

**Practitioners' Insights: Investing Under Uncertainties** 

**By Kuntal Shah** 

13<sup>th</sup> May 2020



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



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



#### **Elevated Debt Levels and Rock Bottom Interest Rates**














Source: Bloomberg, PIMCO, Hover Analytics

#### **Negative Bond Yields and Currency Interplays: Supply or Price, but not Both?**











|             | The Negative Bond Yield Matrix |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
|-------------|--------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Country     | 6 Mo                           | 1Yr   | 2Yr   | 3 Yr  | 4 Yr  | 5 Yr  | 6 Yr  | 7 yr  | 8 Yr  | 9 Yr  | 10 Yr | 15 Yr | 30 yr |
| Switzerland | -0.75                          | -0.64 | -0.89 | -0.91 | -0.89 | -0.87 | -0.79 | -0.76 | -0.69 | -0.63 | -0.52 | -0.29 | -0.01 |
| Germany     | -0.58                          | -0.68 | -0.74 | -0.76 | -0.74 | -0.68 | -0.64 | -0.58 | -0.46 | -0.4  | -0.31 | -0.1  | 0.27  |
| Netherlands | -0.59                          |       | -0.72 | -0.7  | -0.64 | -0.61 | -0.5  | -0.42 | -0.32 | -0.25 | -0.15 | -0.01 | 0.3   |
| Japan       | -0.13                          | -0.17 | -0.2  | -0.22 | -0.23 | -0.22 | -0.22 | -0.22 | -0.21 | -0.16 | -0.12 | 0.07  | 0.36  |
| Denmark     | -0.66                          |       | -0.7  | -0.7  |       | -0.68 |       |       | -0.45 |       | -0.28 |       |       |
| Austria     |                                | -0.54 | -0.65 | -0.63 | -0.57 | -0.47 | -0.39 | -0.28 | -0.22 | -0.14 | -0.03 | 0.31  | 0.7   |
| Finland     |                                |       | -0.66 | -0.63 | -0.61 | -0.54 | -0.45 |       | -0.19 |       | -0.01 |       | 0.56  |
| Sweden      | -0.4                           |       | -0.62 |       |       | -0.55 |       | -0.26 |       |       | -0.01 | 0.18  |       |
| France      | -0.59                          | -0.6  | -0.68 | -0.66 | -0.62 | -0.53 | -0.41 | -0.31 | -0.21 | -0.1  | 0.02  | 0.38  | 1.15  |
| Belgium     | -0.57                          | -0.58 | -0.6  | -0.66 | -0.6  | -0.54 | -0.42 | -0.25 | -0.14 | -0.06 | 0.09  | 0.4   |       |
| Slovakia    |                                | -0.33 |       |       |       | -0.24 | -0.5  |       | 0     | 0.18  | 0.26  |       |       |
| Ireland     | -0.41                          | -0.55 | -0.45 |       | -0.46 | -0.39 | -0.24 | -0.14 | 0.45  |       | 0.22  | 0.58  | 1.16  |
| Slovenia    |                                | -0.48 | -0.3  |       |       | -0.31 |       | -0.14 |       |       | 0.25  |       |       |
| Spain       | -0.41                          | -0.39 | -0.4  | -0.34 | -0.27 | -0.21 | -0.06 | 0.08  | 0.2   | 0.29  | 0.43  | 0.8   | 1.47  |
| Portugal    | -0.38                          | -0.34 | -0.37 | -0.25 | -0.17 | -0.14 | 0.05  | 0.16  | 0.28  | 0.44  | 0.55  | 0.95  | 1.5   |
| Malta       | -0.23                          | -0.2  |       | -0.1  |       | 0.02  |       |       |       |       | 0.74  |       |       |
| Bulgaria    |                                | -0.13 |       | -0.01 |       | 0.05  |       | 0.37  |       |       | 0.58  |       |       |
| Italy       | -0.16                          | -0.02 | 0.22  | 0.71  | 1.03  | 1.31  | 1.53  | 1.61  | 1.77  | 1.82  | 2.12  | 2.45  | 3.17  |
| USA         | 2.19                           | 2.03  | 1.81  | 1.75  |       | 1.78  |       | 1.89  |       |       | 2.03  |       | 2.52  |

Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Refinitiv, Bloomberg, Business Insider



### **Duration of Boom and Bust: Decreasing Duration and Increasing Frequency**






Source : sharelynx.com



#### **Sources of Stock Price Appreciation**










Source : Robert Shiller's Data Library


#### **Easy Money and Congenial Interest Rates are Necessary Conditions for Bubbles**













Source: Advisor Perspectives, Meritocracy, Robert Shiller and S&P, Forbes


#### **Low Future Interest Rates Embedded in Current High Valuations**







| S&P 500 valuation summary      |         |            |         |            |  |  |
|--------------------------------|---------|------------|---------|------------|--|--|
|                                | Aggrega | ate index  | Media   | an stock   |  |  |
|                                |         | Historical |         | Historical |  |  |
| Metric                         | Current | %ile       | Current | %ile       |  |  |
| P/E to growth (PEG)            | 1.5 x   | 97 %       | 1.9 x   | 100 %      |  |  |
| EV / Sales                     | 2.1 x   | 94         | 2.7 x   | 100        |  |  |
| EV / EBITDA                    | 11.3 x  | 88         | 11.4 x  | 99         |  |  |
| Price / Book                   | 2.9 x   | 76         | 3.3 x   | 98         |  |  |
| Forward P/E                    | 17.4 x  | 88         | 17.7 x  | 95         |  |  |
| Free cash flow yield (FCF)     | 4.4 %   | 43         | 4.8 %   | 30         |  |  |
| Cyclically adjusted P/E (CAPE) | 23.7 x  | 85         | NA      | NA         |  |  |
| Median                         |         | 88 %       |         | 98 %       |  |  |




Source: Advisor Perspectives, Robert Shiller and S&P, Forbes

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
### Significant Role of Buybacks in the Current Valuation








# Buybacks have provided significant support to global equity markets Attribution of total cumulative returns for the MSCI World Index




Source: State Street Global Advisors

### **Significant Role of Interest Rates in the Current Valuation**








Source : FRED, Thomson Financial, Bloomberg



#### A Modern Pandemic in the Era of Airlines and Social Media






| Twelve Large Pandemic Events with at least 100,000 deaths |       |      |             |  |  |  |
|---|-------|------|-------------|--|--|--|
| Event   | Start | End  | Deaths      |  |  |  |
| Black Death   | 1331  | 1353 | 75,000,000  |  |  |  |
| Great Plague of London                                    | 1665  | 1666 | 100,000     |  |  |  |
| First Asia Europe Cholera Pandemic                        | 1816  | 1826 | 100,000     |  |  |  |
| Second Asia Europe Cholera Pandemic                       | 1829  | 1851 | 100,000     |  |  |  |
| Russia Cholera Pandemic                                   | 1852  | 1860 | 1,000,000   |  |  |  |
| Global Flu Pandemic                                       | 1889  | 1890 | 1,000,000   |  |  |  |
| Sixth Cholera Pandemic                                    | 1899  | 1923 | 800,000     |  |  |  |
| Encephalitis Lethargica Pandemic                          | 1915  | 1926 | 1,500,000   |  |  |  |
| Spanish Flu   | 1918  | 1920 | 100,000,000 |  |  |  |
| Asian Flu   | 1957  | 1958 | 2,000,000   |  |  |  |
| Hong Kong Flu   | 1968  | 1969 | 1,000,000   |  |  |  |
| H1N1 Pandemic   | 2009  | 2009 | 203,000     |  |  |  |

#### Supply and demand shocks in one fell blow Supply Factory Labour Disruptions Drying of shock cash flows shutdowns shortage in input supply Demand shock Loss in Weaker Lower Weaker discretionary income/ sentiment global employment spending demand

#### A Highly Contagious Global Pandemic Triggering Multiple Exogenous Shocks




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Liquidity dependent, inherently interconnected and a complex adaptive system

#### Framework of Investing in the Post-Covid-19 Situation





- Virus will set timelines
- Subsequent waves
- Containment vs
   suppression strategies
- Mutations
- Interim treatment protocols
- Flattening the curve
- Living with the virus

- Access to healthcare
- Restricted living
- Lifestyle changes
- Economic pain
- Psychological issues
- Cognitive overload
- Uncertainty
- Feeling of helplessness

- Demand destruction
- Cashflow preservation
- Cash is king
- Supply chain issues

- Stimulus packages
- Restart policies
- Debt and deficits
- Who pays for the bill?
- Impact of helicopter money
- Policy errors
- Moral Hazard
- Blame game

- Market dislocations
- Flight to safety
- Volatility
- Collateral and solvency
- Liquidity terms
- Correlations
- Supply side issues
- Dealing with extremes of bubbles & crashes

#### Odds, Frequency & Impact – All Three Matter



Frequency vs. Magnitude: Probability and outcome, both matter

| Good Probability, Bad Expected Value |         |                |  |  |  |
|--------------------------------------|---------|----------------|--|--|--|
| Probability                          | Outcome | Weighted Value |  |  |  |
| 70%                                  | +1%     | +0.7%          |  |  |  |
| 30%                                  | -10     | -3.0           |  |  |  |
| 100%                                 |         | -2.3%          |  |  |  |

| Bad Probability, Good Expected Value |         |                |  |  |  |
|--------------------------------------|---------|----------------|--|--|--|
| Probability                          | Outcome | Weighted Value |  |  |  |
| 70%                                  | -1%     | -0.7%          |  |  |  |
| 30%                                  | +10     | +3.0           |  |  |  |
| 100%                                 |         | +2.3%          |  |  |  |

#### **Expected Value**

Expected Value is the weighted average value for a distribution of possible outcomes.

Take the probability of loss times the amount of possible loss from the probability of gain times the amount of possible gain. That is what we're trying to do. Its *Imperfect*, but that's what it's all about

- Warren Buffett


#### Risk vs. Uncertainty

**Risk**: We don't know the outcome, but we know what the underlying distribution looks like (incorporates the element of loss / harm)

**Uncertainty**: We don't know the outcome, and we don't know what the underlying distribution looks like (Need not incorporate loss / harm)


- Frank Knight

Source: Risk, Uncertainty and Profit




#### **Consumers' Perspective**






#### **Corporate Business: Operating Managers' Perspective**






#### **Macro Perspective**






#### **Asset Market Perspective**







#### **Flight to Safety: Rising Spreads**









Source: Refinitiv, FRED, Moodys Analytics, NBER, Factsheet

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
### **Ring of Moral Hazard**



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Source : Slickcharts.com



### The Great Depression vs. The Great Recession vs. The Great Lockdown





|   | Great Depression 1930s                                   | Global Financial Crisis 2008  | Ongoing COVID-19 Recession   |
|---|--|---|--|
| Bank Failures                                       | 9,096 - 50% of banks<br>(Jan. 1930- March 1933)          | 57 - 0.6% of banks<br>(Dec. 2007 - May 2009)  | Banks well capitalized,<br>new NPA cycle likely  |
| Unemployment Rate                                   | 25%  | 8.5%  | 14.7% (09-05-2020) and counting  |
| Economic Decline                                    | -26.5% (1929 1933)                                       | -4.1% (last quarter 2007 - second quarter 2009)                                       | Severe and counting  |
| Biggest Decline in Dow-<br>Jones Industrial Average | -89.2% (Sept. 3, 1929 - July 8, 1932)                    | -53.8% (Oct. 9, 2007- March 9, 2009)  | Unfolding movie  |
| Change in Prices                                    | -25% (1929 - 1933)                                       | +0.5% (Dec. 2007-March 2009)  | Unfolding movie  |
| Emergency Spending Programs                         | 1.5% of GDP for 1 year (increase in 1934 budget deficit) | 2.5% of GDP for 2 years<br>(2009 American Reinvestment and<br>Recovery Act)           | Fiscal Stimulus > 11% of GDP (08-05-2020) and counting   |
| State's Response                                    | Raise taxes, cut spending                                | Federal stimulus plan gives fiscal relief to states to lessen impact of tax increases | Rate cuts, asset purchases, back stopping money/ bond markets, USD swap lines and ongoing measures |
| Increase in Money Supply by Federal Reserve         | 17% (1933)   | 125% (Sept. 2008- May 2009)   | 13.7% (27-04-2020) and counting  |


Source: www.gold-eagle.com, <a href="https://jhss11rajankalsi.wordpress.com">https://jhss11rajankalsi.wordpress.com</a>


#### 1910-1930 Conditions in the Era of the Spanish Flu Pandemic and The Great Depression
















#### What are the Qualities that Bring Longevity, Resilience and Anti-Fragility?










### **Ideal Portfolio Construct : Barbell Approach of Resilience and Optionality**



| Parameter                  | Resilient<br>Companies                           | Anti-Fragile<br>companies :<br>Resilience with<br>Optionality   | Only Optionality  | Survival Issues /<br>Value Traps                          | Mediocre: Neither Resilient nor Optionality  |
|----------------------------|--|---|---|---|--|
| Allocation                 | Core of portfolio                                | Rare but large allocation   | Many positions but small allocation. Maximum of this bucket is capped   | Avoidable commitment                                      | Avoidable  |
| Valuation<br>Consideration | Timeline of investment<br>horizon arbitrage      | Longevity of growth and level of out of the money optionality implied in the current prices   | Large total addressable market and network effects  | Cheap, getting cheaper due to deteriorating core business | Market performer   |
| Investor<br>Consideration  | Sector leadership  Markets share and adjacencies | Take advantage of volatility to add and trim positions  Rare companies; should be averaged up. Risk contribution will be more equally distributed i.e. large position represents the same risk as a very small position | Venture capitalist investing framework  Extension of tail leads to minimizing of error. Foot in the door and a possibility of averaging up or trimming down depending on subsequent outcome | Avoid commitment bias  Alternative opportunity cost       | Filter out at screening level  Companies stuck in the middle, though they can give buy low, sell high, or round tripping opportunities |


### **Gold: Hedge Against Inflation and Negative Interest Rate**






### **Golden Performance**








Source : FRED, Refinitiv


#### **High Yield Bonds**



Skyrocketing spreads
In the segment of markets where borrowers have lower credit ratings, borrowing costs have risen sharply.




| lssuer<br>(US\$ Secondary Levels) | Rating<br>(M / S / F) | Amt. (mm) | Coupon | Price  | Yield  | G Spread | Z Spread | YTD<br>(ΔYield) | YTD<br>(ΔSpread) |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------|--------|--------|--------|----------|----------|-----------------|------------------|
| Large National Bank               | B1/BB-/               | 300       | 5.50%  | 97.125 | 7.71%  | 753      | 735      | 3.44%           | 481              |
| Gold Finance Co.                  | /BB-/BB-              | 300       | 5.90%  | 76.45  | 17.13% | 1689     | 1678     |                 |                  |
| Housing Finance Co.               | B3//                  | 350       | 6.38%  | 55.5   | 39.78% | 3958     | 3942     | 21.46%          | 2282             |
| Transport Finance Co.             | /BB/BB                | 500       | 5.10%  | 71.5   | 16.96% | 1669     | 1660     | -               |                  |
| Gold Finance Co.                  | /BB/BB                | 550       | 4.40%  | 83     | 10.57% | 1029     | 1021     |                 |                  |
| Private Bank                      | Caa1//                | 477       | 3.75%  | 84.25  | 10.45% | 1020     | 1009     | -0.07%          | 125              |
| Finance Lending Co.               | Ba3//B+               | 400       | 5.88%  | 63     | 23.98% | 2372     | 2363     | -1              |                  |




Source: Citi Bank, Credit Suisse, Bloomberg

#### **Polarisation?**







| Ongoing<br>(2020)  | Market Weight (in %) | Market Cap<br>(in \$B) | Valuation<br>(P/E) |
|--------------------|----------------------|------------------------|--------------------|
| Apple              | 5.4%                 | 1164                   | 19.1               |
| Amazon             | 4.1%                 | 1021                   | 60.6               |
| Microsoft          | 5.9%                 | 1328                   | 28.4               |
| Alphabet           | 3.4%                 | 793                    | 23                 |
| Facebook           | 2.1%                 | 434                    | 19.6               |
| FAAMG<br>Aggregate | 20.9%                | 4740                   | 23                 |

| Tech Bubble<br>(2000s)   | Market Weight (in %) | Market Cap<br>(in \$B) | Valuation<br>(P/E) |
|--------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|--------------------|
| Microsoft                | 4.5%                 | 581                    | 55.1               |
| Cisco System             | 4.2%                 | 543                    | 116.8              |
| Intel                    | 3.6%                 | 465                    | 39.3               |
| Oracle                   | 1.9%                 | 245                    | 103.6              |
| Lucent                   | 1.6%                 | 206                    | 35.6               |
| Tech Bubble<br>Aggregate | 15.8%                | 2040                   | 55.1               |

| NIFTY 50<br>(1970s)   | Market Weight (in %) | Market Cap<br>(in \$B) | Valuation<br>(P/E) |
|-----------------------|----------------------|------------------------|--------------------|
| IBM                   | 7.1%                 | 48                     | 35.5               |
| Eastman Kodak         | 3.6%                 | 24                     | 43.5               |
| Sears Roebuck         | 2.7%                 | 18                     | 29.2               |
| General Electric      | 2.0%                 | 13                     | 23.4               |
| Xerox                 | 1.8%                 | 12                     | 45.8               |
| NIFTY 50<br>Aggregate | 17.1%                | 115                    | 35.5               |

Source: Citi Bank, Refinitiv

### Talking Win-Win v/s Walking Win-Lose



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Every day, managers must decide whether to enjoy a dollar of profit this year or two dollars a few years from now

#### **GILLETTE**

- 1996: Promised investors that it would grow its earnings at 15% to 20%.
- Began channel- stuffing products to its' distributors to meet projections
- CEO Kilts stopped issuing earning guidance
- Overextended pricing power benefited in short term but drove customers away and invited hungry new customers

#### **SOUTHWEST AIRLINES**

- Kelleher: Sold a plane instead of laying off employees & formed a "No-Layoff Policy"
- 2010: Was the biggest domestic airline in USA, with a market cap. Greater than all its domestic competitors combined
- Happy employees take care of the customers. Happy customers take care
   of the shareholders by coming back

#### Boeing


 Boeing spent 74% of its Free Cash Flow in Stock Repurchase in the last 10 years. Cost cutting was one of the reasons for failure of its aircraft (737-MAX) and then the company had to be bailed out

#### **STARBUCKS**

- 2010: Howard Schultz said Starbucks had paid around \$300 MN in healthcare costs in 2010
- Decision Unpopular with the investors
- Declined the offer to cut Healthcare spending to retain the respect and value of his employees


#### **COSTCO**


- 2008: Galanti refused to make employees pay more than 10% for healthcare to save \$10 – \$20 Million per year
- Wanted to give their employees as much as they could in tough times





Source : The Investment Checklist




























































































































# Questions?



Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can be counted.

Albert Einstein





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