Deep Industries (DIL)

[pranavpallod12]

ANNUAL REPORT FY26 SOME NOTES:

• The Oilfields Amendment Bill passed in Lok Sabha in March 2025 has redefined the sector’s trajectory. By expanding the definition of mineral oils to include shale gas and unconventional hydrocarbons, streamlining dispute resolution and incentivize enhanced oil recovery techniques, this legislation is unlocking new opportunities for exploration and production.

Complementing this, the 10th round of the Open Acreage Licensing Policy launched during India Energy Week 2025 leverages AI-driven seismic data analysis to accelerate the discovery of new reserves. These reforms align with India’s goal to expand its exploration area to 1 million square kilometres by 2030, signalling a robust push towards self-reliance.

• Deep’s value-added services like providing entire Gas processing facility on charter hire basis & Integrated Project Management are one of its kind services in the industry. No other Indian company is been providing these services in domestic markets except Deep.

• Since last 16 years, DEEP has served long term contracts for Drilling rig and Workover services to variety of clients including PSU’s and Private E&P companies, and having a excellent track record in India.

• DEEP is having a vision to expand the Rig business in overseas Market as well. DEEP is also an approved Drilling Contractor in Kuwait Oil Company for providing the Rigs.

• Leveraging the flexibility of fully mobile units, the company can expediently transport its resources to any corner of the country within a matter of months.

• There are 46 site offices and 3 workshops of the Company situated throughout the Country

• Total employees – 206 (vs 243 in FY24)
Total workers – 1551 (vs 1393 in FY24)

•

• Rate of interest on term loans – 8.75% - 9.15%

•

•

•

• Raas equipments – 1.4cr loss vs 0.5cr loss in FY24

• Deep International DMCC – 1.98.cr profit vs 10.24cr in FY24

• SAAR International FZ LLC – 1.7cr profit vs 0 in FY24

•

[Folok]

This post is about the following:

⟢ DIL’s earning potential
⟢ Breaking down the Valuation
⟢ Scrutinizing risks in business and governance

Earnings Potential

A great deal of our stock-picking confidence largely hinges on revenue and margin visibility, so let’s break that down for DIL.

Before that let’s quickly visit ONGC’s PEC contract which makes up half of DIL’s order book.

ONGC’s 1400 Cr Production Enhancement Contract

I worked out the rough math for the contract and it is as follows:

1. Baseline production: 140,000 cubic meters/day

2. Gas price as per contract: 7.5/MMBtu

3. 1 MMBtu ≈ 28.3 m³ (cubic meters) of gas

4. Hence, 140,000 m³ = 4946 MMBtu of gas

5. 4946 MMBtu of gas/day x Contract price (USD 7.5/ MMBtu) = USD 37,095/day

6. Assuming 330 working days in a year (due to operational downtime) = USD 12.2 Mn/ year

7. This goes on for 14 years: USD 12.2 Mn/ year x 14 = USD 171.38 Mn

8. This converted into INR: @ ₹ 85.5/ USD equals ~ ₹ 1465.2 Cr

This is reasonably close to the contract amount. Please note that the contract price will operate under an Open Price Mechanism (OPM), outside the scope of the administered price mechanism (APM) regulation (currently set at $6.75 per MMBtu for the period between April and September 2025). Prices under OPM > APM.

The PEC may also serve as a big optionality for DIL in the form of incremental revenue generated over and above the baseline production levels.

Now let’s do some projections

Revenue

We start with base revenue of FY25 and management’s consistent commentary of 30% growth:

FY26 Q1 con call

The mgt re-iterated the same in a later section of the call.

Based on the Co’s projections, FY26 revenue should be ~₹750 Cr. Conservatively however, we estimate DIL’s consolidated revenues at ~₹730 crores based on our understanding.

Margins

Source: Shankar Nath’s piece on DIL

Full year FY25, was also an exception due to write-off of inventory and receivables in the acquired entities: Dolphin and Kandla.

The company promptly bounced back with a 41% EBITDA margin in Q1 FY26. Plus, recent commentary from management indicates two possible reasons for margin expansion due to Dolphin and Kandla.

Kandla:

Dolphin:

When analyzed on a segment basis, most of the businesses deliver 40%+ margins.

Company Sources

OK, so let’s put all this together and build a financial projection for FY26 assuming a 42% EBITDA margin:

Valuations

At a market cap of ₹3400 crore (a/o 28th July), the FY26 forward PE stands at ~21x which when combined with BV of 1.87 looks reasonable. However, the BV of 1.87x is inflated, if unadjusted for the high value of receivables owing to the Kandla and Dolphin acquisitions. Consolidated receivables owing to these entities total ₹363 crores and are suspect. Assuming a recovery rate of 30% amounts to ₹109 crores. Adjusting the same from the net worth leads to a price to book of 2.2x which is still reasonable. On the upside, ROCE will also improve when the bogus receivables are written off.

Risks​

That said DIL is not without its own set of risks:

** Client concentration from ONGC:** Although, DIL boasts clients such as Selan Oil & Exploration, Cairns & Vedanta, its primary client remains ONGC. This large exposure to a single client exposes it to extended payment cycles. Management commentary on exploration and upstream investments from ONGC’s con calls are a key monitorable. All that said, client concentration is a feature rather than a bug of this business.

Furthermore, periodic disputes regarding contracts also demand periodic scrutiny such as the one below:

Excerpt from Congruence’s post on DIL

Volatility in Crude and Natural Gas Prices: Even though DIL has repetitively stated that crude and natural gas prices have negligible impact on their revenues owing to fixed price nature of contracts; lower prices often affect upstream budgets, slows down project approvals and impacts rig utilisation. Recent examples include Saudi Aramco deciding to release 27 jackup rigs (6% of global jackup rigs supply) in H1 2024.

As such, this is a key monitorable. However, this risk is lower for Indian clients like ONGC, owing to Indian govts. push for exploration & production to curb high import reliance.

Project Execution Risks: Oil & gas operations are inherently of low frequency-high-severity risk nature. These risks could include equipment failures, accidents, and environmental hazards, which often results in huge financial losses and damage to reputation.

Uncertainty regarding the Russian-Ukraine war: Ukraine and Russia are among the biggest producers of natural gas and crude oil. An end to the war or a stop gap ceasefire will stop the artificial supply glut due to sanctions. This may lead to a fall in global crude and NG prices. Consequently, India will stop getting the discounts that are availed from Russia (although little) and will have to step up its exploration budgets and policies even more. All that said, any stop-gap negotiations in the Ukraine-Russia war is likely to lead to short term volatility in the stock prices.

Dolphin Offshore& Kandla receivables of ₹363 crs: This is more of an optionality than a risk. As of the FY25 AR, receivables attributed to the acquired entities was ~₹363 crs. Even a small part of the receivables if recovered, would lead to a huge cash influx for the company. Here’s what management had to say about the status and quality of the receivables:

Corporate Governance

Related Party Transactions: The only material related party transaction worth flagging is a loan worth ₹91 crs given by DIL to Prabha Energy Pvt Ltd., which is a 53% subsidiary of Deep Energy Resources Ltd., where promoters privately hold a 68% stake. Also, the amount of loan has increased from ₹59 crs in FY24 to ₹91 crs in FY25 and carry’s a 12% interest rate.

Promoter Remuneration: The total remuneration drawn by promoters and their related parties (relatives and enterprises over which promoters exercise control) in the form of salaries and rent amounted to ~₹3.6 crs in FY25 vs. ~₹3.4 crs in FY24. This amounted to < 3% of the PAT of DIL for both the years. However, this is poised to increase in FY26 as the proposed remuneration has been effectively doubled as stated in the FY25 annual report:

This structure is proposed for both the promoters, Paras Salva and Rupesh Salva. Hence, promoter rem. from FY26 onwards might be a notable portion of the net profits, if PAT does not grow commensurately.

Board Composition: Deep Industries Ltd. board comprises 6 Directors, with 3 Independent Directors, meeting the requirement of at least 50% Directors being independent. However, the quality of these personnel may not be the best.

Few things which stand out include:

• All the independent directors seem to be Gujrati. Nothing wrong with that. But the fact that there is a high chance of collusion due to the community being close knit. A high likelihood of having personal associations rather than strictly professional one isn’t something that can be ruled out.
• As detailed in FY25 AR, page no. 22, Dr. Kirit Shelat is a 79-year-old retired IAS. Although, we stand to be grossly wrong his energy commensurate with his age may not allow him to be involved/scrutinize business affairs sufficiently. In FY25, he was proposed to be reappointed as an independent director for a second term of 5 years.
• Ms. Shaily Dedhia, 41 years of age, is a qualified company secretary with 11+ years of experience in legal and secretarial matters. She is also a director in Deep Natural Resources, Prabha Energy Ltd. and Dolphin Offshore Enterprises. Having directorships of related Cos has an off-chance for conflict of interests.
• We could not find a description of Mr. Ashokkumar Patel but discovered that he is also a director of Dolphin Offshore Enterprises (India) Ltd.
• All the directors attended each meeting pertaining to the respective committee which they were nominated to.

Contingent Liabilities: The total contingent liabilities for DIL on account of pending litigations or commitments amounted to ₹24 crs, which is < 2% of the net worth of the company and hence not material.

Insider trading allegations against promoters: Deep Industries promoter - Ratnesh Savla - was accused of insider trading by SEBI - making unlawful gains by trading in his company’s stock based on unpublished price sensitive information (UPSI) between July-Oct 2015. You can find more details of the same here. In another instance, the CBI had registered a criminal case against the promoters and ONGC officials on the charge of causing ₹80-crore loss to ONGC in awarding tenders to a private company.

[kautuk]

I ran some statistical tests on the profit and loss statement of Deep Industries including the Benford’s Law test. To those unaware, Benford’s Law is used to test for possible Accounting fraud by companies. Classic cases like Enron, Satyam, etc have failed this test.

For the sake of brevity, I won’t explain the working and methodology in this post but I am sure a couple of quick google searches would explain the concept.

Again, I won’t go into the technical jargon, but if the test statistic (13.07 in this case) exceeds the critical value (15.507) that means the deviations from the Benford’s law are statistically significant and that there is a high probability of accounting fraud.

Since, in this case the test statistic is less than the critical value, we can infer that the variation from the Benford distribution is purely by chance.
Conclusion: The company has passed the Benford’s Law test which indicates that the probability of accounting fraud is low.

Imp Note: This test has been carried out only on the Consolidated Statement of Profit & Loss of Deep Industries Ltd. for the years FY 2020 to FY 2025. Hence, the accuracy of Balance Sheet & Cash Flow items cannot be inferred from the above analysis. The above analysis is not entirely full proof and there is always a chance of error.

P.S. I hate to be a buzzkill, but I am preparing a pretty long report with all the things wrong with Deep Industries including but not limited to Auditor resignations, Companies Auditor’s (Report) Order 2020 provision violations, Company Secretary resignations (2 within 6 months) and of course the acquisitions shenanigans. It will not be an investment recommendation to buy, sell or hold rather some things that I feel existing investors of the company should be aware about. DM me if you’d like to contribute!

Good Day!

[sgkfinance]

Curious to learn various aspects of forensic accounting.
How did you run this?
Is it some sort of programming, can you share a repository with sample data for Satyam, Enron and a happy case like a say Microsoft, Infosys or TCS.
Or if it is a spreadsheet, can you share it here?

Thank you

[kautuk]

Sure, so I will briefly explain the methodology. I did not do any programming, it was just annual reports and Microsoft Excel.

Basically what I’ve done is I opened the page in the AR which shows the Statement of Consolidated Profit & Loss. Checked the first line item - Revenue from Operations say (Rs. 100). There is a corresponding note to account. Then I opened the note and it bifurcated sales into two parts:

Sale of Goods (Rs. 60) and Provisioning of Services (Rs. 40). So in an excel worksheet in column A, I entered the amounts 60 and 40 one below the other.

I did this for every line item (income and expense) for all years. (Important point is to take figures of FY 24 from the AR of FY 25 so that any restatements due to retrospective change in accounting policy is incorporated).

Figures to exclude from the data: Any sub-totals/totals (any figure that has been arrived by addition/subtraction/multiplication or division) like Profit Before Tax, Profit After Tax, Total Expenses/Income or EPS, etc.

Include negative items without the negative sign.
Exceptional Items are to be included

I am attaching the worksheet for DIL so you can have a look what to do after you have extracted the relevant data.
Benford’s Law Test - P&L.xlsx (23.3 KB)

[Pankaj_Motwani]

I don’t think benford’s law can be used for this purpose
You can try this into some fraudulent company,n still you will not get any negative results

[kautuk]

Hey, I get your point.

“All rectangles are not squares.”

All fraudulent companies don’t fail Benford. All companies that fail Benford are not necessarily fraudulent.

It was more of a test check basis to see if there’s something worth looking into.

The above thesis can obviously be wrong

[kautuk]

I usually start my posts with some movie reference or an attempt to dry sarcastic humor. I wished to make this post sooner but due to my inability to come up with either of the two (movie reference or sarcasm) I procrastinated.

M/s Dhirubhai Shah & Co LLP (herein referred to as “Old Auditors”) resigned as statutory auditors of the company in Mid FY 2022. Extract of the mail from the exchange filing is attached herewith.

As against the additional audit procedures that the auditors were required to perform due to changes and amendments in financial reporting and disclosure requirements of the entity, DIL refused to increase audit fees and hence the auditors discontinued with the engagement.

Now comes the interesting part, M/s Mahendra N. Shah & Co. (herein referred to as “New/Current Auditors”) were appointed to fill the casual vacancy AND the fees charged by them is the same as that of the previous auditors. Despite the increase in additional audit procedures, the new auditors are charging the same fees which could potentially undermine independence of the auditors. (Keyword: Potentially)

Here is a list of companies/entities that Mahendra N. Shah & Co. audits:

• Deep Industries Limited (Listed)
• Deep Energy Resources Limited (Listed)
• Adinath Exim Resources Limited
• India Gelatine & Chemicals Limited (Listed)
• Dolphin Offshore Enterprises (India) Limited (Listed)
• Shree Rama Multi-Tech Ltd. (Listed)
• C N Arts & B D Commerce College PG Self Finance
• PBM Polytex Ltd. (Listed)
• Gujarat Poly Electronics Ltd. (Listed)
• LILAVATI NANDLAL KILACHAND COLLEGE OF EDUCATION (CTE)

Listed Company	Market Cap (as at 23/8/25)	Audit Fees (as per latest AR)
Deep Industries	3527 Crores	26.26 lakhs
Deep Energy Resources	1000 crores	1.4 lakhs
Adinath Exim (Trustedge Capital)	73 crores	0.78 lakhs
India Gelatine & Chemicals	246 crores	8.50 lakhs
Dolphin Offshore	1760 crores	Included in Deep Consol figure
Shree Rama Multi-Tech	565 crores	6 lakhs
PBM Polytex	49 crores	7.12 lakhs
Gujarat Poly Electronics	74 crores	6.85 lakhs

Here is the audit fees charged by the new auditors for various entities. Out of the 8 companies listed above, the promoters of DIL have an association with four of them namely, Deep Industries, Deep Energy Resources, Adinath Exim (Trustedge Capital) and Dolphin Offshore. The Savla family contributes around 50% of the total audit fees charged by the new auditors in the listed companies space.

Upcoming in DIL: Company Secretary resignations and Revenue Recognition

Disc: I am not accusing anyone of anything. Not invested with a mental note of cursing myself for not buying this company when it grows 10x from here on. I am also seeing a therapist to cure my unbridled passion for errors of omission.

[kautuk]

A quick heads up on cash flow:

Kandla Energy & Chemicals Limited

“So the write-off we took in March was primarily of inventory and not of receivables. And for receivables we are continuously following up with them for their recovery.” - Rohan Shah (CFO), Earnings Call Q1 FY26

“Further, we draw attention to the fact that entire trade receivables as at 31st March, 2025 are under review. The management is in the process of obtaining details and supporting documentation from the erstwhile management, the Resolution Professional, and the Liquidator. These balances are subject to confirmation, reconciliation, and any consequential adjustments. While this constitutes a departure from the ideal audit evidence requirement as per the Standards on Auditing, in view of the management being company acquired under liquidation as a going concern at the very end of the financial year and the fact that statutory and financial regularization processes are ongoing, our opinion is not modified in respect of this matter.” - Independent Auditor’s Report, Kandla Energy & Chemicals Ltd. for the FY 2024-25

Let’s begin. Kandla Energy have not booked any Expected Credit Losses on the disputed Trade receivables shown in their as well as Deep’s consol books. So if any time during this financial year, the management talks about how their operating cash flow has grown exponentially due to “streamlining blah blah”, “reduction in working capital days blah blah” and “internal efficiencies blah blah” or whatever cliché they normally use, ask them the following:

How much of the increase in operating cash flow was due to the recovery of debtors attributing to Kandla?

As per consolidation rules, cash flow statements are added on a line to line basis. My operating cash flow + my subsidiaries’ operating cash flow.

Recovery of debtors reduces trade receivables balance, which increases our operating cash flow. This is obviously inorganic and is no way actually related to the core business of the company.

Dolphin Offshore

Just to emphasize, “We have got some decent amount of success in recovering old receivables of Dolphin.” For context, Dolphin was acquired in FY 2022-23. Have a look at the data given below:

• Debtor outstanding of Dolphin as at 31 March 2023 was around ₹ 142 crores.
• Debtor outstanding of Dolphin as at 31 March 2024 was around ₹ 141.30 crores.
• Debtor outstanding of Dolphin as at 31 March 2025 was around ₹ 143.94 crores.

The same trade receivables (outstanding for more than 3 years) are still outstanding at the balance sheet date. If the management claims this to be a “decent recovery”, well kudos to them.

Stinson Out!

Disc: Not invested

[yashchandak]

@kautuk

Here is a list of companies/entities that Mahendra N. Shah & Co. audits:

• Deep Industries Limited (Listed)
• Deep Energy Resources Limited (Listed)
• Adinath Exim Resources Limited
• India Gelatine & Chemicals Limited (Listed)
• Dolphin Offshore Enterprises (India) Limited (Listed)
• Shree Rama Multi-Tech Ltd. (Listed)
• C N Arts & B D Commerce College PG Self Finance
• PBM Polytex Ltd. (Listed)
• Gujarat Poly Electronics Ltd. (Listed)
• LILAVATI NANDLAL KILACHAND COLLEGE OF EDUCATION (CTE)

What is the source for this list?

[kautuk]

Typing “Mahendra N Shah & Co filetype:pdf” on Google Chrome and clicking/scrolling till I get bored.

The list is not exhaustive. That’s all I could find from the public domain.

P.S. “Believing that you have found a high growth company in a high growth industry supported by regulatory tailwinds with “sustainable business moat” which enjoys a “monopoly” in its niche segment at a “Discount” is like believing that the stripper is into you.” - Charlie Munger (probably)

[kautuk]

Another quick point:

Mahendra N. Shah & Co were appointed as statutory auditors of Asahi Songwon Colors Ltd in 2017. Upon completion of their first term of 5 years, they were not reappointed.

Companies Act, 2013 allow audit firms to audit a company for 2 terms of 5 years each i.e. a total of 10 years. Asahi Songwon upon completion of their first term appointed Talati & Talati LLP as their stat auditors.

Before someone raises a question regarding Asahi’s practice of appointing auditors for only one term, the auditors prior to Mahendra N. Shah, M/s. Trushit Chokshi & Associates audited the firm for more than 5 years.

This is just a statement of fact and does not represent conclusive evidence. But I’d like this on the record.

Stinson Out!

[pranavpallod12]

Pardon me , but What an unnecessary sequence of comments!

No actual substantial/meaningful red flags unearthed.. Trying to fill with witty comments the lack of substance in the above arguments.

Point out some actual big red flags (It would be a big help to have contrary viewpoints or actual evidence of wrongdoing)

I have been invested in the company since 2022.. And there hasn’t been any big red flags in all those years.

Loan given to related party is an obvious negative. But it’s interest payments have been regular and at a fair rate (12%).
Company secretory resignations are the most common resignations in listed companies.

On “Cheap valuations”, there are 3 factors i believe.

1. Oil & Gas sector related company. So automatically some investors are put off by it. Also, it means terminal value isn’t substantial for the business

2. Capital intensive business. Consistent capex is required to grow and invest in equipments. There is risk of debt overload/equity dilution/ idle equipment if the cycle turns negative (Though this has never been the case with Deep)

3. ROE & ROCE have been 8-10% range (12% last year and will improve going forward). Because of demerger related goodwill accounting entry of 300 odd cr and the old receivables of Dolphin and Kandla (Pls refer to my operating ROCE calculations above in the thread)

4. Cash flows have been solid. Acquitisions have been done well and at no substantial costs. Net Debt free company. Contracts with ONGC, Vedanta, Oil India etc (reputed companies)

It is a business that i dont think will command 30 pe + even if it grows at 30% CAGR (If it commands that pe in the future, than great)

As long as execution and order book continues and balance sheet remains solid, I would remain invested in it.

• Above is my opinion. It is subject to change only if actual substantial facts are presented and not empty witty fluff!

DISCLOSURE- INVESTED (SINCE 2022, first at 88, than at 240, avg price -175) So obviously I’m extremely biased since it has made me boatloads of money and will hopefully continue to do so.

[Pankaj_Motwani]

Also you were talking about CS resignation, which is 3 year old News

I don’t know what’s the sense of bringing those old news and agreed with @pranavpallod12 that CS resignation are too normal

And if you are not aware,Deep is based out of Ahmedabad and gift city came up with lots of compliance officer vacancies. So if there is more such resignation in future , I will not be surprised

Tbh most of your comments I find irrelevant. I am so much aware about the core business model of the company that those all comments make no sense against my thesis on the company

[Folok]

@kautuk Hey I appreciate your findings but they might be misconstrued. Here’s my rationale for the same:

1. The new auditor charging the same fees is very likely because that was the contention of the Co against the old auditors. If the Co agreed to hike the old auditors fee, then they wouldn’t have resigned in the first place. Also, the agreement with the new auditor can be such that there might be fee increases in the upcoming years. This is a Co run by Gujarati promoters hence frugality is kind of expected. (Not stereotyping but just stating a common observation). Also, your arguement lacks any clear evidence of concern or dispute.

2. Moving on to receivables, you would see that almost the entire amount of receivables have moved on from undisputed receivables (FY24 end) to disputed receivables (FY25 end). (refer 3rd screenshot in thread 369). When the management says they had decent amount of success they might be referring to legalities or enforced litigation to make sure that a good chunk of debt is recoverable or made undisputed. "These balances are subject to confirmation, reconciliation, and any consequential adjustments. " Debtors refuting to pay up and subsequent litigation is very common in bankrupt Cos (else they wouldn’t be bankrupt in the first place). Hence, I believe (although not fully sure) that mgt is referring to the status and recovery adjustments of the receivables being decent rather than the amount itself.

Also, maybe don’t put too much wit and humor in your threads. Make it dry and bland as possible as members would rather make judgement based on facts than creative writing. I guess the point is to make money and not sound smart. Just a feedback.

Appreciate your research!

[kautuk]

Hi @Folok

@Folok

This is a Co run by Gujarati promoters hence frugality is kind of expected. (Not stereotyping but just stating a common observation). Also, your arguement lacks any clear evidence of concern or dispute.

I don’t have the figures at the back of my hand but I am sure you can have a look. The audit fees was same for the new auditor vis - a vis the old auditor up until last year (FY 2023-24), post which it was suddenly increased by a considerable amount.

One explanation could be that the audit fees was increased due to acquisition of Dolphin and various other entities. Even so, the standalone audit fees increased by a considerable amount.

Here’s the audit fees summary and timeline:

Old auditor’s resigned because management did not agree to a increase in audit fees as against additional audit procedures to be performed.

New auditor’s were appointed and they charged the same fees up until FY 24.

Now the same frugal Gujarati promoters, suddenly after only one year, increased the new auditor’s fees.

I am not inferring anything from the above 3 statements. I am just trying to counter the Gujarati frugal point raised by you.

@Folok

When the management says they had decent amount of success they might be referring to legalities or enforced litigation to make sure that a good chunk of debt is recoverable or made undisputed.

By this logic the reverse should have happened. If the management is deeming success as successful litigations and/or future recoverability, the trade receivables should have been classified from disputed to undisputed. Whereas in this case, the inverse has happened. The receivables were classified from undisputed to disputed. So the management were neither able to recover a decent chunk of receivables nor establish future recoverability and yet they claimed “success” of recovering old receivables in Dolphin.

(Poor choice of words by the management)

(P.S. I know you told me to cut down on the humour, I swear this is the last one. I just couldn’t resist. The opportunity was too good to pass)

@Folok

Also, maybe don’t put too much wit and humor in your threads

Thanks for the constructive criticism. I will keep this point in mind for the future. My only reasoning was to maybe make the readers tiniest bit interested in the boring stuff that I write but I understand your point.

Also I admit that my tone could have been less accusatory in my previous posts and I apologise for the same.

I also request the members of this thread to read my posts with an open mind by keeping aside their confirmation bias (looking for posts that support their thesis). I appreciate @Folok who actually provided reasons why he thinks my points are immaterial. Other members just dismissed my points as “Your points are irrelevant” without actually telling me or giving me reasons as to why they are irrelevant.

Good day!

[Ghonarbochon]

Your points are very indirectly relevant but very useless because you are unable to commit to your opinion . Say clearly in a single sentence whether in your opinion ,the promoters are crooks or not and spare everyone long harangues beating about the bush .How would your posts help anyone in making decisions if you yourself is not able to say it clearly ?
After reading miles of posts ,the question on top of my mind was …

Disc. Not invested in Deep because I think its a capital heavy industry and I do not have conviction to justify the patience needed .

[kautuk]

I"ll just clarify this once and for all.

It was neither my intention nor my expectation that the posts that I write on this thread affect the “decisions” of the respected members of the forum.

As stated earlier, I am trying to find points that I feel other investors probably missed in their thesis.

Whether to consider those “material”, “direct”, “indirect”, or “significant” is entirely upto the readers.

There is also no need to dismiss my posts as immaterial, because materiality is subjective.

To summarise, my job is to ask questions. Determining whether it’s material or not is yours.

I"ll cut back on the sarcasm though.

[Debojit_Kangsa_Banik]

@kautuk

The same trade receivables (outstanding for more than 3 years) are still outstanding at the balance sheet date. If the management claims this to be a “decent recovery”, well kudos to them.

This was mentioned in Aug 25 and the AR details is till Mar 25. How did you conclude that they haven’t recovered anything after Mar 25?

[kautuk]

I can’t.

But if the management failed to recover receivables in 3 years, how can you expect decent recovery in only 6 months post March 2025?