Simple facts: 1. The company until 6 months back talked about 16K - reduced it to 12K 2. Talked about 30-40% growth but has delivered less than 8% growth in FY26. Not pessimism but no need to get carried away by management narrative when facts are saying otherwise.
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Simple fact ..its a SME in a promising sector with some possibilities in near future .Its not a very established company with long track record and stable business model . Doing stable business modelling, believing management guidance etc is simply not for companies like these . Those are better suited for other companies which attract analysts and where one can feel super elated at making 12% cagr after a 5 year hold and congratulate oneself for channeling warren buffet , pulak prasad ,parag parikh etc .
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Sir, what I said was number based fact; what you said is an opinion not fact. The performance of the company has been super disappointing in H2. Such a small company growing at 7-8% is going to get punished by silent shareholders. No need to cheerlead underperformance. Hope the management delivers on its narratives.
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Can someone please help me understand this? Management has said they invested INR 70 Cr in FY26. However, fixed assets including CWIP have increased by only INR 35 Cr if we add increase in working capital then total is INR 42 Cr. Also cash flow from investing is INR (20) Cr. How to reconcile this INR 70 Cr with the numbers in financial statement? What am I missing please?
results are average and a lot of narrative building is being done with whatever brief commentary given.
| Metric (âš Cr) | FY25 | FY26 | Growth |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 139.2 | 152.1 | +9.3% |
| PAT | 14.3 | 17.1 | +19.9% |
| EPS (âš) | 19.85 | 23.89 | +20% |
H2 sales collapsed to 61 cr and war only affected March so essentially there is a problem of orders. Also, they did not even mention CMAS and focus is more on wagons. That said, they are now claiming to be the largest container manufacturers in India at present. They are also claiming to have declined orders in H2 and delayed collections due to west asia war
Steel prices remained depressed through out the FY upto January 2026, then surged sharply in February, compressing margins and forcing us to selectively decline orders. Geopolitical disruptions in West Asia further delayed customer collections in March. In spite of all of this, we grew revenue, grew profit, and grew earnings per share.
Historically their h2 has always been lower or equal to h1 so above reason may be acceptable. What is not acceptable is declining orders due to steel price volatility and management must fix this in future because it will happen again. They have also mentioned few industry firsts which are already discussed in this thread*â*
Stainless Steel Dry Cargo Containers
Stainless Steel Foldable Containers
Corrosion-Proof Salt & Chemical Containers
Super High Cube Containers for 2/3/4- Wheeler Autos
Phase 1 of wagon manufacturing is expecting a capacity of 2500 units per year and long term target of around 8000 wagons per year. They have given a revenue vision of 2000 cr in 5 years (67% cagr). I am not sure if this should be treated as guidance.
Now let me discuss some points I look with much more optimism
As I said earlier this reefer MOU is huge. Most MOUs dont go anywhere just collect dust. They have now put a production date on this which makes it a lot more realistic. We have a dire need of upgrading cold supply chain in India and I believe these can be a game changer.
Another important thing is location. I have a lot of fascination with deep sea ports. The gulf of kutch has deep draft, calm sea and vast stretch of open flat land complemented by western dedicated frieght corridor and airport. Hence, mundraâs dominanace as largest port will continue to be in future as well. It is essentially the manufacturing export gateway of India to west asia and europe. A manufacturing plant of finished good in UP or Haryana will naturally prefer Mundra over Kolkata or other eastern and southern ports. KCTL will naturally benefit from these advantages due to its proximity to mundra port. It is not possible to become export dominated economy without building own containers. I need not say anything about promoter pedigree as its already discussed. Of course, none of this means everything will be handed to them on a platter. In fact, key risks to watch out for are execution, order book and fund raise. I suspect h1 fy27 results to be mixed as well. I do have some other questions over results but waiting for a concall or annual report. All these narrative building is very good to push price up and go for a QIP.
Disc: invested
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Excellent points. Any thoughts on the fact that they say INR 70 Cr invested in FY26 but the balance sheet / fixed assets have grown way less than that.
They said invested which is not same as accounted. They might have purchase orders or letter of credit but unable to log in the balance sheet. I am an IT guy so have only basic level of understanding in accounting. Annual report should contain detailed breakdown or maybe you can shoot a question to IR team.
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In containers they are rejecting orders due to small increase in steel prices, in wagons they will do the same when itâs time to grab railway orders with both hands and seize the opportunityâŚhighly disappointed with management commentaryâŚhow will they achieve 4000 cr when max capacity is 8000 wagons and container orders are decliningâŚitâs just a pipe dream in 7-8 years when there is no surity of railway orders
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They need to provide clarity. A number of things do not add up:
- Rejecting orders due to steel price rise. I think it is because there were no orders, they are lying on it. Order book is merely 60 Cr. They reduced capacity of containers from 16K to 12K. Shows that market for wagons is not as large as was being made out earlier
- Said spent 70 cr in capex but balance sheet and cash flow does not support it
- How did they acquire 114 acre? Is it on lease, up front payment etc. etc.
Disc: invested but disappointed by poor performance and lack of clarity
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Forensic Check on Kalyani Cast-Tech: The Disconnect Regarding the 144-Acre Mega-Campus
Iâve been digging into the recent May 2026 audited results and cross-referencing them with managementâs previous commentary on the Q2 FY26 and FY25 concalls. While the operating cash flow turnaround (CFO > PAT) is highly commendable, I found a glaring mathematical disconnect regarding the capital execution of their much-talked-about Gujarat mega-campus.
Iâd love to get the forumâs thoughts on this.
1. The Managementâs Claim:
On recent concalls, management has repeatedly highlighted the massive scale of their expansion in Gujarat:
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FY25 Concall (June 2025): âThe company has acquired 115 acres of land. And out of 144 acres of land, up to 140 within this month, I think we will be completing this around 144 acres of land in our name.â
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Q2 FY26 Concall (Nov 2025): âNow we have bought 144 acres of land we have already procured at a very strategic locationâŚâ (Bhachau, Kutch, near Kandla/Mundra ports).
2. Identifying the Corporate Vehicle:
Management also confirmed the expansion is happening through a subsidiary. Based on public filings, this is KMT Engineering Private Limited, which was incorporated on Feb 17, 2024, as a 51% subsidiary. Page 21 of the recent May 2026 Auditorâs Report confirms KMTâs financials are baked into the consolidated results.
3. âFollowing the Moneyâ (The Balance Sheet Math):
By isolating the Standalone vs. Consolidated Balance Sheets for FY26 (ended March 31, 2026), we can reverse-engineer the exact capitalization of this subsidiary:
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Equity Injected: The Standalone balance sheet shows âš10.50 Cr in âNon-Current Investmentsâ. This drops to zero in Consolidation, proving Kalyani transferred âš10.50 Cr in equity to KMT.
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Loans Given: The Standalone balance sheet shows âš14.71 Cr in âLong-Term Loans & Advances,â whereas Consolidated only shows âš4.95 Cr. The âš9.76 Cr difference is clearly an inter-company loan to KMT.
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Total Capitalization: Total funds transferred to KMT = ~âš20.26 Crore.
4. The Asset Base Disconnect:
If we look at what KMT actually built with that âš20.26 Cr (by subtracting Standalone fixed assets from Consolidated fixed assets), we see:
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CWIP in KMT: ~âš17.03 Cr
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Gross Block (PPE) in KMT: ~âš3.48 Cr
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Total Factory Assets in KMT: ~âš20.51 Crore.
5. The Red Flag / Open Question:
This is where the math completely breaks down. It is physically impossible to outright purchase 144 acres of prime industrial land near Kandla Port, pay 80% advances for heavy wagon-manufacturing machinery, and build a â95% completeâ Gati Shakti rail terminal with a total subsidiary capitalization of just âš20.5 Crore. The cost of 144 acres of land alone would likely exceed the entire asset base of KMT.
My Conclusion & Question for the Community:
The hard accounting trail strongly suggests that the listed company (or its subsidiary) does not actually own this 144-acre land parcel, despite the concall claims of âbuying it in our name.â
The most probable structure here is an asset-light lease model. If the land was purchased privately by the promoters and is being leased back to the listed entity, If that is the case then it completely changes the risk profile (related party transactions, public company paying rent while promoters capture land appreciation).
Has anyone else looked into the KMT Engineering structure? Are we waiting for the full Annual Reportâs Related Party Transaction schedules to confirm who actually owns the dirt under this mega-campus?
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You are getting confused with the smart marketing being done here. This land is >60 km from kandla port and >100 km from mundra port. And this is not industrial land its a Non-agriculture land as mentioned in document. My assumption is its acquired at cheap rate not industrial land rate.
Public company paying rent is nothing new. Thats how good promoter accumulate money to buy more shares and infuse capital. works other way as well if promoter intentions are to suck cash flows.
Couple of things:
Land is indeed 80-100kms from the ports and that should be the case. Well connected via w. railways so why put up a large manufacturing plant near to port when your wagons/ rolling stocks would be on rails and be shipped quickly? expansion issues as well in future.
No issues with large 4k cr LT vision. Never Underestimate an entrepreneur who over estimates himself!
But definitive issues with 70cr incurred and KMT engineering bit. One qualifying comfort is that KMT financial are audited so less chances o outright fraud.
Over the past several years, have seen a lot of murky over-smart promoters, this Guy is surely not one of them.
If at all for ex. land parcel being far off from ports needed to be hidden, he would not have put up FULL address on 3rd page of the press release when KCT had a 20% revenue decline.!
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Has anyone been able to spot the Gujarat campus? I tried doing that yesterday via google earth (their phots are >1yr old) & Copernicus (it has 10 days old photos). I couldntât spot the campus
It would be appreciated if someone can share if they spotted
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I donât have any proof but given all these issues people are highlighting something seems to be off with this company. Things are not adding up. Is this an unethical promoter who rips off investors? Have people met him? Has anyone visited the Gujarat site recently?
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Is there any concall planned or no concall for this H2?
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Can anyone pls give update on this?
The results met the PAT guidance of 9-12% growth despite failing in meeting the revenue guidance in the FY 25-26. The management had walked the guidance talk in the previous FY 24-25 however. As such, it is not possible to outright disregard the managementâs words and credibility, but, at the same time, we cannot blindly believe what the management commented during the result announcement on May 29, 2026. They definitely added timelines to it, but at the same time, there appears a confusion among its investors as far as the financials are concerned. The management must take a serious note on this.
Last year, when two of its Retail Investors questioned on equity dilution, the management got angry and asked not to ask the same question again and again despite answering the question satisfactory on the first instance. This straightforward shutting down the investors is not a great sign from the management. I have great regards for Mr. Naresh Kumar but I found this disrespectful towards the investor. This year, the result announcement if full of rosy statements and as we all have been tracking the developments of the company, we believe in the innovations they just claimed. However, how do that plan to capitalize on these innovations and how do they plan to reach Rs. 2000 Cr in 4-5 years is needed to be discussed. As of now, the investors are just sitting in hope with slightly diminished confidence and it can be seen from the price movement of the script as well.
Last year, the results were announced on the same date i.e. May 29,2025 and Concall was conducted on June 10, 2025 and announcement for the same was done on June 5,2025 and an Investor Presentation was uploaded on June 9, 2025 . So, as investors, we should trust the management in its intention to held the concall this month as well. As the company had conducted a concall on November as well, I expect that the company plans to consistently held concalls in the future as well. I just hope that the Management takes investors questions sportingly instead of outrightly disregarding it.
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Whatever happens 2027 will be a disaster year for Kalyani with such a low order book..Wagons might help the company revive to some extent in 2028 if they are able to get railway ordersâŚAnyways 4000 cr seems a far-fetched target with the current decline in container segment whatever they state in their concall
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Seeing a lot of pessimism here after the recent results. Compiling a few thoughts from whatever notes I had made when researching the stock:
- Investment in Kalyani was never based on them doing good in the existing container business. The promoter himself said they wonât be able to sustain the ISO container business without govt help, given the severe subsidisation and competition from China. Luckily govt help seems to be on the works but thereâs nothing solid yet. For all we know it could take a few years for it to materialize, if at all.
- Whatâs left is the specialized container business. As Iâve noted in my previous posts, I donât expect mass adoption of this, so even if Kalyani manages to get a few orders, theyâll be lumpy one offs.
- The big kicker, however, is going to be the wagons business. Again , I donât expect mass adoption of any specialized wagons, but even for regular wagons , even if they manage to capture a small slice of the market, it will be a significant jump in the topline and bottom line, given the small scale of the company now.
Honestly, my whole Investment thesis is based on the last point above. I wasnât expecting a solid topline growth based on its current business, so was not at all disappointed with the latest quarter.
Some might question why would a customer go to Kalyani for regular wagons instead of established players - I personally believe moats are overhyped, and donât see any reason why a customer wonât go to Kalyani. Initial orders will be slow of course, but once they gain traction ( again, itâll take a few quarters/years for this), theyâll surely see a good flow of orders.
In fact , the current quarterâs growth in the bottom line even after a decline in sales is a positive sign for me, surely the promoter is able to squeeze the best value out of every penny he spent. Hope this ability spills over to the wagons business as well 
.
Just my thoughts.
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