

# APOLLO HOSPITALS

This is not a stock recommendation. Please do your own due diligence. Presenter is an investor in some of companies in healthcare sector

> Kumar Saurabh 14<sup>th</sup> July 2018

# PERCEPTION OF HEALTHCARE SECTOR

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- Capex Heavy and hence stay away
- Low Return on Capital Employed
- Capitalism-Socialism Debate
- Can never make profit due to

political intervention (recency bias)

• Doctor's are king makers

# PERCEPTION OF APOLLO HOSPITALS

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• A CAPEX heavy hospital business

with all the features of hospital

sector mentioned in previous slides

# What does company do??











Pharmacy business with ~2800 stores

### **Apollo Health and Lifestyle**

## BUSINESS

Apollo Clinic Expertise: Closer to you	Apollo Sugar	DIAGNOSTICS Experime Experime pase	Apollo WHITE	Apollo DIALY SIS	Apollo Spectra	Cradle
<b>75 Primary Clinics</b> 33 Owned 42 Franchisee (40 National and 2 International)	<b>38 Diabetic Care</b> Centers 3 Advanced Centers 35 Primary Centers	44 Laboratories 163 Collection Centers	73 Dental Care Centers	5 Dialysis Centers	12 Surgery Centers 11 Owned 1 OMA	12 Birthing Centers 8 Owned Cradles 2 Fertility units 1 Cradle clinic 1 Franchisee
~371,000 Consultations ~200,000 Health Checks In FY17	~122,000 Consultations In FY17	~348,500 direct and ~900,000 internal billings In FY17	~52,500 Procedures In FY17	~22,700 Dialysis sessions In FY17	~17,900 Surgeries In FY17	~100,000 Consultations ~4350 Deliveries ~7400 NICU Days In FY17
~1150 Doctors As on FY17	~90 Doctors and 27 Dieticians As on FY17	~74 Doctors 800 Test menu As on FY17	~300 Doctors As on FY17	~13 Doctors As on FY17	~750 Doctors As on FY17	~500 Doctors ~188 Beds ~66 NICU Beds As on FY17
Revenue ~INR 1113 Mn in FY16 Revenue ~INR 1173 Mn in FY17	Revenue ~INR 186 Mn in FY16 Revenue ~INR 276 Mn in FY17	Revenue ~INR 540 Mn in FY17	Revenue ~INR 382 Mn in FY16 Revenue ~INR 335 Mn in FY17	Revenue ~INR 52 Mn in FY15 Revenue ~INR 55 Mn in FY17	Revenue ~INR 1103 Mn in FY16 Revenue ~INR 1403 Mn in FY17	Revenue ~INR 461 Mn in FY16 Revenue ~INR 878 Mn in FY17

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## **CURRENT PERCEPTION**




For ailments in complexity between minor and major

In such cases, it's a blend of hospital reputation and doctor reputation.

To me it seems that it'll be difficult to profitably grow for hospitals offering a plethora of disciplines.

As time elapses, costs will obviously go up. And, the inability of hospitals to transfer costs to patients could lead to margin compression. Populist governments have absolutely no qualms in intervening to regulate cost of treatment.

### FOR PERCEPTION, LETS REWIND 10 YEARS BACK




In short term, market is all about emotional perceptions. In long run, market is all about earnings and demand-supply economics


# WE ARE NOT ASTROLOGERS, SO, BEST WE CAN DO IS LEARN FROM HISTORY AND LOOK AT FUTURE FROM DEMAND-SUPPLY PERSPECTIVE...

## WHAT DOES HISTORY TELLS US


## **HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE**


PAT






CAGR-17%











CAGR-20%


\* Bed includes both owned & managed haspitals; \* Number of standalone pharmacies. Note: FY17 figures has been presented on the basis of ind AS.


















Mature Stores (Pre FY08) EBITDA Margins



ALOS - Average Length of Stoy, ARPOB - Average Revenue per Occupied Bed. Note: FY17 Igures has been presented on the basis of Ind AS. + Occupancy rate. + Operating beds.

EBITDA

55

# WHAT DOES FINANCIALS SAY

## HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE

	Mar-08	Mar-09	Mar-10	Mar-11	Mar-12	Mar-13	Mar-14	Mar-15	Mar-16	Mar-17	TTM	3 Year Average/Sum	5 Year Average/Sum	Overall Average/Sum
PRICE:	256.2	197.8	378.6	483.3	610.3	829.4	896.1	1307.5	1347.4	1177.2	974.85			
Adjusted Equity Shares in Cr	11.8	12.1	12.4	12.5	13.5	14.0	14.0	14.0	14.0	14.0	13.91			
Revenue	1125	1458	1826	2332	2800	3318	3862	4593	5588	6442	7255	16623	23802	32218
Invested Capital	1529	1813	2232	2380	2931	3695	4044	4842	5661	6336				
PAT	101.8	118.1	152.0	181.7	231.0	309.1	330.7	346.6	334.0	285.2	233.2	966	1606	2288
CFO	28.9	63.1	168.9	195.0	306.2	332.6	303.1	389.1	626.2	623.5		1639	2274	3008
CAPEX		348.7	351.8	271.3	329.9	535.8	534.5	628.1	857.8	637.8		2124	3194	4496
Dividend	35.2	40.2	43.3	46.8	53.8	76.5	80.0	80.0	0.0	0.0		80	237	420
FCF including Dividend		-285.6	-182.9	-76.3	-23.8	-203.3	-231.4	-239.0	-231.5	-14.3		-485	-920	-1488
Enterprise Value	3222	2778	5102	6588	8670	12296	13386	19692	20907	18926	16047			
Revenue Growth		30%	25%	28%	20%	18%	16%	19%	22%	15%				
PAT Growth		16%	29%	20%	27%	34%	7%	5%	-4%	-15%				
Receivables as a % of Sales	11%	11%	11%	12%	13%	13%	12%	12%	10%	10%		11%	12%	12%
Inventory as a % of Sales	7%	7%	7%	6%	7%	6%	7%	7%	7%	7%		7%	7%	7%
PAT Margin	9.0%	8.1%	8.3%	7.8%	8.2%	9.3%	8.6%	7.5%	6.0%	4.4%	3.2%	6%	8%	8%
Tax Rate	30%	31%	32%	33%	32%	24%	21%	26%	20%	21%	0.270	29%	34%	38%
CFO-PAT	-72.9	-55.0	17.0	13.3	75.2	23.5	-27.6	42.5	292.3	338.4		673.1	668.9	719.3
Liquidity Ratios	Mar-08	Mar-09	Mar-10	1		-		1	Mar-16			3 Years	5 Years	Overall
Debt to Equity	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.7	0.8		0.7	0.5	0.4
Current Ratio	1.6	1.7	1.9	1.5	1.9	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.0	1.9		2.0	2.1	1.9
Interest Coverage Ratio	8.3	8.7	6.9	5.9	6.3	6.6	5.8	6.6	4.1	2.8		4.5	5.2	6.2
Quick Ratio	1.4	1.4	1.7	1.3	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.7	1.6		1.7	1.7	1.6
Operating Ratios				110	110	1.0	1.0	1.5		110		10	217	210
Working Capital/Sales (including cash)	20%	19%	30%	15%	19%	22%	23%	26%	21%	20%		22%	22%	22%
Debtor Days	41	40	41	42	46	47	44	44	36	37		38.9	41.6	41.9
Inventory Days	26	27	27	24	24	23	25	26	25	25		25.5	24.8	25.1
Cash Return on Assets	1.5%	2.8%	6.0%	6.2%	8.8%	7.6%	6.2%	6.7%	9.1%	8.1%		8%	8%	6%
Return on Assets	5.4%	5.3%	5.4%	5.8%	6.6%	7.1%	6.8%	6.0%	4.9%	3.7%		5%	6%	6%
Asset Turnover	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8		0.8	0.8	0.7
Fixed Asset Turnover	2.1	2.2	2.0	2.2	1.9	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.8		1.8	1.9	2.0
CFO/PAT	0.3	0.5	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.1	0.9	1.1	1.9	2.2		1.7	1.4	1.2
CFO/Sales	3%	4%	9%	8%	11%	10%	8%	8%	11%	10%		10%	9%	8%
FCF/Sales	0%	-20%	-10%	-3%	-1%	-6%	-6%	-5%	-4%	0%		-3%	-4%	-6%
Profit Margin	9%	8%	8%	8%	8%	9%	9%	8%	6%	4%		6%	7%	8%
Asset turnover	0.60	0.65	0.65	0.74	0.80	0.76	0.80	0.79	0.82	0.83		0.8	0.8	0.7
Financial Leverage	1.5	1.6	1.8	1.9	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.8	2.1	2.2		2.0	1.9	1.8
Return on Equity	8%	9%	10%	11%	10%	11%	11%	11%	10%	8%		10%	10%	10%
Return on Capital	10.8%	10.7%	11.6%	13.6%	13.7%		12.5%	11.4%	9.7%	8.8%		10%	11%	12%

# WHAT DOES FINANCIALS SAY

- *Historically, strong operational execution*
- Margins have fallen
- PAT margins has gone down heavily in last few years
- *CFO has gone up or constant in last few years*
- Debt has increased

# MARKETS ARE

# OVERVALUED....SO


# HOW CAN WE GET




When the image perceived is disguised with respect to actual image

### 1.MOST OF THE TIMES VALUE EMERGES WHEN NOTHING SEEM TO BE RIGHT...


### **UNLESS THERE IS DISRUPTION RISK**



- Policy Changes
- Political Interventions
- Sentiment Impact
- Underutilization of resources
- Bloated financials with liabilities eating up and assets non-contributing
- Profit eating emerging businesses
- Loss making new hospitals
- State related issues
- Rising interest rates




2. Sometimes value is created when what it looks like and what it is actually is not the same



2. DO COMPANIES ALSO HOLD SUCH IMAGES IN INVESTOR'S MIND?


## **BUSINESS DYNAMIC: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE**

The basic business building blocks are also many times driven by memory perceptions



## LET US COMPARE THESE 2 BUSINESSES

ON RETURN ON CAPITAL EMPLOYED BASIS



FY53, FY55 & FY55 ROCE of Healthcare services excludes new hospitals (Hanagariam, Japanagar, Trichy, Nachik, Karapaksan, WEZ SMR, Nachare, DMR, Visag new, Multenawaram & Yaai Mumbal, added in the fast 30 membra and Antiz. - Capital employed of ₹ 56,476 mm in FY15, ₹ 12212 mm in FY15, ₹ 8,007 mm in FY15 and ANti. Capital employed of ₹ 4,882 mm in FY17, ₹ 1275 mm in FY16, ₹ 1204 mm in FY15, Camtribution to EBT yet to be realised.

Return on capital employed \* consolidated (%)




\* FY 17 ROCE (excluding capital employed of New Hospitals) is at 12% & P18 ROCE is 12% \* Excludes CMIP & Investments in Equil mutual funds. Normalized hospital Return on Capital Employed has been ~ 18% (not as bad as we think) and has been more or less despite of old vs new hospital mix

Peaked at 14% and declining. Is it a bad business?

## A UNIQUE FEATURE OF BOTH BUSINESSES ARE

They are operating leverage driven business which gets better as they mature

HOSPITAL 70% 60% 50% 30% **Y4 Y1 Y2 Y3** PHARMACY Q1'17 Q1'18 EBITDA Margin (Upto 2008): > 10 Year old 7.30% EBITDA Margin (Upto 2010): > 8 Year old 6.10% 6.70% EBITDA Margin (Batch 2011): 7 Year Old 5.50% 6.50% EBITDA Margin (Batch 2012): 6 Year Old 4.20% 5.30%




Reduction in ALOS means more on same capacity



Return on Capital Employed of matured stores ~ 25%

60% increase in count of pharmacy stores => which means 35% of stores are <4 years old => which means EBITDA margins can almost double for 35% of stores => A clear case of operating leverage

## **LEVERS OF HOSPITAL BUSINESS**



# SO, LET US SEE WHAT IS THE SCOPE FOR OPERATING LEVERAGE????

Which means metric like PE, EV/EBITDA can hide more than what it reveals

## SCOPE OF OPERATING LEVERAGE

### ON CAPACITY BASIS FOR HOSPITALS

SBU	Segment	Unit	2016	2017	2018	2019E	2020E	2021E	20228
	Apollo Hospital - Operational Beds > 5 Years Old as on 2018	Beds		4883					
	Apollo Hospital - Operational Beds 3-5 Years Old as on 2018	Beds		198					
Hospital	Apollo Hospital - Operational Beds 0-3 Years Old as on 2018	Beds		1874					
	Apollo Hospital - Non Operational Beds	Beds	_	1378					
	New Beds to be added	Beds		1700		750			
Hospital Total				10033	10033	10783	10783	10783	10783

Almost ~3000-4000(30%-40%) beds are < 3 years old This is has taken debt from 1000 cr to 2800 cr with:

- Fixed asset going 2.5x up but yet to contribute fully
- Interest is up from Rs 119 cr to Rs 257 cr. This increase is 20% of current profit
- Depreciation is up from Rs 168 cr to 314 cr which is another 20% of current profit

Together, this is 40% of PAT. So, from 8% of PAT margin to 3.5% PAT margin (almost 100% margin hit), almost 40% hit is directly by interest cost and depreciation as operating leverage has not fully kicked in, considering others constant

1-1.5% margin hit has been due to policy (stent pricing)/Kolkata hospital issues which is another 15-20% of PAT

Chennai hospital non-operational for 2 months due to VIP visit which further contributed to ~10% of PAT hit

Remaining ~30% can be attributed to upfront cost (doctor hires, marketing cost of new hospitals, new pharmacy stores

FY18	Healthcare Serv Group (Existing)	Healthcare Serv Group (New & Others)	Healthcare Serv Group (Total)
Hospitals	30	13	43
Operating beds	5,427	1,749	7,176
Occupancy	67%	58%	65%
Revenue	35,280	9,876	45,157
EBITDAR	8,081	694	8,774
margin (%)	22.9%	7.0%	19.4%
EBITDA	7,368	231	7,599
margin (%)	20.9%	2.3%	16.8%
EBIT	5,641	-716	4,926
margin (%)	16.0%		10.9%

# Operating Beds Operating Beds Mail Xine 4207 Operating Science 75% 76% 75% 72% 75% 76% 76% 72%

## SCOPE OF OPERATING LEVERAGE

### **Pharmacy Stores**

Batch	Particulars	Q4 FY 17	Q4 FY 18	yay (%)	FY 17	FY 18	yay (%
	No of Stores	767	764.00		767	764	
Upto	Revenue/store	3.76	3.94	4.8%	15.21	15.75	3.6%
FY 10 Batch	EBITDA /store	0.25	0.29	5.7%	1.05	1.12	6.6%
	EBITDA Margin %	6.7%	7.4%	64 bps	6.9%	7.1%	20 bp
	No of Stores	154	153		154	153	
	Revenue/store	3.18	3.50	10.0%	12.77	13.68	7.2%
FY 11 Batch	EBITDA /store	0.21	0.27	28.1%	0.86	1.01	17.4%
	EBITDA Margin %	6.6%	7.7%	109 bps	6.7%	7.4%	64 bp
	No of Stores	214	214		214	214	
	Revenue / Store	2.91	3.17	8.9%	11.73	12.44	6.0%
FY 12 Batch	EBITDA /store	0.14	0.20	38.7%	0.61	0.72	19.19
	EBITDA Margin %	4.9%	6.2%	134 bps	5.2%	5.8%	64 bp
	No of Stores	261	258		261	258	1. Maria and 1
	Revenue/store	1.58	1.82	15.3%	6.08	7.08	16.4%
Hetero	EBITDA /store	0.02	0.04		0.02	0.10	
	EBITDA Margin %	1.4%	2.0%		0.3%	1.5%	
	No. of Store	2,556	3,021		2,556	3,021	
	Revenue / Store	2.98	3.01	1.3%	11.52	11.42	-0.8%
	EBITDA / Store	0.12	0.14	13.9%	0.48	0.50	3.1%
Total	EBITDA Margin %	4.1%	4.6%	51 bps	4.2%	4.4%	16 bp
	Total Revenues	7,193	8,631	20.0%	27,852	32,689	17.49
	EBITDA	304	402	31.9%	1,233	1,479	19.9%
	EBITDA Margin %	4.2%	4.7%	42 bps	4.4%	4.5%	10 bp
Capex (Rs Mio)		103	174		411	584	
Capital Employed (Rs Mio)		6,559	7,834		6,559	7,834	
Total ROCE %		14.8%	16.3%	150 bps	14.9%	15.0%	9 bps
Total No. of Employees					14,093	16,675	18.3%

	Q1'17	Q1'18	Q1'18 Count	
EBITDA Margin (Upto 2008 ): > 10 Year old		7.30%		
EBITDA Margin (Upto 2010 ): > 8 Year old	6.10%	6.70%	766	
EBITDA Margin (Batch 2011): 7 Year Old	5.50%	6.50%	154	
EBITDA Margin (Batch 2012): 6 Year Old	4.20%	5.30%		
EBITDA Margin (Pre 2014 ): > 4 Year Old		6.10%		
Hetero Stores	-3.70%	1.60%		

### **Key Highlights**

0.5%

FY II







ALOS - Average Length of Stay, ARPOB - Average Revenue per Occupied Bed. Note: FYUT (igures has been presented on the basis of Ind AS. † Occupancy rate: 
† Operating beds.

28

7.3%

FY 17


# HOW DOES FUTURE


# LOOKS LIKE

1. Market Size Opportunity

2. Technology Disruptions


## **MARKET SIZE OPPORTUNITY**












## **MARKET SIZE OPPORTUNITY**



#### Beds per 10,000 people

Searce (site) - mark reach listence 2012

State (MSI America


www.app?chospitals.com

10

india lags behind other developed and emerging economies in healthcare infrastructure







Source: PCD and E&A from Data for India's share in world health parameters

#### Comparison of India vs. other countries in Healthcare Infrastructure parameters

Per 10,000 population	Ohina	India	Indonesia	Maleysia.	Singapore	Thatand	Australia	USA
Health Workforce Density		-						
Physicians	34.6	65	20	12.0	19.2	1.0	38.5	24.2
Nurses and midwives	15.1	10.0	13.8	32.8	63.9	15.2	95.9	98.3
Dental	0.4	0.8	0.4	1.4	3.3	0.7	6.9	363
Infrastructure		-						
Hospital beds	39	T	6	18	27	23	39	30
Source: MIND - WorkE Health Statistics 2013		()						
Investment required to me	eet demand su	pply gap						
Investment required to me in order to meet the global median			tia will need to inve	st over ₹14 trillion i	(\$730.bo)			


Under-penetrated and under-resourced

Indian healthcare services market





Growth in Indian healthcare services will be driven by in patient based facilities



## **TECHNOLOGY DISRUPTIONS**

Microsoft AI Network for Cardiology with Apollo Hospitals to bring new insights in predicting population-based heart diseases

## Apollo Hospitals adopts IBM Watson for oncology and genomics

Apollo Hospitals has partnered with IBM to deploy its cognitive computing platform Watson for oncology and genomics in 10 of its cancer care centres.

## Apollo ties up with Google Health Card in India

https://news.microsoft.com/en-in/features/microsoft-ai-network-healthcare-apollo-hospitals-cardiac-disease-prediction/ https://www.livemint.com/Companies/7qQuekX0U2pKoAv9nMHsNJ/IFC-invests-Rs450-crore-for-29-stake-in-Apollo-Health.html https://tech.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/technology/apollo-hospitals-adopts-ibm-watson-for-oncology-and-genomics/64275478 http://forum.valuepickr.com/t/apollo-hospital-the-one-stop-healthcare-service/17964/14 https://factsbevondnumbers.wordpress.com/2018/06/07/apollo-hospital/

## **TECHNOLOGY DISRUPTIONS**

- Can technology reduce cost of healthcare CAPEX + OPEX model and make it a volume game for India?
- Can technology bring in uniformity of service?
- Can technology solve manpower scarcity challenge?
- Can technology help to reduce over dependence on few doctors?
- Can technology really disrupt healthcare operating model?

# Valuations



When you have businesses with significant capex which scales up in a staggered manner on profitability side with operating leverages possibility, a financial relative valuation metric like PE, EV/EBITDA based on TTM numbers can hide more than what it reveals

It is better to incorporate operational valuation with normalized scenario



## VALUATION

Average											
EBITDA Margin	1	L4%	Historical El	BITDA margin	of matured h	ospital is >169	6				
PAT Margin		6%									
EBITDA Multiple		15		Historical PAT margin of matured hospital is 8% The demand opportunity is humongous, disruption is low, terminal value has low							
PAT Multiple		25			_			and developed			
Per bed Revenue GAGR		6%		0 year value is							
Conservative				,							
EBITDA Margin	1	12%	Historical El	BITDA margin	of matured h	ospital is >169	6				
PAT Margin	4	.5%		AT margin of n							
EBITDA Multiple		10			-			value has low and developed			
PAT Multiple		20						le digit growth			
Per bed Revenue GAGR		3%	Historical 10	0 year value is	9%						
	l o	1'17	Q1'18	Q1'18 Coun	t						
EBITDA Margin (Upto 2008): > 10 Year ol			7.30%	<b>4</b>	-						
EBITDA Margin (Upto 2010): > 8 Year old		.10%	6.70%	766							
EBITDA Margin (Batch 2011): 7 Year Old		.50%	6.50%	154							
EBITDA Margin (Batch 2012): 6 Year Old		.20%	5.30%								
EBITDA Margin (Pre 2014): > 4 Year Old			6.10%								
Hetero Stores	-3	3.70%	1.60%								
Average											
Store Growth Rate		8%	Historical g	rowth rate is 1	4%						
Same Store Revenue Growth Rate		8%	Historical g	rowth rate is 1	2.5%						
EBITDA Multiple		20	High ROCE, opportunity	-	tail-FMCG kin	d of business	with tremend	ous market size			
Conservative											
Store Growth Rate		5%	Historical g	rowth rate is 1	4%						
Same Store Revenue Growth Rate		5%	-	rowth rate is 1							
EBITDA Multiple		15	High ROCE,	asset light ret	tail-FMCG kin	d of business	with tremend	lous market size op			
AHLL Valuation	1										
<u>Average</u>											
Nerwork Unit Revenue Growth	10%	Histori	cal growth rate	is 20%+							
P/S Ratio	2										
Conservative Nerwork Unit Revenue Growth	5%	Histori	cal growth rate	is 20%+							
P/S Ratio	1	riistofi	cargrowthrate	15 20/07							
. / 0	-										

Overall Valuation			
	2	3	4
Average	2020E	2021E	2022E
Hospital	14778	16125	17581
Pharmacy	4870	5717	6669
Others	1091	1320	1601
Total	20739	23163	25851
CAGR	26%	21%	19%
Conservative			
Hospital	7909	8386	8884
Pharmacy	4321	4849	5407
Others	497	602	729
Total	12727	13837	15020
CAGR	-1%	2%	4%

## SUMMARY

Quality business? Reasonable Valuation? Margin of Safety? A mix of all?

### • Hospital Drivers

- $\circ$  Not such a bad business based on ROCE
- Increase in capacity utilization
- Reduction in ALOS
- Improvement in Case Mix
- Post Capex expense reduction reduction in debt, Slowness in accelerated depreciation, Better Asset Turns
- o Terminal Value Comfort
- Non-cyclic demand (could be supply side)
- Pharmacy Drivers
  - $\circ$  Operating leverage of new stores
  - Huge market size opportunity and high growth rate
  - Higher ROCE business
  - $\circ$  Potential increase in share of inhouse brands

- Risk to watch out for
  - More regulatory cuts
  - More debt
  - *Recent stagnation in same bed revenue and same store revenue*
  - Historical political risk
  - Too many loss making current ventures continue to bleed
  - Supply side economics
  - Corporate governance issues

Disruptions They are both opportunity as well as threat



# Questions??

https://www.dropbox.com/sh/49ckmmlx4ggt2wx/AADuc4p xzYgwhDTqMYkvqFxKa?dl=0 Apollo Hospitals (1) Apollo Valuation Sheet

