Key monitorable and risk is as above and yield dessribes nature of customers
2 Likes
The figure rose to 55Cr. in November 2025. Anyone has this data for the Oct month?
“Emerald Finance Limited, along with its material
subsidiary Eclat Net Advisors Private Limited, under its syndication business, has
disbursed Gold Loans aggregating to more than ₹105.00 Crores (Rupees One Hundred
and Five Crores only) in the month of December, 2025. The said disbursements were
primarily made with ICICI Bank Limited, HDFC Bank Limited, RBL Bank and Muthoot Finance
Limited.”
5 Likes
While everyone awaits a miracle in the EWA execution, the company has surprised on loan dispersed as DSA …a 2x scale up in 6 months just for the gold loans… If silver based securitised loans get rolled out, may see more acceleration on this front.
Awaiting q3 results now, the management has surprisingly been consistent with their concalls and their commitments so far.
4 Likes
just to clarify, as I figured, the MD and promoter of JM Financial is Vishal Nimesh Kampani and not to be confused with Vishal Sudhir Kampani. Screener has it wrong under his investments.
3 Likes
Yeah, no, this is wrong, bro. I think screener did the name tagging wrong (have seen this more examples of this before as well). if you look at the shareholding pattern of JM financial You will see that someone by the name Vishal Kampani holds the same number of shares as Vishal Sudhir Kampani. But he is Vishal Nimesh Kampani, the son of Nimesh Kampani who was the founder and chairman of JMF.
Here’s more details with the whole family tree and deeper investigation into the same: https://gemini.google.com/share/bfd0cd6f660f
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this is the guy, son of Nimesh Kampani, which screener mistakenly tagged with Vishal Sudhir Kampani.
This guy is someone else altogether. No connection with JMF.
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This company on the TAM basis looks oddly good. As per government surveys india is paying 24 lakh crores in salaries to private sector employees.
Now if we assume that just 1% of the total work force use ewa and out of that market share of Emerald is 2% and they are charging 1.5% fee they will be having profits more than 15-20 crores. So game is all about execution for the company.
I will be very greatful if someone can come with exact data for salaries paid.
There is one more thing they doing 100 crores gold loan sourcing means they are going to make 70-80 Lakhs per month and that alone will be 8-9 crores before tax.
Naturally they are going to make some profits from their lending on their own books this way in next two three years 30+ crores net profits is not very difficult to achieve.
Things here are too good to be true I might be missing something.
Many things here are like to good to believe so there might be something I am missing.
The management imho is the bottleneck here. At least to me it looks like they’re not capable enough. Initially the talks were about signing up Tatas and Mahindras but all of their sign ups so far have been small/tiny enterprises. If it was a capable management they would be aggressively signing up customers and expanding sources of funds.
1 Like
There are too many firms trying to target the big corporates. The one reason for choosing Emerald Finance was their approach to target the small and micro corporates which was ignored by the likes of Refyne and Jiffy. I find it a good thing. Management seems to be walking the talk for now.
CAC for big corporates is also much higher and other EWA companies are still loss making
2 Likes
Bro where do u assuming this CAC thing or u have some concrete information which I am missing because of my ignorance.
| Quarter | Sales (₹ Cr) | Absolute Increase (₹ Cr) | QoQ Growth (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jun ’22 | 2.21 | — | — |
| Sep ’22 | 2.39 | +0.18 | +8.14% |
| Dec ’22 | 3.05 | +0.66 | +27.62% |
| Mar ’23 | 3.87 | +0.82 | +26.89% |
| Jun ’23 | 2.78 | −1.09 | −28.17% |
| Sep ’23 | 3.24 | +0.46 | +16.55% |
| Dec ’23 | 3.42 | +0.18 | +5.56% |
| Mar ’24 | 3.89 | +0.47 | +13.74% |
| Jun ’24 | 4.39 | +0.50 | +12.85% |
| Sep ’24 | 5.00 | +0.61 | +13.90% |
| Dec ’24 | 5.72 | +0.72 | +14.40% |
| Mar ’25 | 6.45 | +0.73 | +12.76% |
| Jun ’25 | 6.71 | +0.26 | +4.03% |
| Sep ’25 | 6.90 | +0.19 | +2.83% |
| Dec '25 | 7.80 | +0.90 | +13.04% |
Just Updating here for everyone to keep track
9 Likes
Great results. Company seems to be walking the talk.
good results , but this might not get the rerating it could have because of the aggressive PAT guidance given . I don’t see them achieving their guidance
I started following this company recently. What seems to separate Emerald from many traditional NBFCs is its hybrid model. A significant portion of revenues comes from fee based activities such as loan sourcing, servicing, and EWA, which keeps balance sheet risk low. The company operates with a very lean team and limited physical infrastructure, relying instead on digital workflows, employer partnerships, and DSA networks. Its role as a sourcing and distribution partner for well run NBFCs like MAS Financial Services (taking it as an example here) suggests that Emerald’s core strength lies more in origination, underwriting filters, and access to customers rather than in scaling a large on balance sheet loan book. The key question is whether this advantage in sourcing and risk control can be sustained as the company scales and potentially increases exposure to its own lending book. The key question is if they can scale with a 50:50 fee and interest based income mix (which helps them be asset light) or would they look at increasing margins via tilting towards more interest based income (which was hinted in the recnt investor call uploaded on Youtube). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2AWbpgHn4gE
I have a few pointers to share from my understanding and would appreciate anyone who can throw some light on the questions i have:
-
Based on disclosures, around 52 percent of revenue appears to be fee based, including loan sourcing for larger lenders and a small contribution from EWA (3-4%), while the remaining ~48 percent is interest income from loans on the company’s own balance sheet.
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Given that EWA has near zero credit risk due to payroll-linked recovery, and loan sourcing for other lenders also carries no balance sheet risk for Emerald, what exactly is the company doing on its own lending book that allows it to maintain such negligible NPAs? Are these low NPAs structural in nature, or a still-limited scale of the on-balance-sheet loan book?
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Someone earlier mentioned a possible ceiling for the EWA business. Even if Emerald uses EWA primarily as a low CAC acquisition channel and then cross sells lending products using employer and employee data, is this model scalable without meaningfully increasing credit risk? Or will credit risks become a part of the model along with scale up.
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While discussion seems heavily focused on EWA, the company’s core revenues appear to come from a broader mix of lending and other fee based activities. How should one think about the relative importance of EWA versus the rest of the business for long term growth?
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Given the company operates with a relatively small team and limited physical presence, how scalable is the current operating model, and does growth (if reliant on interest income) require a meaningful increase in fixed costs or branch infrastructure (or will Origination via : EWA and relaince on thier own DSAs and collection via third party agencies suffice)?
Emerald’s current model works because:
- Fee income dominates
- Own loan book is small
- Risk is structurally limited
If Emerald wants to grow interest income materially:
- In-house collections will become unavoidable
- Origination discipline must tighten
- Costs (both operational and credit) will rise, but sustainability improves
If it stays fee-led:
- Outsourcing to DSAs would work
- But upside is capped and partner risk remains
3 Likes
I dont care about guidance. What I am focussing is that a 20 P/E company is giving me growth of 50-60%. Management’s some times tend to overstate expectations, often without any malevolence due to their enthusiasm.
4 Likes
I am looking at the annual reports of the company and came across a few thing which seemed odd to me.
First out of all the loan and advanced they have almost 30% it to related parties and 20% is to unrelated promoter owned companies which is kind of weird. What made me more weird that they have a lot of loan form NBFC like Punjab Kashmir Finace and Alwar General Finance etc. These NBFC normally charge much higher rate of interests because they would have borrowing at higher rates. So the thing is that on the balance sheet of the company your are borrowing at higher ROI and lending to promoter owned companies at lesser ROI , this does not made much sense to me.
In FY23 they had some 200+ loans NPA with average loan amount around 10,000 don’t know what happened in that story.
Who owns 19% of the ECLAT and why its not a wholly owned subsidiary.
One issue on the regulatory side can cause problem to whole model, although its rare probability but we need to keep in mind. EMI / NMI ratio is followed by all the bank although RBI has not mandated it. At some point of time RBI might give mandate about the EMI NMI ratio then it will reduce the employees who can take 40% of the salary as advance.
Holding small position but with lower conviction.
5 Likes
CRISIL upgraded rating one notch up.
Good sign
2 Likes
Not going to sugar coat but the drawdown of this script has taught how important is a good capital allocation especially in downtrend/sideways market
it is trading way below its 5 year median PE/sales to mcap/ev to ebitda and still no sign of any technical support. I really wish they accelerate their sales speed..
2 Likes