MPS Ltd


(Dhwanil Desai) #382

@ayushmit, @rohitbalakrish_, @Donald,

Super efforts in first collecting and then compiling the inputs from management/business in BQ/MQ sheets. I truly believe that BQ/MQ sheets compels one to look at the businesses in more structured manner and help one identify his/her blind spots in investment thesis.I have benefited immensely and am sure if one is disciplined enough to follow it with all sincerity, the rewards are bountiful. In fact, I feel (or rather wish!) that all the new threads initiated on VP shall have this templates filled in before is is approved. That forces the initiator to do plenty of work before presenting it to the forum which can improve the quality of discussion and participation.

Coming to MPS, I think the BQ/MQ sheet very well highlights the distinctive features of the business and management and makes a strong case. So, I will focus on the risk factors and disconnect in the story…

- Management has highlighted in the concalls/it’s interactions that there is a clear trend of consolidation of vendors for the industry and MPS is on the right side of such trend

First, if the publishing outsourcing industry is growing at 15% (And if we believe so is the growth for relevant STE segment) and the peers/competitors are growing much faster as Mahesh has very succinctly highlighted with data from competition, then what explains the much slower growth rate for the company and still it ending up on the right side of the consolidation move? In order to be in right side on this trend, shouldn’t it be growing at more than 15% in USD terms to support this hypothesis? Last 3 years, growth is much below this number.

- IF i am inferring correctly, the BQ/MQ sheet implies that MPS business has high entry barriers, the business is sticky and the there is limited competition.

How do we reconcile the above characteristics with the fact that the business faces and will continue to face the pricing pressure from the publishers as indicated by the management? In my limited understanding,if all the three above characteristics are present in a business , it is typically a price setter and not a price taker! As management indicates some whehre, their budget for outsourcing remains constant, However in the same budget, they will get more and more work done. This again is a disconnect, we need to factor in while assigning the business BQ category

The risk because of this as I see, tomorrow if the rupee appreciates significantly, will the pendulum shift in favor of smaller yet long existing players in the industry which have currency advantages thus hitting the twin blow to MPS/other players’ businesses due to lower margins and negative operating leverage (due to lesser volumes)?

BQ Category: Personally, I feel that MPS belongs to a business with B+ quality with management smarts. If they are able to pull of the technological edge as per hypothesis and other players lag in that (as of now we do not have any evidence of proving that other players are not as strong in technology platform as MPS), it may move to A category business.

On lower organic growth I have slightly different take: I think, what is missed by the market today is small but incremental changes happening in terms of client inroad made (top 10 Client contributions), new “core vendor” status won (2 new wins recently), offering gap being filled in (Element and TSI acquisition). All these should be seen in the context of “low contrast effect” and the small incremental gains made from these developments will lead to a tipping point in couple of years which will propel into a higher growth trajectory of above industry growth rate.

Disclosure: Invested. Allocation- 7%; Average Buying price:330


(T Anil Kumar) #383

Thanks Donald for Mgt Q&A, I have atleast some basic understanding. Also read the entire VP thread. I think Mahesh Shah has posted some really very useful information.

Chuck Akre describes very well in his speech how to determine the fair value of any business and to surprise of most of us he do not use PE, PB or EV/EBITDA it depends more on qualitative factors read here https://www.evernote.com/shard/s68/sh/aa3cabf9-6e8f-477e-8c82-1ae14805a8e7/7cbbb92de7c10752

My understanding of MPS remains very limited and I remain scared of technology. For me the biggest block is to understand the organic growth drivers and the market opportunity itself. Are we talking about prospective market and possibilities or are we talking about ready market which is not served or explored. Is their a problem which MPS is trying to solve or MPS is selling a better execution strategy and need to convince prospective customers of its use.

Let me just pose few questions which are already discussed to some extent but remain important in my view

Key takeaways: 1) Not a commoditized business. Slightly better than a pure IT services company. 2) Organic growth of max 10-15% over next 3-5 years. infact for me this is the main impediment. I do not want to bet only on inorganic growth. Not able to understand clearly the sources of organic growth 3) Exit PE multiple not more than 20x over 3-5 years 4) future pay offs to shareholders depend on outcome of acquisition lead growth strategy.

Let me set the context right. I have no views either positive or negative. Just trying to throw some different angle for further analysis by playing a devil’s advocate:

What’s factored in price: Assuming that MPS will pay only 1x sales [could be materially higher] to acquire total addition to revenue over next three years would be 150crs. Assuming organic growth of 15%, MPS organic sales will grow to 350crs. Overall sales of 500crs. Now what sort of margins are possible. Even assuming organic EBITBA margins remain flat at 40%, giving generous margins of 15% on acquisitions [I assume they will acquire break-even or loss making entities], EBITA would come to 150crs. So a healthy 25% Revenue and EBITA CAGR. We can expect 7-10% CAGR for salary inflation over next 3-5 years. I am assuming that this will be absorbed by productivity and scale advantages and INR depreciation. Yes, am not factoring any appreciation of INR J. I think one should compare and contrast MPS with other similar size IT companies. In my understanding MPS is more an IT service provider than part of printing and publishing industry. If we see the margins of IT service providers, Average EBITA margins of last five years is around 27% [which is substantially higher than 24% during 2004-08]. I am guessing higher level of margins in latter period is due to steep INR depreciation. Why should MPS margins continue to remain at 36% [excluding FX gains & interest income] .I am not suggesting margins will decline. For a customer why he should not be comparing this outsourcing with what it does to IT firms. EBITA margins of bigger players are in the range of 10-20%. We need to dig deeper into why there margins are lower.

ON a TTM basis most of IT companies are trading at 15-25x PE. MPS is trading at 21X PE exl cash. So I guess it’s already trading at its top end of PE range. [Though I guess organic revenue growth could be higher in IT industry in general compared to publishing Industry]… Ofcourse we can pay premium for better capital allocation, high mgt quality and high dividend.

From reading of VP thread and MDA what comes out clearly is that customers are sticky. Then customers will be sticky to their existing vendors too. What makes us believe that existing customers won’t leave MPS but MPS will be able to convince others to shift vendors?

Vendor consolidation: I understand one of the main motive in vendor consolidation is pricing advantage from bigger players. Top three players EBITDA margins is in the range of 10-20%. Taking the example of Infosys I would argue that either one can maintain top line growth or margins. It would be difficult to control both. Not arguing margins will crash to 20% would in our 3-5 years estimates we should factor in lower margins.

Acquisitions: All the top three players are backed by big institutions. So I guess there won’t be scarcity of money for them. All of them will be chasing the same players and seller will have lot of options. So can be count on getting acquisitions at reasonable price.

So if one wants to play inorganic growth story and good capital allocator, One should also compare and contrast other bets like Piramal enterprises and leaving the question of valuation aside Thomas cook too. Businesses like Shriram transport, Shiram city union, Contract research and their own quasi NBFC which is lending to real estate and infrastructure can easily grow at organic growth rate of 15%. DRG which is their data analytic business is an exception where organic growth rate will be only 5-7% [DRG contributes 15% to EV] and key acquisition are more or less are done except for one or two more. So if one wants to play inorganic growth story and good capital allocator purely on valuation basis, One should also compare and contrast other bets like Piramal enterprises and leaving the question of valuation aside Thomas cook too

.Lastly end market [publishing market] at best is growing at 4-5%, unless it is the case that we are standing at the beginning of the outsourcing trend. Technology is going to be key differentiator for publishing entities who are fighting for their survival in their fight with companies like Amazon. So how much they will be willing to outsourced should also be questioned. So regarding the potential to some extent there is some similarity with Kaveri seeds where the market size was/is growing at single digit and main bet was on increasing market share. But unlike Kaveri, MPS is only a marginal player in the industry and not a market leader.


(Mahesh Shah) #384

@desaidhwanil

(1) we need to be fair to the management and respect the fact that to turnaround MPS from a messed up situation to 35 % + EBITDA margin situation must not have been an easy task and Mr. Arora did it in a very short time which is commendable. While doing this he must have done a trade off between less lucrative and more lucrative contracts because of which topline was bound to suffer initially which is ok. Company is able to sustain its topline at this margins signifies that company has credibility in the eyes of clients and has some relative advantages because of which clients are coming to it. That’s the end of one side – positive.

If we wanted only a steady dividend earner opportunity this side was ok but what we want is a real long term wealth creator. Now for that organic growth has to start somewhere. What I expected personally is the growth to start post stabilisation which didn’t happen in FY15 and there is no sign yet. Possible gaps were filled by acquiring three small entities and if now gaps are filled FY16 should at least see a double digit organic growth which we will need to check as the year progresses.

(2) Extreme Pricing pressures that Mr. Arora has talked about remain a puzzle for me frankly. So far amongst peers only SPS gives volume as well as value figures and over last many years both growths are almost similar so at least SPS is not facing pricing pressure. Even if we consider the fact that it’s almost an offshoot of a big publisher then also in the reported official statements pricing variation could not be that drastic and ultimately market forces come into play. Newgen’s volume figures we were able to derive in past AR which was discontinued recently and from that also pricing pressures was not that evident. Infact if such pricing pressures was there then it actually means for such a healthy value growth they recorded tremendous volume growth which seems unlikely. However, small industry players feedback suggests a definite pricing pressure from clients. So is it that from a messed up situation in which MPS was acquired when it was on verge of loosing contracts, new management had to resort to significant discounts – if that’s the thing then post stabilisation at least such pricing pressures should subside – or is it that new management is playing a strategy to regain its top position by compromising on pricing because of the advantages Dehradun facility provides ??

(3) regarding currency risks, major threat is philippines and until both the currencies move inline there seems to be not much threat to Indian counterparts. However we need to keep a watch of that.

(4) When MPS was acquired it was at no. 3 or 4 position from which it seems to have slipped to 6 or 7…the way efficiently and in a very quick time super turnaround was made, topline growth seems to be not that easy…its high time now that organic growth needs to start and FY16 and FY17 are crucial for that. So far company’s strategy has been good and even numbers that we see seems to reflect that but for this story to remain relevant over many years to turn out to be a great wealth creator that we all are searching for, organic growth has to start now that’s what I believe.

Rgds.

Discl. - Invested in MPS over last ~one year. Forms ~23 % of my portfolio. No transactions done in last 30 days.


(Varadharajan Ragunathan) #385

Anil wonderful questions - infact, I attended the AGM in chennai and had the some concerns about this getting commoditized. To counter this, much like infosys, MPS is adopting a platform approach where they take on a customer’s entire process on their software and keep re-engineering their work processes to increase automation. So, it sort of becomes a platform led BPO operation which is very sticky and can deliver good returns - think eclerx.

if anyone, Nishith understands this game and I remain bullish on him delivering - he understands profitability and cash flows and is not running after building an empire and the impression I got of him is that he is a patient, shrewd guy who can wait for the right opportunities. I see an analogy with eclerx - lots of tuck in acquisitions each of which kicked in operating leverage 18-24 months post the acquisition - resulting in a 25 % compounder ahead.

Also, MPS could ultimately become an acquisition for a larger guy which nishith may be open to - given he understands the importance of growth.

I am invested in MPS and looking to add slowly - I see it as a modestly asymmetric bet - little downside and decent upside with optionality from acquisitions.


(Aveek Mitra) #386

I think few issues about MPS needs reiteration (may be at the cost of repetition) …

  1. MPS is in a business where outsourcing was not a default choice for end customers. Because, it is the end product of the customer; not something happening in the back end to improve profitability or efficiency or stuff like that. It the the FINAL PRODUCT which a player like Elsevier or Cengage give to its end customers. So, the emotional, strategic, executional involvement of the customers with MPS type companies would be extremely high. And this engagement would evolve slowly and steadily.

  2. Inevitability of customers of MPS giving away more and more jobs / projects to players like MPS would be evident if we study the financial and market performance of many of the publishing giants who are in the listed space … All of them are suffering profitability pressure and are laggards in the market. But their pre-eminence as a publisher is undisputed and would remain so for many many years because of their reach, association and credibility in the academic field.

  3. MPS is not a high tech business … Their transition from a BPO to Technology player is some time away, if at all. They are among those companies who are trying to solve a problem for its end customers … “How to produce a technical journal or a book without compromising on any factor of output at a lower cost” … Cost / Ease / Volume are three key determinants … On Cost, Dehradun is their answer; On Ease, a technology platform, integration with vendor is their answer; On Volume they have readiness with 50% unutilized capacity in Dehradun. But it would come once Cost / Ease / Quality gets firmly settled in the mind of the customer.

  4. Large acquisition failure is the single biggest risk factor for MPS … I think customer decamping them for a lower cost is a negligible probability event. MPS has shown success in turnaround and tiny acquisitions. My gut feel (no solid reason to back) is they would do well if they do smaller acquisitions slowly than some big bang acquisitions as cost of failure would be unbearable. And, I don’t think, MPS has the operational capability or management bandwidth to manage large acquisitions.

  5. .To me a modest investment case is built on assuming a 12% revenue growth, 15% profit growth from organic business and a 20% - 25% margin from a Rs. 200 - 250 Cr additional revenue from inorganic / unutilized capacity led growth in 3 years. So, a Net Profit of about 125 - 150 Cr. over 3 years + dividends.

Disc.: I am invested and no transaction in last 30 days.


(Sreekanth) #387

Not sure if this is relevant, but in publishing context this is how i see MPS scaling up in publishing world…
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-05-08/news/61948016_1_digital-transformation-persistent-systems-business-model

Secondly in the long run if business is not scalable organically why would any large player want to acquire MPS? Ultimately for any PE/large cap.co growth is what matters…

Regards
Sreekanth


(Varadharajan Ragunathan) #388

Sreekanth

Quite the contrary - growth is not what people chase always. Look at infy - they do acquisitions to get into a domain and scale that up using their SG & A capabilities. Happens all the time - you take someone with a good domain understanding and IP and allow for your sales force to sell it globally and it becomes a low risk, easy to integrate acquisition.

It all comes back to how well MPS can deliver steady growth of 10-15 % without sacrificing profitability.


(Atul Garg) #389

Thanks and kudos to @ayushmit, @rohitbalakrish_, @Donald, @Mahesh and @desaidhwanil for sharing MQ, BQ, MQ&A, relevant extensive data points and clear analysis.

For me, the facts that count, though already captured and pretty basic, are below.
+ves:

  1. Value migration: MPS is operating in a space where it is facilitating the value migration. Moving to digital and platform based processes.
  2. EPS assertive efforts: a) Investments in platforms. b) Efforts towards (more comprehensive portfolio) core vendor selection and success in that. c) Acquisition
  3. High Entry Barriers: High Customer confidence and realtionships
  4. High dividend Yield

-ves:

  • High client concentration is a big (Management even thinks of this as an asset) one for me.
  • keyman risk remains as well before we see how Rahul performs.

As we all know MPS has to be seen as a movie :smile:

Disclosure: Invested, roughly 10% of my portfolio.


(Donald Francis) #390

Team VP is proud to have raised the bar again.

We are happy to bring to you a new initiative VP BizQuest - which will provide a peek into how Team VP goes about dissecting a promising investment prospect - every month.

This month - MPS Limited.
Please have a close look. Hope all of you tracking/invested in MPS are in for a special delight :smile:
Hurry! Team VP might be deserving a pat on the back for another special effort.


(Keshav Karunakar) #391

Awesome Donald & team, Highly appreciated.


(Donald Francis) #392

Let’s now get more folks to play the devils advocate on MPS.

The thrust of this effort, as Sandeep articulated so well, was to get Due Process going for
a) a holistic cross-examination
b) make a small team put in serious efforts to prepare hard on BQ, MQ, and the Defence
c) Rest make equally serious efforts to read and digest structured info-sets quickly, and question critically
c) spur each other to greater efforts & learning

This is another way for us to pay it forward. Expose everyone to the same rigour that Team VP puts in.
Try and attempt bringing every serious learner/practitioner on the same page, speeding up the learning curve, as possible.

Once this discussion/insights are digested well (from BQ, MQ presentations & the Q&A discussion) we should focus on carrying forward the discussion to the next level.

There are still gaps in the understanding of the real intricacies of the business.
More folks should get inspired to get down to the next level of data-points. Contacts from publishing technology vendor industry like from SPS, SPI Global, Aptara or Innodata and others would be useful to get down to the bone of the matter, quickly.

Cheers


(Amit Aggarwal) #393

Team VP - excellent initiative and raising the bar! Thanks a lot for providing this collaboration platform for a common investor.
I would say VP is a compounding learning machine and time/effort/learning invested in VP compounds maybe at a faster pace than stock returns :slight_smile:

Regards,
Amit


#394

Thanks to the Team VP for such a treat. Kudos to all (Rohit-Ayush-Dhawnil-Kiran-Donald-Sandeep-Anant-Anil)!
Missed Hitesh in Action.

As Product/Services could not be touched and felt and business does not have a pricing power. Details about stickiness and mining of existing customer needs to be mined further to understand the organic growth drivers.

Generally clients have multiple vendor strategy and someone with better margins might offer a compelling price to snatch away the business.

  1. It would be great if VP web could find a way to understand the REAL customers take for vendor like MPS. Why MPS? What differentiation does it bring on the table?

  2. What SPS global and newgen are doing to maintain excellent margins?

Any thoughts on the above?

Disclosure : Invested and trying to practice assiduity!


(Ayush Mittal) #395

Hi Surender,

Yes, what you are saying is the next level of work which should be done and it will be great if we can do such kind of scuttlebut and take customer feedbacks. Unfortunately, we haven’t been able to find connects. Will be great if someone has links and can help in connecting.

Regards,
Ayush


(Mahesh Shah) #396

Donald, Ayush, Rohit, Sandeep and all others – excellent work…you all are doing great service to the investor community and valuepickr has progressed very well – infact at that stage where hardly few forums have reached…such interactive sessions go a long way in building/raising our conviction as also challenging our analysis again and again to check whether we are on right track or not.

Although went through the entire 2 hour session at one go but wasn’t able to absorb entire thing well because of constraints of the device on which I heard (ipad)…but still was able to pick some queries which even I have went through at the time of doing research on MPS and therefore have answers for them…Thought of putting them here for members benefit…

(1) Rgdg. Mr. Nishith Arora’s previous venture which he sold off, it was International Typesetting Corporation (ITC) which was acquired by Infomedia in 2006 at INR 52 cr… At that time its turnover was INR 16 cr…

(2) Rgdg. size of Mr. Arora’s BPO venture before acquiring MPS (which he is talking about as operated at high margins) and its margins, maximum scale which his BPO venture reached was INR 20.2 cr. and EBITDA margin range in which it worked was 35-46 % after first year minor loss.

(3) Rgdg. peer Innodata debt status, as at FY14 it was a net cash rich company.

(4) Rgdg. volume growth, although management is fairly transparent and seems perfectly genuine, there seems to be some disconnect here. With VP team now having detailed access to management, I seriously think we need a more clear answer to this by presenting the peer data points to the management. As I have pointed previously too in this thread, SPS is having no pricing pressures and from the YoY value growth that we are seeing for Newgen, TNQ, Amnet, Crest, etc. there seems to an almost impossible case for severe pricing pressure for them as for them to achieve such a value growth with severe pricing pressure that MPS management is talking about, their volume growth should be higher than 50 % YoY which is unlikely in this industry and at the scale they are operating. This is the only point on which I feel management’s words don’t match with actual figures that we are seeing and that we need to accept being genuine analysers.

Will go through the entire session again next week and in case have any other answers to fellow members’ queries will post them.

Rgds.

Discl. - Invested in MPS.


(Donald Francis) #397

Thanks Mahesh as always for taking the discourse further. And providing answers to the gaps !

Yes, its a good idea to present Competition data points again to MPS Management, at Conference Calls and other interactions with Management consistently. We did raise this in the Mgmt Q&A at a first level - MPS wanted to see if FY15 stellar margins reported by SPS sustains in FY16 - before responding further on this point.

We do not find inconsistency in the Management commentary, atleast not yet. From our perspective these are the counter-arguments to your thesis.

  1. We should be careful of comparing Apples to Apples. SPS fits the bill well as it serves the same Customer segment. Newgen doesn’t serve the STM market from what I could see, so that shouldn’t figure in any rational/objective peer comparison chart (http://www.newgensoft.com/customers/)
  2. That almost all other players in STM Market report inferior margins than MPS gives credence to MPS observations on margin pressures faced
  3. It is also consistent with the Publishing Industry dynamics - where most of the large Publishers are struggling with profitability/cost pressures
  4. We suspect SPS higher margins have to do with a mix of two factors a) captive of Springer (there may be long term contracts) which accounts for 50% of the business b) better productivity/efficiency from automation tool-kits and processes

Any others competitors in STM Market with higher margins that you can point to?

Did you cultivate any contacts in the STM Technology Vendor space? We are now primed to extract the most out of any direct interaction with domain specialist folks :smile:


(Mahesh Shah) #398

Hi Donald,

I think you have misunderstood my point…I am not saying that management is saying any lies or something…infact I have been on record in this thread saying that management led by Mr. Nishith Arora has been one of the best and most ethical management I have seen in mid-cap cos…otherwise MPS would have not formed more than 20 % of my family portfolio…but, some facts are facts that we need to accept…It’s just that managements are sometimes hesitant to accept openly them lagging peers and we need to live with that…as I have said in my last post and I repeat that ‘severe’ pricing pressures (which lead to good volume growth but muted value growth) seem to be absent in reasonable peers…SPS, I told before also, could be beneficiary of its parent…

Rgdg., Newgen, my analysis makes me believe that it is in the similar area as MPS (If I remember correctly, even Mr. Arora has told this in the MPS’s initial concalls)…
link that you seem to have provided www.newgensoft.com – is this the same co. or affiliated co. of Newgen Knowledgeworks ?? I have always referred Newgen Knowledgeworks in which PEs are invested and I believe its website is – www.newgen.co – If I am wrong then pardon me but in all the mca filings that I have same website is referred.

TNQ also seem to be a very close l-t-l peer. Its YoY data I have provided before also – its 9 %, 32 % and 35 % for FY12, 13 and 14 respectively with EBITDA margins of 30.4, 23.3 and 42.3 % respectively.

Also, what I have understood of this industry is that when you say l-t-l you have to see the clients and segments it serves…for ex., you can’t compare a player like Impelsys which is largely a platform play with MPS but otherwise what every player including MPS is eventually attempting is to plug the gaps in its offerings and offer maximum it can offer…In that sense even what Mr. Arora tells of his vision to approach its largest peer Aptara’s scale – even Aptara is present in other segments (XBRL) and serves those end clients (BFSI) which I don’t think MPS serves.

To conclude, evenif I see the most closest l-t-l comparable Indian peers like SPS, Newgen or TNQ, I don’t find ‘severe’ pricing pressure that could amount to a single digit organic growth post stabilisation period. This is the only disconnect I can find in story or, specifically speaking, management commentry otherwise the story seems compelling to me personally.
The biggest advantage that I see for MPS in this industry is its positioning…which is slipping every passing year as its reasonable peers are growing that much faster…I see no point in comparing MPS with small peers which have sub-80 or -50 cr. revenues (in my initial posts I have given all the data points wrt different scale cos. Revenue CAGR and EBITDA margins)…MPS surely is well positioned and its credibility is very high but organic growth has to start somewhere for it to be great wealth creator for all of us…company’s operating matrix is excellent with Mr. Rahul Arora also specifically pointing to his focus on improving margins further in recent concall…Mr. Nishith Arora – the great man behind building and divesting ITC at premium rates and then turning around MPS in style has taken the sole responsibility for crucial acquisitions thats also reassuring from investor point-of-view…but two things we need to understand :
(1) Without Organic Growth story will struggle in long run,
(2) EBITDA margins of 35 % + that we see might settle for 25 or max 30 % range as company scales up (even Newgen at consolidated level seems to be operating at 30-32 % margins).

Rgdg. contacts, I think Varadha has some very good contacts in the industry.

Rgds.

( You can refer my September’2014 post in this thread in which I have given all the data points scalewise of different cos.)


(Donald Francis) #399

Mahesh,

Thanks. And sorry for the confusion. My mistake

Let’s focus and dig deeper on SPS http://www.sps.co.in/, NewGen http://www.newgen.co/, and TNQ http://www.tnq.co.in/

@varadharajanr
Re: contacts in the industry, let’s do a call


(chirag jain) #400

I am sorry if I am wrong.

Firstly dividend paying company is categorized as good company and also regarded as company with strong cash flows…agreed.

MPS has good cash flows and also paying healthy dividend payout ratio of 60% .

I have a bit of confusion that though paying dividend is a good policy, but seeing the fact that MPS has still more mileage to go in terms of market share and as well as grow both organic and inorganic ( it raised money recently for acquistions ).

I would like to know whether to pay such high dividend still in nascent stage and miles to go ahead, is it not advisable to hold back the dividend payout or pay dividend in more calibrated fashion and invest more money on technology up-gradation and acquisition to capture more market share.

Agree that management don’t want to overpay for the acquisition but seeing to the stickiness in the business lost of market share risk could be even more detrimental for the company.

Just my thoughts and may be wrong.

Disc : Invested


(Varadharajan Ragunathan) #401

@Mahesh

thanks @Donald - will share my notes. I have spoken to a few guys in the industry and the gist of it was

a. mps mgmt is very good and they know what they are doing
b. they are focussed on margins and would never sacrifice it for growth
c.their sales team doees not have as much mojo as others - partly because they were never used to selling as a macmillan subsidiary - they were a cost centre and had captive business
d. SPI global and Newgen are ahead in terms of growth and profitability. Spi has scale while newgen has a lot of niche IP

I do not know SPS and TNQ. will share financials of newgen and others by this weekend. Also, will check if any of my contacts is willing to talk specifics on these.

Thanks