade negotiations between China and the US.
US	June 2019	Tourism restrictions	According to <i>BBC News</i> , the Chinese Ministry of Culture and Tourism issued a travel advisory against the US. The warning urged Chinese tourists to 'fully assess the risks' of travelling to the country in the light of recent shootings, robberies and harassment of Chinese citizens by law enforcement authorities. This immediately followed the US's tariff hikes in May and the blacklisting of Huawei.
Vietnam	May 2014	Trade restrictions	According to <i>Thanh Nien News</i> and Huong Le Thu, China stopped importing Vietnamese lychees following protests in Vietnam against China's deployment of the Hai Duong 981 oil rig within Vietnam's exclusive economic zone. ⁸⁷ The rig was deployed in early May 2014 in what was considered 'the worst incident in the South China Sea since China's occupation of Mischief Reef in 1995'. <i>The Guardian</i> reported that Anti-China protests in Vietnam escalated on 13 and 14 May and targeted Chinese businesses and nationals. At least 21 people were killed, and thousands of Chinese citizens were evacuated. The summer export of lychees rotted at the Chinese border during peak lychee season. As some 60% of lychee production in Vietnam is exported to China, this had a substantial impact on Vietnamese farmers. Vietnam started exporting lychees to Australia and America for the first time in 2015 in an attempt to diversify its markets and find higher prices. Lychee exports to China were also up significantly in 2015.




Table 2: Cases of CCP coercive diplomacy targeting foreign companies

Company	Date	Business location	Information	Did the company apologise (or otherwise comply with the CCP's direction)?
85C	August 2018	Taiwan	According to <i>BBC News</i> , 85C Bakery Cafe faced a boycott from Chinese consumers and was removed from multiple food-delivery services in China after employees from the Los Angeles branch presented Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen with a gift when she attended the cafe on 12 August. Many Chinese consumers interpreted the gesture as a move to support Taiwanese independence. The company issued a statement reiterating support for the one-China policy and said it opposed actions that divided 'the feelings of compatriots on the two sides.' The brand received additional backlash from China when it was revealed that the statement was published only on the mainland website.	Yes
Airlines (various)	May 2018	Various	According to <i>Business Insider</i> , 36 international airlines were ordered by the Chinese Civil Aviation Authority to remove all references on their global websites suggesting that Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao are separate regions from mainland China. The airlines included Air Canada, Air France, All Nippon, American Airlines, British Airways, Delta, Lufthansa, Malaysia Airlines and Qantas. Most of them complied with China's deadline of 25 May to avoid consequences that would have affected their right to operate in China. Japan Airlines managed to avoid any penalties or serious backlash despite complying with China's demands by using the 'Taiwan, China' descriptor only on its Chinese-language sites. The <i>South China Morning Post</i> reported that United Airlines took a unique approach to complying with China's demands and distinguished Hong Kong, Taiwan and China based on their currencies. A spokesperson from the Chinese Foreign Ministry released a statement on 30 August 2018 stating China's dissatisfaction with this approach; however, no further changes were made to the listings.	Yes
Amazon	August 2019	US	According to <i>Reuters</i> , Amazon faced a backlash from Chinese social media users after its platform contained listings of Hong Kong pro-democracy protest slogans. Although Amazon no longer operates domestically in China, some overseas shipments were still accessible to the Chinese public. In response, Amazon issued an apology and stated that it would continue to acknowledge the one-China policy. In 2020, Amazon faced another round of boycotts by Chinese consumers and the state-owned media outlet <i>Global Times</i> after clothing and coffee mugs with the slogan 'Coronavirus made in China' were listed on its platform. After the incident, the heading 'Amazon insulting China' garnered around 1.6 million views on Weibo. Amazon quickly removed the products but didn't respond to requests for an apology.	Yes

Company	Date	Business location	Information	Did the company apologise (or otherwise comply with the CCP's direction)?
APA Hotel Group	January 2017	Japan	According to the <i>Japan Times</i> , the APA Hotel Group faced a backlash from Chinese consumers after a video that showed the group's hotel rooms containing a number of revisionist history books denying the Nanking Massacre was circulated on Weibo. The China National Tourism Administration pressured Chinese tour operators to remove listings of the hotel chain's properties. The company's booking site became inaccessible in China after the video went viral. The company didn't apologise, and it's reported that the uproar had no impact on the number of hotel room cancellations.	No
Apple	August 2019	US	According to <i>RADII</i> , Apple received backlash from Chinese internet users after it was alleged that software updates no longer listed Hong Kong as a part of China. Subsequently, an additional software update removed the Taiwanese flag emoji from Apple devices in China, Hong Kong and Macau. The <i>South China Morning Post</i> reported that on the company's Chinese website, it wasn't possible to engrave products with 'inappropriate words', such as 'June 4', 'Taiwan independence', 'dictatorship' and 'human rights'. Apple also repeatedly rejected the submission of an app used by Hong Kong protesters that gave live updates on protests and police activity. After Apple eventually allowed the release of the app, Chinese state media retaliated, stating that Apple was inciting illegal behaviour and hurting the feelings of its consumers. This led to Apple reversing its decision on the app's release. Apple has complied with Chinese authorities and state departments on multiple occasions to remove virtual private network apps, foreign media apps and iTunes access in mainland China. <i>The Mac Observer</i> stated that Chinese companies reportedly encouraged employees to sell their Apple products and offered incentives for using Huawei products. That corresponded with a growing number of calls to boycott Apple in response to US trade restrictions on Huawei.	Yes
Arsenal	December 2019	Canada	According to the <i>New York Times</i> , the Chinese state-owned <i>Global Times</i> published an article criticising Arsenal football player Mesut Ozil for commenting on China's treatment of its Uyghur minority and referring to Xinjiang as East Turkestan. The Chinese Football Association also condemned Ozil's comments as 'unacceptable' and said he had 'hurt the feelings of the Chinese people'. Arsenal's response that the comments were 'entirely Ozil's personal view' drew anger from Chinese internet users. The <i>Global Times</i> reported that an Arsenal-Manchester City game was later removed from broadcast on China Central Television and replaced with a replay game of Arsenal's rival team, Tottenham.	No

Company	Date	Business location	Information	Did the company apologise (or otherwise comply with the CCP's direction)?
Audi	March 2018	Germany	According to <i>Business Insider</i> , Audi generated serious criticism within China and was pressured to apologise after it used a map of China that didn't include the regions of Taiwan, South Tibet and Xinjiang in a press conference. <i>SupChina</i> reported that Audi subsequently issued an official apology, stating that 'an incorrect geographical map' was used and that it was a 'serious mistake for which Audi wants to sincerely apologise'.	Yes
Bloomberg	June 2012	US	According to the <i>New York Times</i> , Bloomberg published an article on the assets of close family members of Xi Jinping on 29 June. Before publication, Chinese officials put pressure on Bloomberg to prevent it. When the article was published, Bloomberg's website was blocked in China and its journalists weren't granted new residency visas. <i>The Intercept</i> reported that Leta Hong Fincher, the wife of one of the journalists working on the investigation behind the article, said that their family received death threats from representatives of relatives of Xi Jinping. Her husband was later fired by Bloomberg, and the newspaper subsequently killed a story that investigated ties between one of China's richest businessmen, Wang Jianlin, and the CCP.	Yes
BNP Paribas	September 2019	France	According to the <i>South China Morning Post</i> , a lawyer working for BNP Paribas published a Facebook post that condemned pro-Beijing counter-protesters during the Hong Kong protests. The post received backlash after it was circulated on Weibo. Many Chinese users threatened to boycott the bank and called for the lawyer to be dismissed from the company. The <i>Global Times</i> also called for the users campaigning for the bank to be placed on China's forthcoming 'unreliable entity list'. BNP Paribas issued a public apology and condemned the behaviour of the lawyer for causing social division. The <i>Financial Times</i> reported that the bank's chairman, Jean Lemierre, stated in an interview with <i>CNBC</i> that the lawyer's comments were 'inappropriate' and 'not compatible with the standards of the bank'. The lawyer subsequently deleted the Facebook post and resigned from his position.	Yes
Boeing	February 2020	US	According to the <i>Seattle Times</i> , the Chinese Government threatened to impose sanctions on several US defence contractors, including Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, due to their involvement in a major arms sale worth \$9.64 billion to Taiwan. While Boeing has a crucial stake in the Chinese market, the company has stated that it hadn't received any real notice of sanctions. The Chinese Government also announced a suspension of high-level military exchanges with the US in response to the Taiwanese arms sale. Boeing declined to comment and didn't issue an apology.	No

Company	Date	Business location	Information	Did the company apologise (or otherwise comply with the CCP's direction)?
Bottega Spa	March 2020	Italy	According to the <i>South China Morning Post</i> , the Italian wine company Bottega Spa faced Chinese backlash in March 2020 after the owner, Sandro Bottega, published an open letter in the Italian newspaper <i>La Stampa</i> calling on the Chinese Government to 'compensate Italy and the world for the damage it has caused' in relation to the Covid-19 pandemic. The letter further stated that China has failed to 'respect people, animals and the environment, and their health and working conditions are almost incomparable with the Western world.' The letter generated significant criticism across Chinese social media, resulting in the brand's main Chinese importers announcing that they would stop sales of all its products. While Bottega did apologise for the letter, the <i>Global Times</i> reported that the apology 'failed to quench Chinese distributors' anger' and quoted an industry insider who said 'bigots who practice such discrimination learn their lesson.'	Yes
Burger King	March 2020	Taiwan	According to the <i>Taiwan News</i> , the Taiwanese branch of Burger King faced consumer backlash in China after it referred to Covid-19 as 'Wuhan pneumonia' in a Facebook advertisement promoting its food delivery service on 25 March. The <i>Global Times</i> reported that the hashtag #BurgerKingApologise gained around 150 million views and 7,500 comments on Weibo. Burger King China (the mainland operator of the fast food chain) issued an apology on behalf of Burger King Taiwan on Weibo, stating that 'although Burger King China and the operator in Taiwan are different operating firms, we feel embarrassed about the Taiwan operator's irresponsible remarks.' The original Facebook post was removed and the advertisement modified so that 'Wuhan pneumonia' was replaced by 'Covid-19'.	Yes
Calvin Klein	August 2019	US	According to <i>SupChina</i> , Calvin Klein received backlash in China for listing Hong Kong and Taiwan as separate countries on its website. The <i>South China Morning Post</i> reported that Calvin Klein's brand ambassador in China, Lay Zhang, warned that he would terminate his contract with the company unless it corrected this 'careless mistake' and apologised. Calvin Klein subsequently apologised on Weibo, stating that it would correct the mistake and that it respected and supported 'China's sovereignty and territorial integrity'.	Yes

Company	Date	Business location	Information	Did the company apologise (or otherwise comply with the CCP's direction)?
Cathay Pacific	August 2019	Malaysia	According to <i>ABC News</i> , the Chinese Civil Aviation Authority on 10 August demanded the suspension of all Cathay Pacific employees who were involved in the Hong Kong protests. The authority requested identification information for all Cathay Pacific crew members and stated that members who hadn't been approved would be prohibited from entering Chinese airspace. The <i>South China Morning Post</i> reported that the Cathay Pacific suspended two pilots and two airport employees who were involved in the protests in Hong Kong and threatened to dismiss any further employees who actively supported the protest movement. On 16 August, Cathay Pacific CEO Rupert Hogg and one of the airline's deputies resigned in response to 'recent events'.	Yes
Coach	August 2019	US	According to <i>Bloomberg</i> , calls to boycott the company Coach began circulating on Chinese social media after it was revealed that T-shirts sold by the brand listed Hong Kong and Taiwan as separate countries. Coach's brand ambassador in China, supermodel Liu Wen, terminated her relationship with the brand via Weibo. Coach responded on Weibo with an apology and stated that the T-shirts were pulled from sale in May 2018. The <i>Global Times</i> reported on the consumer backlash and stated that the Coach website had been 'taken down "for maintenance"' at the time of publishing.	Yes
CoCo	June 2019	Hong Kong	According to the <i>South China Morning Post</i> , an image of a receipt issued by CoCo dated 16 June that expressed support for the Hong Kong protesters through a text saying 'Go Hong Kong people!' received backlash on Chinese social media. With many users threatening to boycott the brand, the company released a statement on Weibo stating that the receipt had been altered by staff at a particular franchise in Hong Kong and that the franchise's business had now been suspended. The company further emphasised that Hong Kong is an inseparable part of the PRC.	Yes
Deutz	March 2020	France	According to the <i>South China Morning Post</i> , the French champagne brand Deutz was boycotted by China after Patrick Rosset, the son of the company's CEO, published a Facebook status that said 'Chinese products should be boycotted at whatever cost since the [Covid-19] virus spread beyond China to elsewhere.' The <i>Global Times</i> reported that the brand was boycotted by many Chinese wine importers, and its products were removed from Chinese online platforms. In response to the boycott, Rosset apologised for the 'hugely regrettable' statement and deleted his Facebook and LinkedIn profiles. The brand issued a formal apology soon after, stating that 'Not a single word of what Patrick said reflects the values our companies or our staff hold ... All of us here are full of admiration at the courage shown by the Chinese people.'	Yes

Company	Date	Business location	Information	Did the company apologise (or otherwise comply with the CCP's direction)?
Dior	October 2019	France	According to the <i>South China Morning Post</i> , Dior faced a consumer backlash after images of an employee using a map of China that excluded the island of Taiwan during a presentation were shared extensively on Chinese social media. Dior apologised and distanced itself from the dispute in its statement on Weibo, claiming that it would conduct a serious investigation into the employee's actions. The company further stated that it has 'always respected and upheld the principle of one China, strictly upholding China's rights and complete sovereignty, treasuring the feelings of Chinese citizens.' The <i>Global Times</i> reported on the story and quoted a Chinese academic saying, 'Foreign brands should respect their market and consumers. They should also strengthen internal training and management to prevent similar mistakes.'	Yes
Fresh	August 2019	US	According to <i>The Guardian</i> , American beauty company Fresh was subject to online backlash on Chinese social media for listing Taiwan and Hong Kong as regions separate from China on its website. In response to the incident, Fresh apologised on all of its Chinese platforms, stating that it resolutely upholds China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.	Yes
Gap	May 2018	US	According to the <i>New York Times</i> , Chinese social media users circulated photos of a Gap T-shirt that omitted Taiwan and other territories from China in its design. Gap issued an apology on Weibo within hours, stating that the company was 'truly sorry about this unintentional mistake' and promising to undertake 'more rigorous reviews'. Gap further stated that the products had been removed from the market and destroyed. The <i>Global Times</i> described the incident as an 'act of disrespect to China's territorial sovereignty'.	Yes
Givenchy	August 2019	France	According to <i>Reuters</i> , Givenchy's brand ambassador in China, Jackson Yee, publicly severed ties with the company after images of a T-shirt listing Hong Kong and Taiwan as separate countries were revealed online. The brand apologised on Weibo on 12 August for the 'mistake' and stated that it 'respects China's sovereignty' and 'firmly upholds the one-China principle'.	Yes

Company	Date	Business location	Information	Did the company apologise (or otherwise comply with the CCP's direction)?
Global Blue	August 2019	UK	According to the <i>Global Times</i> , Global Blue faced backlash among Chinese netizens after it was revealed that its overseas tax refund system listed Hong Kong and Taiwan as separate countries. This was pointed out in an email sent by a Chinese citizen to the company, asking that it 'correct the mistake' as soon as possible. The company responded to the email, stating that it wouldn't do this, as there had been reports of 'Macao, Hong Kong and Taiwan passport holders being refused by customs after filling in China on their tax return forms'. The email concluded with the remark that 'Taiwan is an independent country and not part of China.' In response, the company received even more backlash on Weibo. Global Blue responded by stating that it would immediately dismiss the staff member who wrote the email and further stated that the company firmly supported China's territorial integrity.	Yes
GMM Grammy	April 2020	Thailand	According to <i>Reuters</i> , Chinese fans organised a large boycott against GMM Grammy's popular Thai show <i>2gether</i> after the lead actor, Vachirawit Chivaaree, liked a photo on Twitter that described Hong Kong as a country. While Chivaaree quickly posted a public apology on Twitter for his 'lack of caution talking about Hong Kong', there was further online backlash against the show on Weibo after Chivaaree's partner, Weeraya Sukaram, retweeted a post that criticised China's handling of the Covid-19 pandemic and made an Instagram comment that was construed as a post suggesting Taiwan isn't part of China. The show's ratings dropped significantly in China. Chivaaree's followers on Weibo declined from 600,000 to 410,000 in just 24 hours, and the <i>Global Times</i> reported that related hashtags for the show's boycott garnered a combined 4.64 billion views and more than 1.44 million posts on Weibo. Chivaaree issued a further official apology on Weibo on behalf of the show in June 2020.	Yes
HSBC	July 2019	UK	According to the <i>Australian Financial Review</i> , HSBC assisted with the US Department of Justice's investigation into Meng Wanzhou, the CFO of Huawei, by handing over sensitive documents in 2017. In July 2019, the <i>Global Times</i> ran a story that branded HSBC as 'unethical' and further suggested that the bank could be included on the soon to be released 'unreliable entity' list in China. The <i>Financial Times</i> reported that HSBC launched a lobbying effort in response to convince the Chinese Government that it wasn't responsible for Meng Wanzhou's arrest.	n.a.
IKEA	August 2018	Sweden	According to the <i>South China Morning Post</i> , on 28 August, Chinese state media revealed that IKEA referred to Taiwan and Hong Kong as countries on its packaging. An article in the <i>Global Times</i> stated that IKEA had violated the one-China principle. While a number of Chinese users turned to Weibo to voice their discontent, IKEA didn't apologise.	No

Company	Date	Business location	Information	Did the company apologise (or otherwise comply with the CCP's direction)?
It's Not Made in China	March 2019	South Africa	According to the <i>South China Morning Post</i> , Chinese social media users called for the boycotting of a South African bottled-water company called 'It's not Made in China'. While the original post reportedly received only two comments, the story was picked up by the state-run media outlets <i>Global Times</i> and <i>Guanch</i> , amassing 259,000 views of their social media posts. The company's executives published a formal apology, saying 'We don't want to start a war' and have considered renaming their brand to 'Made in Madiba-land'. However, the brand's name remained the same, with a description on their website explaining that 'because everyone is so used to reading MADE IN CHINA on just about everything, we knew that by saying the opposite and calling ourselves IT'S NOT MADE IN CHINA, we would signal that we wanted to do things a little differently.'	Yes
JYP Entertainment	January 2016	South Korea	According to the <i>New York Times</i> , Chinese authorities halted promotional activities of Korean girl group TWICE after 16-year-old Taiwanese member Chou Tzuyu waved a Taiwanese flag on national television in 2016 and caused a backlash among mainland audiences. <i>BBC News</i> reported that JYP Entertainment published a formal apology video on the group's official social media channels, which featured Chou proclaiming that 'There's only one China. The two sides of the Taiwan Strait are one. I will always consider myself as a Chinese person and feel proud of this.'	Yes
Lancome	June 2016	France	According to <i>BBC News</i> , Lancome faced online backlash in China after organising a concert in Hong Kong that was to feature a well-known pro-democracy artist. Calls for a boycott spread across Chinese online forums. Lancome released a statement that the Hong Kong artist, Denise Ho, 'is not a spokesperson of Lancome' and apologised for any confusion caused. Lancome cited 'possible safety reasons' as the reason behind cancelling the event but didn't clarify further. The <i>Global Times</i> reported that the 'real reason' for the cancellation was 'self-explanatory', that the 'mainland public has realized that they are an influential market force' and that anyone who wants access to the Chinese mainland market 'must not harm China's national interests'.	Yes
Leica	April 2019	Germany	According to the <i>South China Morning Post</i> , Leica received widespread backlash from Chinese consumers and was censored by Weibo for releasing a promotional video that depicted events related to the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. A Leica spokesperson announced that the ad wasn't officially sanctioned by the company and stated that the video wouldn't be used in future advertisements.	Yes

Company	Date	Business location	Information	Did the company apologise (or otherwise comply with the CCP's direction)?
Lockheed Martin	February 2010	US	According to the <i>Seattle Times</i> , the Chinese Government threatened to impose sanctions on several US defence contractors, including Lockheed Martin, due to their involvement in a major arms sale to Taiwan valued at an estimated US\$9.64 billion. Under the foreign military sales contract, Lockheed Martin was to provide Taiwan with 263 PAC-3 air defence missiles. China also announced a suspension of high-level military exchanges with the US in response to the Taiwanese arms sale. Lockheed Martin didn't issue an apology.	No
Lululemon	April 2018	US	According to the <i>New York Times</i> , the American activewear brand Lululemon Athletica received backlash on social media platforms Instagram and Weibo from angry Chinese users after the brand's art director, Trevor Fleming, posted a link to his personal social media account featuring a T-shirt depicting a Chinese rice box with bat wings and chopsticks accompanied by the words 'No Thank You'. <i>Reuters</i> reported that the hashtag 'Lululemon insults China' was viewed 204 million times on Weibo. Lululemon responded to the criticisms with an apology on Instagram, stating that 'the image and the post were inappropriate and inexcusable', and issued a separate statement on the Chinese platform WeChat explaining that Fleming's employment with the brand had been terminated. Fleming also apologised for sharing the T-shirt design and has since deleted his personal Instagram and LinkedIn profiles.	Yes
Marriott	January 2018	US	According to <i>The Guardian</i> , the Chinese Government blocked the Marriott International hotel chain's online booking platform for a week after discovering a customer questionnaire distributed by the company that listed Tibet, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan as separate countries. Chinese internet users later found that Marriott International's official Twitter account 'liked' a tweet by a Tibetan independence group. The hotel chain sacked its social media manager and issued an official apology alongside an 'eight-point rectification plan'. Following the incident, the Chinese Government ordered other hotel companies to review their websites and booking platforms for any similar 'mistakes'.	Yes
McDonalds	January 2019	US	According to the <i>South China Morning Post</i> , McDonalds received backlash on Chinese social media after it aired an advertisement on 6 January that included a video of a student identification card listing Taiwan as a separate country. McDonalds issued an official apology on Weibo on 19 January and subsequently removed the video advertisement. McDonalds stated that it 'supported the one-China policy' and deeply regretted its actions.	Yes

Company	Date	Business location	Information	Did the company apologise (or otherwise comply with the CCP's direction)?
Medtronic	January 2018	US	According to Reuters , Medtronic was ordered by Chinese state authorities to apologise for listing Taiwan and Tibet as separate countries on its website and to rectify the mistake by 15 January. Medtronic released an official apology for 'causing public misconduct' and adjusted the listings on its website, stating that it respected the Chinese Government's position on territorial issues.	Yes
Mercedes-Benz	February 2018	Germany	According to Reuters , the German car maker Mercedes-Benz experienced backlash from Chinese consumers after publishing an Instagram post on 5 February that advertised a car alongside a quote from the Dalai Lama. The Telegraph reported that Mercedes-Benz removed the post immediately and issued an apology on Weibo, stating that the company has 'published extremely incorrect information' and that it would 'promptly take steps to deepen our understanding of Chinese culture and values, our international staff included, to help standardize our actions to ensure this sort of issue doesn't happen again.'	Yes
Muji	May 2018	Japan	According to Reuters , Muji was fined ¥200,000 (US\$43,000) by the Shanghai Administration for Industry and Commerce for using labels on products imported into China that listed Taiwan as the country of origin. Muji had also been subjected to a consumer backlash over a catalogue in January 2018 that featured a map of China containing 'inaccurate' borders and islands. A spokesperson from Muji confirmed the fine, and the company has since changed its packaging in compliance with Chinese regulations. The fine cited a violation of Article 9, Section 4 of the PRC Advertising Law, which sanctions any activity 'damaging the dignity or interests of the state or divulging any state secret'. The violation was then recorded on the National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System.	Yes

Company	Date	Business location	Information	Did the company apologise (or otherwise comply with the CCP's direction)?
National Basketball Association	October 2019	US	According to <i>Business Insider</i> , the National Basketball Association (NBA) faced a significant backlash from Chinese consumers and was banned from broadcasting in China after the general manager of the Houston Rockets, Daryl Morey, posted a tweet supporting the Hong Kong protests. The Chinese Basketball Association and other key Chinese partners announced the termination of business deals with the team. Broadcasts of NBA games were suspended in China, and a number of e-commerce platforms removed Houston Rockets franchise products from sale. Houston Rockets executive Adam Silver stated that 'We will protect our employees' freedom of speech', and Morey clarified that 'My tweets are my own and in no way represent the Rockets or the NBA.' The NBA released a statement saying the tweet was regrettable, although it was pointed out that the Chinese version of the statement went further in labelling the tweet as 'inappropriate' and something the NBA was 'extremely disappointed in' and that it 'undoubtedly seriously hurt the feelings of Chinese basketball fans'. A <i>CNN</i> sports reporter was later prevented from interviewing NBA athletes about the conflict during a press conference in the US. Four months later, the NBA donated US\$1.4 million to support Hubei Province in dealing with the Covid-19 outbreak, with the expectation that the NBA may return to China Central Television (CCTV) and recover from economic losses as a result of the fallout. The <i>Wall Street Journal</i> indicated that the mass Twitter campaign against Morey was likely coordinated by the Chinese Government. In July 2020, CCTV confirmed that the blackout of NBA games would continue, despite Tencent streaming the NBA's initial return after a four-month Covid-19 lockdown.	Yes
Nintendo	April 2020	Japan	According to <i>The Guardian</i> , 'Animal Crossing: New Horizons', a popular console game developed by the Japanese company Nintendo, was removed from sale on Chinese platforms in April after players used the game to voice opposition against the Chinese Government and spread pro-democracy messages relating to the Hong Kong protests. A number of allegedly politically sensitive materials, such as banned phrases and portraits of senior Chinese leaders, were shared among players from Hong Kong and overseas. Pro-democracy activist Joshua Wong also took part in this movement by sharing screenshots on Twitter of his in-game island with a slogan saying 'Free Hong Kong, revolution now.' Chinese technology website <i>PingWest</i> reported that messages were sent through WeChat to sellers on the Alibaba-owned Taobao platform ordering a ban on sales of all 'Animal Crossing' products.	No

Company	Date	Business location	Information	Did the company apologise (or otherwise comply with the CCP's direction)?
Pocari Sweat	July 2019	Japan	According to the <i>South China Morning Post</i> , Pocari Sweat (a sports drink) faced a Chinese consumer backlash and was termed a 'pro-Hong Kong independence drink' after it removed advertisements from the Hong Kong Television Broadcast network due to accusations of pro-Beijing coverage of the extradition bill protests in July 2019. The popular Chinese girl group GNZ48 terminated its contracts with the brand and retracted all promotional videos made with the company. Otsuka Pharmaceutical, the parent company for Pocari Sweat, remained firm despite the cancellation of its advertisements but apologised for the leaked messages having 'caused inconvenience'.	Yes
Raytheon	February 2010	US	According to the <i>Seattle Times</i> , the Chinese Government threatened to impose sanctions on several US defence contractors, including Raytheon, due to its involvement in a major arms sale worth US\$9.64 billion to Taiwan. Under the foreign military sales contract, Raytheon was to supply a Patriot air and missile defence system to the island. China also announced a suspension of high-level military exchanges with the US in response to the Taiwanese arms sale. Raytheon didn't issue an apology.	No
Red Candle Games	February 2019	Taiwan	According to <i>The Guardian</i> , 'Devotion' (a horror game developed by the Taiwanese company Red Candle Games) faced significant backlash from Chinese online users and was removed from sale on global platforms after it was discovered that the game contained a number of jokes about and critical references to China. Public discussion relating to the game was removed from Chinese social media platforms, and the game received a flood of negative reviews. The company released an official apology, stating that there was a 'critical and unprofessional error during the game's production' and that 'we have no intention for causing harm nor hatred.' A revision patch for the game later removed all politically sensitive material.	Yes
Samsung	August 2019	South Korea	According to the <i>South China Morning Post</i> , Samsung faced a consumer backlash in China for listing Hong Kong and Taiwan as separate countries and regions on its global website. This prompted Chinese K-pop star Lay Zhang to revoke his contract as brand ambassador with the company and publish a statement on Weibo condemning Samsung's actions of damaging China's 'territorial integrity' and seriously hurting 'the national feelings of our compatriots'. Samsung didn't issue an apology.	No

Company	Date	Business location	Information	Did the company apologise (or otherwise comply with the CCP's direction)?
Swarovski	August 2019	Austria	According to the <i>South China Morning Post</i> , Swarovski faced backlash from Chinese users on Weibo and apologised to 'the Chinese people whose feelings have been hurt' after it listed Hong Kong as a separate country on its website. The online backlash targeted a number of other foreign luxury retailers over similar territorial issues in the same week. The company issued an official apology, stating that it would work on its global brand awareness and correct any inaccuracies. Swarovski's brand ambassador, Chinese actress Jiang Shuying, has since terminated her cooperation with the brand, and her agency released a statement saying that 'we uphold the one-China principle and our national sovereignty and territory integrity cannot be violated.'	Yes
Taipan Bread and Cakes	September 2019	Hong Kong	According to the <i>South China Morning Post</i> , the Hong Kong-based bakery Taipan Bread and Cakes received backlash from mainland Chinese consumers and had its products removed from major supermarkets and e-commerce platforms in China after the bakery's director, Garic Kwok, supported the Hong Kong protests on Facebook. The <i>South China Morning Post</i> reported that a mainland Chinese importer of the brand announced it would destroy stock due to the 'huge amount of mooncakes' being returned by retailers. The bakery announced that it would likely 'suffer a big financial loss' as a result. Kwok deleted the Facebook posts and published an official apology for having 'caused misunderstanding or offended anyone', which was also shared on the bakery's Weibo account.	Yes
Tiffany & Co.	October 2019	US	According to the <i>Hong Kong Free Press</i> , Tiffany & Co. faced a backlash from mainland Chinese consumers after posting a promotional campaign on Twitter that showed Chinese model Sun Feifei wearing a ring on her right hand while covering her right eye. The post, which was associated by many Chinese consumers with Hong Kong democratic protests, was swiftly removed from the company's online platforms. The company's spokesperson said that the image wasn't intended to be political and apologised if it was perceived to be.	Yes

Company	Date	Business location	Information	Did the company apologise (or otherwise comply with the CCP's direction)?
UBS Group	June 2019	Switzerland	According to the <i>Sydney Morning Herald</i> , UBS Group faced boycott threats by Chinese clients, financial experts and investors after its Global Chief Economist, Paul Donovan, said during a podcast episode that the high consumer prices brought on by African swine fever, which killed herds of pigs across China, would 'matter to a Chinese pig'. A number of Chinese consumers interpreted the comments to be referring to Chinese people, rather than livestock, and condemned the bank for its racist remarks. UBS promptly removed the podcast and released an official apology for 'any misunderstanding caused by these innocently intended comments ... about inflation and Chinese consumer prices rising, which was driven by higher prices for pork'. Donovan also delivered a personal apology for using 'hugely culturally insensitive language' in an interview with <i>Bloomberg</i> .	Yes
Undercover	June 2019	Japan	According to the <i>Financial Times</i> , Undercover faced a backlash from Chinese online users and had its products withdrawn from Chinese retail platforms for sharing an Instagram post with the slogan 'No extradition to China'. Undercover deleted the post and issued a statement clarifying that it was an 'individual opinion' posted by mistake. Nike stated that it had to cancel sales of limited-edition shoes designed by Undercover in China 'based on feedback from Chinese consumers'.	Yes
Valentino	August 2019	Italy	According to <i>SupChina</i> , Valentino faced a backlash on Chinese social media after it listed Hong Kong and Taiwan as separate countries on its official website. The company released an official apology stating that it 'resolutely' respects and upholds 'China's sovereignty and territorial integrity'. Many Chinese users praised the brand for the apology.	Yes
Versace	August 2019	Italy	According to <i>ABC News</i> , images of a Versace T-shirt identifying Hong Kong and Macau as countries were widely criticised on Chinese social media and led to calls for a boycott in August 2019. Versace's brand ambassador in China, Yang Mi, made a public announcement on Weibo that she would officially terminate her contract with Versace; the announcement garnered more than 640 million views. The company issued an apology on social media, stating that it 'resolutely' respected 'China's territory and national sovereignty' and further stated that it had stopped selling and had destroyed the T-shirts.	Yes
Walmart	March 2018	US	According to <i>Shanghaiist</i> , Walmart faced a backlash from Chinese online users after a video that showed a sign in a Walmart store referring to Taiwan as 'country of origin' went viral on Weibo. The company issued an official apology for its 'serious mistake' on its Weibo account, stating that it would immediately correct the mistake and implement a review process for store signage to prevent any recurrence of the incident.	Yes

Company	Date	Business location	Information	Did the company apologise (or otherwise comply with the CCP's direction)?
YiFang	August 2019	Taiwan	According to <i>The Guardian</i> , Chinese online users placed YiFang on a blacklist on Weibo and called for a mass boycott of the brand after it temporarily closed one of its Hong Kong stores and put up a sign that said 'Stand together with Hong Kongers' in support of the Hong Kong protests. The brand issued an official apology, stating that it had terminated the employee responsible for the store's closure and planned to permanently close the specific store.	Yes
Zara	September 2019	Spain	According to <i>SupChina</i> , Chinese social media users accused Zara of supporting the Hong Kong demonstrations after it temporarily closed four stores on 2 September, which coincided with strikes across the city. Zara issued a statement on Weibo clarifying that the closure of the stores wasn't in support of the protests but due to transportation issues that were likely to arise and stated that it was a 'long-term advocate' for the one country, two systems policy.	Yes

Notes

- 1 See data in Appendix for more details.
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- 3 Hua Chunying, 'Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying's regular press conference on October 23, 2019', Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, press conference, 23 October 2019, [online](#).
- 4 Jinghao Zhou, 'China's core interests and dilemma in foreign policy practice', *Pacific Focus*, 2019, 34(1):33.
- 5 Kathleen Hicks, Joseph Federici, Connor Akiyama, *Hybrid CoE strategic analysis 18: China in the grey zone*, European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, 2019, 3.
- 6 Jinghan Zeng, Yuefan Xiao, Shaun Breslin, 'Securing China's core interests: the state of the debate in China', *International Affairs*, 2015, 91(2):245.
- 7 Elizabeth Economy, *The third revolution: Xi Jinping and the new Chinese state*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2018, 187.
- 8 The origin of coercive diplomacy is deeply rooted in traditional security studies, in which earlier definitions involved the threat of future military force or the limited use of military force. See Alexander George, William Simons (eds), *The limits of coercive diplomacy*, Westview Press, Oxford, 1994; Daniel Byman, Matthew Waxman, *The dynamics of coercion: American foreign policy and the limits of military might*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2002. While a widely accepted definition of coercive diplomacy hasn't been established, this report has adopted the definition used by Ketian Zhang to reflect recent shifts towards a diplomatic strategy that's more political and economical. See Ketian Zhang, 'Chinese non-military coercion—tactics and rationale', *Brookings*, 22 January 2019, [online](#).
- 9 Graeme Dobell, *China and Taiwan in the South Pacific: diplomatic chess versus Pacific political rugby*, Center for the Study of the Chinese Southern Diaspora, 2007, 10.
- 10 Anne-Marie Brady, 'China's foreign propaganda machine', *Journal of Democracy*, October 2015, 26(4):51–59.
- 11 Global Agenda Council on Geo-economics, *The age of economic coercion: how geo-politics is disrupting supply chains, financial systems, energy markets, trade and the internet*, World Economic Forum, 2016, 7, [online](#).
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- 13 Harrell et al., *China's use of coercive economic measures*, 20.
- 14 Chuntai Qian, '论冷战后美国的强制外交' [On US coercive diplomacy after the Cold War], *国际观察 [International Review]*, 2007, no. 3.
- 15 Jing Zhang, '韩国抱怨遭中国不公对待'向WTO诉苦 我外交部:民意如此' [South Korea complains to the WTO about "unfair treatment" from China. China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs: This is public opinion], *People's Daily*, 21 March 2017, [online](#).
- 16 James Reilly, 'China's unilateral sanctions', *The Washington Quarterly*, 2012, 35(4):122–123. See also Richard Nephew, *China and economic sanctions: where does Washington have leverage?*, Brookings Institute, 2019, 3, [online](#).
- 17 Jian Jisong, '关于单边经济制裁的'司法性'与'合法性'探讨' [Investigation into the 'judicial' and 'legal' aspects of unilateral economic sanctions], *法学 [Legal Studies]*, 2007, 1:87. See also Reilly, 'China's unilateral sanctions'.
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Acronyms and abbreviations

AUSMIN	Australia–US Ministerial Consultations
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CEO	chief executive officer
CFO	chief financial officer
EU	European Union
ICPC	International Cyber Policy Centre
PRC	People's Republic of China
THAAD	Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
UN	United Nations

